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Abstract
This dissertation examines domestic culture as a project of nation building in a divided Germany between
1949 and 1989. Soviet and American backing during escalating Cold War tensions pulled East and West
Germans in opposing ideological directions, which they initially expressed in diverging aesthetics.
Historiography on German material culture traditionally concentrates on the East-West competition during
the first two decades of the Cold War. By extending the narrative into the 1970s and 1980s, Germany's
Cold War on Display: The Political Aesthetics of German-German Relations, 1949-1989 argues instead
that internal economic and political collaboration between the two German states created an alternative
to Americanization and Sovietization – a third way that allowed for German cultural rapprochement within
the context of European integration. To display changes in political culture and trace their effect on the
German-German relationship, this study analyses archival documents alongside objects of domestic
culture. This approach includes a discussion of five interior design dimensions: the institutionalization
process, the design discourse, production and consumption processes, furniture trade, and diplomatic
utilization of design. Postwar reconstruction presented the "two countries in one German nation" with
both opportunities and challenges in redefining their nationhood, global position, and cultural reputation.
After initial delineation, East and West Germany's aesthetic convergence began in the mid-1960s with
domestic critiques of their respective political systems. Cultural and economic cooperation following the
1972 Basic Treaty on Germany's status quo enabled both states to detach their handling of the German
Question from superpower policies. One major impulse sought to salvage ties by increasing trade,
resulting in a similar interior design aesthetic that facilitated exports. Other endeavors focused on
normalizing German relations through cultural encounters and political treaties, reconnecting populations
on both sides of the border. Concentrating on similarities and collaboration, this study refocuses
Germany's Cold War - that is, the special relationship between the two German states - and offers a new
context in which to understand the relative stability during four decades of division and considerably
smooth transition to unification in 1990.
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ABSTRACT

GERMANY’S COLD WAR ON DISPLAY:
THE POLITICAL AESTHETICS OF GERMAN-GERMAN RELATIONS, 1949-1989
Katrin Schreiter
Professor Thomas Childers
This dissertation examines domestic culture as a project of nation building in a
divided Germany between 1949 and 1989. Soviet and American backing during
escalating Cold War tensions pulled East and West Germans in opposing ideological
directions, which they initially expressed in diverging aesthetics. Historiography on
German material culture traditionally concentrates on the East-West competition during
the first two decades of the Cold War. By extending the narrative into the 1970s and
1980s, Germany’s Cold War on Display: The Political Aesthetics of German-German
Relations, 1949-1989 argues instead that internal economic and political collaboration
between the two German states created an alternative to Americanization and
Sovietization – a third way that allowed for German cultural rapprochement within the
context of European integration. To display changes in political culture and trace their
effect on the German-German relationship, this study analyses archival documents
alongside objects of domestic culture. This approach includes a discussion of five interior
design dimensions: the institutionalization process, the design discourse, production and
consumption processes, furniture trade, and diplomatic utilization of design. Postwar
reconstruction presented the “two countries in one German nation” with both

vii

opportunities and challenges in redefining their nationhood, global position, and cultural
reputation. After initial delineation, East and West Germany’s aesthetic convergence
began in the mid-1960s with domestic critiques of their respective political systems.
Cultural and economic cooperation following the 1972 Basic Treaty on Germany’s status
quo enabled both states to detach their handling of the German Question from
superpower policies. One major impulse sought to salvage ties by increasing trade,
resulting in a similar interior design aesthetic that facilitated exports. Other endeavors
focused on normalizing German relations through cultural encounters and political
treaties, reconnecting populations on both sides of the border. Concentrating on
similarities and collaboration, this study refocuses Germany’s Cold War – that is, the
special relationship between the two German states – and offers a new context in which
to understand the relative stability during four decades of division and considerably
smooth transition to unification in 1990.
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INTRODUCTION: GERMANY’S COLD WAR ON DISPLAY
With the statement that “the entire German people are called on to achieve by free
self-determination the unity and freedom of Germany,” the 1949 Basic Law of the
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) posed an immediate dilemma to a newly divided
Germany.1 In spite of this proclamation for national unity, four years of allied occupation
had already pulled East and West Germans in different directions. Through Soviet and
American patronage during rising Cold War tensions, Germans identified politically with
their respective bloc alliance rather than with the Germany on the other side of the
border. Moving further away from unification, the German Democratic Republic (GDR)
and the Federal Republic faced the same problem of defining their new state systems.
This study examines domestic culture (Wohnkultur) as a project of nation building in the
two German states to display changes in political culture and how these changes affected
their relationship. Ironically, their attempts at expressing difference unintentionally
created a shared code of ideological inscription in the German everyday. Along the way,
Cold War confrontation evolved into German cooperation through reciprocal influences
and information exchanges in the realm of interior design. But how did material culture
emerge as a recognizable language in the intra-German relationship and which functions
did it serve? To answer these questions, this work offers a new perspective on Germany’s
Cold War by integrating the material and political ambitions of the two German states in
one history of Germany’s aesthetic reconstruction.2
1

Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, 23 May 1949. Emphasis by the author.
In my usage of nouns describing the eastern and the western part of Germany, I tried to refrain from
employing ideologically loaded language. I use the terms “Federal Republic of Germany,” “Federal
Republic,” “German Democratic Republic,” and “GDR” like they would be employed in German – without
any ideological connotation. But the different linguistic traditions in the English language make it
necessary to point out that also the abbreviation “FRG” as well as “West Germany” and “East Germany”
2

2

More than two decades after German unification, the historiography of
Germany’s postwar decades remains starkly divided.3 In the first years after 1989 with
newly available sources, scholars in Europe and the United States produced a flood of
narratives about the East German state. Controversies emerged over the relative stability
of communist rule, which collapsed so suddenly after four decades.4 West Germany’s
seemingly untainted success served as a benchmark against which to measure the East
German past. Even in recent years, seminal syntheses of postwar Germany have handled
the GDR as a footnote to history.5 Scholarship on East Germany has not entered the
mainstream of German history, which still develops largely against the backdrop of the
Third Reich.6 The task for historians of postwar Germany is to offer narratives that, as

are value free denominations for the two German states. Especially the latter allows for an easy
geographical identification. I tried to avoid the shorthand East and West as to not confuse my readers when
I am addressing the larger East-West conflict between the superpowers. However, if I used East and West
in relation to the two German states, then I made the specific meaning evident through context.
3
Elizabeth Harvey evaluated the state of the field of German history instantly after unification in 1990. Her
calls for a useful integrated German history are still echoed today. Elizabeth Harvey, “The Two Germanies:
Recent Publications on the Federal Republic, the German Democratic Republic and the German Question,”
The Historical Journal 33, no. 4 (1990): 953-970; H-German Forum on the integration of postwar German
history, January and February 2011.
4
The range of explanations for the GDR’s stability reaches from the intimidation of the population through
the surveillance state (Überwachungsstaat), over the political structures of a dictatorship of mass
organizations to the social consensus induced by the welfare state (Konrad Jarausch’s Fürsorgestaat) and
the niche society (Nischengesellschaft). Most of these approaches are marked by at times implicit, but often
explicit comparisons with the Third Reich and its historiography. These comparative studies of the two
German dictatorships convince through the apparent parallels of the one-party state. In England, a group of
scholars has focused on the seemingly contradictory ways in which the stability of the GDR worked in the
social realm. Mary Fulbrook, Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR, 1949-1989 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1995); Jeannette Z. Madarász, Conflict and Compromise in East Germany, 1971-1989: A
Precarious Stability (Houndmills: Macmillan, 2003); Catherine Epstein, The Last Revolutionaries: German
Communists and Their Century (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003). A similar approach has
been taken by Andrew I. Port, Conflict and Stability in the German Democratic Republic (New York:
Cambridge University Press. 2007).
5
Hans-Ulrich Wehler, Deutsche Gesellschaftsgeschichte IV (Munich: C.H. Beck, 2008), pp. xv-xvi;
Heinrich August Winkler, Der lange Weg nach Westen II: Deutsche Geschichte 1933-1990 (Munich: C.H.
Beck, 2000), Edgar Wolfrum, Die geglückte Demokratie: Geschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland von
ihren Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2006).
6
Exceptions to the rule present studies that compare how the two German states came to terms with the
Nazi past. See for example Jürgen Danyel (ed.), Die geteilte Vergangenheit. Zum Umgang mit
Nationalsozialismus und Widerstand in beiden deutschen Staaten (Berlin: Akademie, 1995).

3

Konrad Jarausch put it, “break out of the straight-jacket of parallel stories” and instead
look at mutual influence and internal relationships.7
At the heart of this literature is the problem of how to bring together the history of
two competing systems so deeply connected to the bipolar Cold War climate. Detailed
analysis of what held Germans together still needs to be undertaken. Why did the GDR
not emulate the Austrian path and emerge as a distinct state in its own right? If cultural
nationalism is the dominant explanation for the special “German-German” relationship,
why does this not apply to the Germans of Switzerland – who have created instead a
nation of multiple ethnicities? The unification of 1990, enveloping the former GDR into
the Federal Republic, must be examined without the teleological assumption that East
and West Germany are easily identified as one nation. After all, nobody in Germany, East
or West, believed that reunification would be possible up to the point when it actually
happened.8 With these problems in mind, the challenge is to present a methodological
alternative in approaching the German past that highlights the interconnectedness of the
two states.
Germany’s postwar division posed a great problem: redefining the nation after
German nationalism had been unmasked as ruthless and cruel in the first half of the

7

Konrad Jarausch, “Divided, Yet Reunited - The Challenge of Integrating German Post-War Histories,” HGerman Forum, 1 February 2011.
8
Literature has explored very different factors that play a role in illuminating the sudden collapse of the
GDR: the changing international system of the Cold War, the lacking political-military support by the
Soviet Union, the immanent state bankruptcy after four decades of command economy and the resulting
failure to fulfill the population’s consumer demands. What is striking is the isolated examination of the
GDR – the Federal Republic plays only a role insofar as it is the objectionable opposite and the ideology to
be defeated. See Ina Merkel, Utopie und Bedürfnis: Die Geschichte der Konsumkultur in der DDR
(Cologne: Böhlau, 1999); Raymond Stokes, Constructing Socialism: Technology and Change in East
Germany 1945-1990 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000); Jonathan R. Zatlin, The
Currency of Socialism: Money and Political Culture in East Germany (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2007).

4

twentieth century. With the horrors of the Second World War and the genocide of
Europe’s Jewish population fresh in mind, the racial nationalism of the Third Reich
complicated the search for acceptable political values. Nationalistic definitions that
stressed German exceptionality became unacceptable, to which the West German
decision to remove the first stanza from the German national anthem aptly attests.
Germany should never again aspire to stand “above everything in the world.”9 In a
parallel development, allied involvement and policy prescription left the population with
a sense of insecurity about the origins of the states, which hindered their political
identification with postwar Germany. Facing Germans’ retreat from public life after years
of mobilization in mass organizations and the military, politicians in the two German
states followed them into the living room and politicized the German home. In
cooperation with cultural and economic elites they employed interior design to create
distinct national domestic cultures as integrative concepts that communicated the new
political order.
The political dimension of German interiors has, of course, been acknowledged
by the literature on the history of public housing. Discussions of the early twentieth
century reform movements, such as the Werkbund and the Bauhaus, have debated past
visions of “everything from the spoon to the city” for the aesthetic uplift of the lower
classes. While these attempts have been coined an elitist failure, scholars agree on the
success of the pioneering work of New Architecture (Neues Bauen) and the closely
connected New Objectivity (Neue Sachlichkeit), which revolutionized the structural
9

The first stanza of the Song of the Germans began with the words “Deutschland, Deutschland über alles,
über alles in der Welt.” After two world wars, these lines had received a strong expansionist meaning. To
regain the trust of the international community, the German successor states wanted to prove that they
practiced collaboration and diplomacy instead of military aggression.

5

conditions in workers’ living quarters in the Frankfurt am Main of the 1920s.

10

The

housing shortage after the destruction of the Second World War guaranteed that such
socio-political programs remained a central part of national politics in the FRG and the
GDR alike. However, this time the effort did not simply aim at creating the architectural
shell of the German home; rather, both German states utilized the opportunity of the
bomb-shattered towns to bring the new reality of the German division into the private
sphere.11
Building on these accounts of earlier reform movements, a new school of German
design history has emerged that finds strong national impulses in the making of postwar
material culture. Treatments of the modernist heritage in West German everyday design
focus on the political reinvigoration of a (West) German national style, while analyses of
East German cultural policy discuss it as an embodiment of a socialist modern identity.12
Both strands of literature gesture to the respective other part of Germany, but a balanced
10

Heinz Hirdina, Neues Bauen, Neues Gestalten. Das neue Frankfurt/Die neue Stadt: eine Zeitschrift
zwischen 1926 und 1933, Amt für Industrielle Formgestaltung, ed. (Berlin: Elefanten Press 1984); Andreas
Butter, Neues Leben, Neues Bauen: Die Moderne in der Architektur der SBZ/DDR 1945-1951 (Berlin:
Hans Schiller, 2006);
Joan Campbell, The German Werkbund: The Politics of Reform in the Applied Arts (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1978); Christina Biundo and others, Bauhaus-Ideen 1919-1994. Bibliographie und
Beiträge zur Rezeption des Bauhausgedankens (Berlin: Reimer, 1994).
11
Werner Durth, “Kontraste und Parallelen: Architektur und Städtebau in West und Ostdeutschland,” in
Axel Schildt, Arnold Sywottek, eds., Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau: Die westdeutsche Gesellschaft der
50er Jahre (Bonn: Dietz, 1993).
12
Paul Betts, The Authority of Everyday Objects: A Cultural History of West German Industrial Design
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), Katherine Pence and Paul Betts, Socialist Modern: East
German Everyday Culture and Politics (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008); and Eli Rubin,
Synthetic Socialism: Plastics & Dictatorship in the German Democratic Republic (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press, 2008) offer the most widely read interpretations of industrial design in postwar
Germany. German literature on the topic is represented by Christopher Oestereich “Gute Form” im
Wiederaufbau: Zur Geschichte der Produktgestaltung in Westdeutschland nach 1945 (Berlin: Lukas, 2000)
and Gert Selle, “Das Produktdesign der 50er Jahre: Rückgriff in die Entwurfsgeschichte, vollendete
Modernisierung des Alltagsinventars oder Vorbote der Postmoderne?” in Axel Schildt, Arnold Sywottek,
eds., Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau: Die westdeutsche Gesellschaft der 50er Jahre (Bonn: Dietz, 1993),
612-624; and Gert Selle, Geschichte des Design in Deutschland, Second Edition (Frankfurt: Campus,
[1994] 2007). Ronald Stade offers an account of the politics behind GDR aesthetics in “Designs of Identity:
The Politics of aesthetics in the GDR, “ Ethnos 58, no. 3/4 (1993): 241-258.

6

analysis remains to be written. Recently, Greg Castillo’s work on the “soft power” of
midcentury design has provided a first comparative study of political utilization of
modern design principles in the two German states’ mutual dealings.13 However, he
focuses foremost on the superpower struggle over cultural domination of Germany. Like
most scholars in this field, he limits his examination of cultural policy to the first two
postwar decades, a period marked by intense competition between eastern and western
ways of life. As a result, such studies subordinate internal German relations to the larger
picture of bloc alliance in the East-West superpower conflict. On closer examination,
however, this period of delineation should be understood as a prelude to the détente of the
1970s. As the signing of the German Basic Treaty in 1972 “normalized” the antagonistic
relationship between the two German states, a long-term analysis that expands to 1989
can provide insights into a more diverse political utilization of German material culture –
and thus into the internal German relationship – than has been known so far.
In addition to extending the chronological parameters of the literature, a fruitful
examination of German material culture needs to bring back into focus Germany itself
and the relationship between its two parts. The East-West conflict’s tensions left Europe
with the problem of whether or not Germany should be able to unite and which role it
should play in the region. While this “German Question” lost its political urgency after
the peaceful unification of 1990, it is still part and parcel of its Cold War history. Over
the past decade, a renewed historical interest in the German Cold War has brought

13

Greg Castillo, Cold War on the Home Front: The Soft Power of Midcentury Design (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2010). Design historian Jeremy Aynsley’s account of at times parallel, at
times opposing East and West German aesthetic developments covers the entire Cold War period: Jeremy
Aynsley, Designing Modern Germany (London: Reaktion Books, 2009).

7

forward studies that approach it from both cultural and political perspectives.

14

Diplomatic and international historians have looked at the German Question mostly from
the nervous perspective of its European neighbors or in regards to the national security
concerns of the Soviet Union and the United States. The general consensus finds that
nobody but the Germans themselves desired unity.15 Superpower attempts at containing
each part of Germany within their sphere of influence has led cultural historians of the
Cold War to look at German political, cultural, and economic development through the
lens of Americanization and/or Sovietization.16 While these paradigms have long
dominated the analysis of postwar Germany, over the past decade Americanization has
been challenged by a more inclusive concept of Westernization, which sees cultural and
social practices in Germany as products of a constant exchange of ideas between Europe
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and North America. Looking at the Cold War from the German perspective, it becomes
evident that after the initial postwar years under the Marshall Plan, Western European
influences dominated cultural and economic considerations of Wohnkultur.
Finally, the literature on economic reconstruction must also be considered. The
importance of economic success for political legitimacy in the East-West competition has
long been acknowledged.18 Taking the capability to offer the population a comfortable
and adequate standard of living as the ultimate marker of economic success has led many
cultural studies to evaluate economic performance exclusively based on consumer
satisfaction.19 This interpretation is consistent with a general shift in postwar European
economic behavior when consumption started to take precedence over social security,
trading rights for goods.20 Product design served as lingua franca in the Cold War
competition, as exemplified by the famous Kitchen Debate between Khrushchev and
Nixon in 1959.21 What differentiated the situation in the German context decisively from
the Soviet-American conflict is the shared cultural heritage – it was not just a competition
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for economic preeminence between East and West Germany; it was also a rediscovery of
forgotten similarities.
It is true that German-German relations during the Cold War represented a
piecemeal effort to coexist in a geopolitical situation marked by rising superpower
tensions. East Germany’s wish to delineate itself from the West stood against West
Germany’s claim to sole German representation and its official refusal to acknowledge
the GDR. Nevertheless, they kept open avenues of interaction in the hopes of salvaging
what was left of the cultural and economic (not to mention familial) bonds between them.
These channels of communication were subject to constant redefinition, entangling both
countries in formal as well as informal interactions. In examining a process of
rapprochement, there are always the pitfalls of teleology that do a disservice to the
historian’s task of exploring patterns of past developments. Convergence theory of the
1960s predicted the inevitable rapprochement of capitalist and socialist countries. Facing
the same challenges of the industrial age, the theory assumed, both systems would solve
their respective problems with similar technological means, which eventually would
create the same social and political modernity. East and West Germany, left to deal with
the wartime destruction of their infrastructure and industry, might seem like ideal
candidates for applying this theory. On closer examination, however, convergence
implies a kind of linear determinism that overlooks the internal relationship that bound
the two German states together. Going beyond parallel histories of convergence, this
study examines processes, mechanisms, visual and spatial concepts as well as
institutional and individual agency in the realm of Wohnkultur. This approach to the
German past allows insights into mutual provocation and cooperation in the field of
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cultural policy. At the center stands the question of how both Germanys turned a
competitive situation, the aestheticization of the respective political orders in German
material culture, into a diplomatic tool for reconciliation.
In an effort to integrate the narratives of postwar Germany, this dissertation
explores the emerging internal relationship between East and West Germany by
examining their respective cultural strategies for negotiating a modus vivendi through the
medium of industrial design. In approaching this problem, I am using the perspective of
material culture. Scholars, especially folklorists and anthropologists, have used material
culture as a lens to reconstruct the histories of past societies.22 Material culture as an
analytical perspective assumes that the entirety of material culture represents the values
of the people who commission, produce, consume or use these objects; and by extension,
it presupposes that they represent the values of the entire society to which they belong.
Moreover, material culture is a type of historical evidence that does not contain the
abstract qualities of language, which can render archival sources problematic. Words and
their meaning are mediated through social context; there is no logical connection between
the signifier and the signified. Words convey meaning. On the contrary “things both
embody meaning and convey that meaning” at the same time.23 In accord with this
anthropological methodology, historian Leora Auslander once coined the term “the
communicative capacity of objects” in her groundbreaking study Taste and Power:
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Furnishing Modern France. By using material culture as a way of historical inquiry for
the twentieth century, I investigate the articulation of political messages in material
evidence as well as the ends to which they were employed. With a mixed methodology of
material culture and traditional archival research, this study traces ideological inscription
in German Wohnkultur and how they incidentally contributed to a growing GermanGerman understanding.
My analysis focuses on five different, but connected, dimensions of materiality:
the politicization of aesthetics, the intellectual discourse about their meaning, the
realization of aesthetics in the economic spheres of production and consumption, the
aesthetic dialectic of the retail and export market, and the use of objects toward
diplomatic ends. Such a project required a structured research technique that started with
the archival documents of the Federal Republic in the Bundesarchiv Koblenz and the
papers of the GDR in the Bundesarchiv branch in Berlin to establish the institutional
system surrounding official aesthetics. In a next step, design magazines, advice literature,
and exhibition catalogs offered insights into the theoretical meaning of material aesthetics
and its change over time. Interviews with former East and West German designers and
politicians have been instrumental in closing gaps in the archival documentation of
technological and aesthetic development in industrial design. They also offered valuable
insights into the lived reality of Cold War Germany. In addition, visits to furniture
manufacturers and retailers helped to establish the technological, material, and
infrastructural challenges in furniture production. Finally, a return to the archives, this
time focusing on the smaller design archives of the Rat für Formgebung in Frankfurt as
24
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well as the Werkbund and the Sammlung industrielle Gestaltung’s uncataloged collection
in Berlin, and the Design Archives in Brighton helped in establishing the diplomatic
operationalization of material culture. Finally, the government of the Federal Republic of
Germany provided me the opportunity to see previously inaccessible documents on the
cultural activities of the FRG Ministry of Economics and the Permanent Representation
in East Berlin.
It should be pointed out that this study is based on idealized archetypes of
furniture and interior design visions. Design historians have grappled with the problem
that most surviving visual representations were originally produced for publication in
catalogs, coffee table books, and advice literature or to document exhibition displays.
These idealized depictions of interiors have little in common with the way in which
furniture is reappropriated in real life situations.25 Consumers collect specific objects
from among the vast impersonal array of goods on display and then arrange them in
personally meaningful ways.26 Similarly, these limitations apply to the documentation of
German material culture. First, both the GDR and the FRG relied on such ideal interior
design settings for their political projects of postwar nation building – a project of
projecting an ideological identity onto the German people through streamlined and
consistent life styles. Second, consumers remain a corrective to these ideal scenarios of
Wohnkultur. While parts of the population might have actually liked the official
aesthetics, the consistent application of the style was rarely executed successfully.
Furniture is expensive and cannot easily be replaced on a working-class or even middle25
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class budget. Therefore, the problem of “wrong” or impure appropriation comes into
play: one modern piece in an otherwise diversely assorted living room, such as a Cubist
vase on a Chippendale sideboard, perhaps even placed on a lace table cloth to protect the
antique wood, obliterates the entire aesthetic concept. The existence of different tastes
equally complicates stylistic consistency: with increasing individualization of the
societies in East and West Germany life styles diversified, which was often expressed in
customized interior designs.27
This study focuses predominately on cultural events and educational programs,
which serve as indicators of official aesthetics. Design exhibitions provide a window into
the ties between politics and aesthetics. Whether domestic or international, both East and
West German design shows offer insights into the operationalization of material values
for political goals. While national exhibits intended to enlighten the population about the
‘right’ consumption, the international exhibitions aimed at political image improvement.
Both exhibition types were rooted in the conviction that aesthetic progress communicates
ethical betterment – and the German living room served as moral compass. In this
scenario, the consumer served as a benchmark against which to evaluate the success of
the two states in implementing their ideal aesthetics in the everyday. This analysis of
domestic design sheds light on the processes by which Germany became molded into
East and West, acculturated in post-Nazism and postwar modernities. Moreover, it also
reveals how conceptions of domestic products changed Germans’ view of each other
27
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throughout this transformation and brings into focus the complex challenge to create a
material identity, a brand that binds together people and signifies ideological allegiance.
To effectively illustrate change over time, this study consists of two parts. The
first part develops against the backdrop of East German delineation policy
(Abgrenzungspolitik) and the West German claim to single German representation
(Alleinvertretungsanspruch) by paying special attention to mutual pressures, action, and
reaction. In the immediate postwar years, cultural delineation happened alongside the
creation of new institutions for product design in both German states. By illustrating how
interior design served as an aesthetic expression of East-West demarcation, it also
examines avenues to project their new image to the international community. These
efforts combined cultural and economic considerations to create a national brand,
imprinting ideological principles onto domestic culture by prescribing official aesthetics
in the making of a national domestic culture. These issues are further explored in the
context of design discourse and consumer education, which presented additional efforts
to align the population with the national brand. However, the two German states also
depended on the participation of the production sector to forge this cohesive aesthetic. An
analysis of the two German economies’ ability to foster a national brand narrative against
the market behavior of producers and consumers shows how regional structures
undermined national aesthetic coherence. In the 1960s, rapid industrial growth challenged
the cultural preeminence of design institutions in the two Germany states. Industrial and
economic interests prevailed, subsuming the quest for a national aesthetic into broader
considerations of productivity, efficiency, and marketability. Strong inflections of
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regionalism, including regional industrial traditions in the GDR and regional politics in
the FRG, weakened the coherence of national branding further.
In the second part the focus shifts from the analytical emphasis of GermanGerman delineation policies to cultural-economic convergence and diplomatic
cooperation as a specific German way of Cold War détente. It first explores intra-German
trade within the context of the European Economic Community. West German insistence
on the unresolved nature of the German Question led to the territorial integration of the
GDR into the EEC and thus the Common Market. As East German consumer goods
production grew dependent on trade with the West in the 1970s, the GDR chose to
compromise its official aesthetic, using Western furniture styles to cater to their Western
customers.

Finally,

this

part

traces

German

product

design’s

diplomatic

operationalization in relation to the question of East German international recognition
and German-German relations between 1960 and 1989. The two German states were
concerned about questions of representation, nationhood, and a basic modus vivendi. By
looking at membership in the international design organization ICSID, industrial design
exhibitions, and finally German-German cultural negotiations following the Basic Treaty,
it follows the process by which the two German states grew in international importance in
relationship to one another.
Postwar reconstruction presented both opportunities and challenges to the “two
countries in one German nation” in redefining their nationhood, global position, and
cultural reputation. This process was neither as contrarian nor as malicious as the
traditional focus on intra-German competition and demarcation policies suggests. Rather,
this study adds to the German material culture historiography by extending the narrative
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into the 1970s and 1980s to show how internal economic and political negotiations
created a third space next to Americanization and Sovietization that allowed for cultural
rapprochement within the context of European integration. One major impulse sought to
salvage ties by increasing trade, resulting in a similar interior design aesthetic that
facilitated exports. Other endeavors focused on normalizing German relations through
cultural encounters and political treaties, reconnecting populations on both sides of the
border. By looking at similarities and collaboration, this study of material culture in
combination with the economic dimensions of the German Question attempts to provide
an alternative to traditional Cold War histories of Germany that emphasize rivalry. It is
an attempt at refocusing Germany’s Cold War – that is the special relationship between
the two German states – and explaining the relative stability during four decades of
division as well as the considerably smooth transition to unification in 1990.
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CHAPTER 1: POLITICIZATION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
INDUSTRIAL DESIGN IN EAST AND WEST GERMANY
Introduction
In 1967, Walter Gropius, the founder of the Bauhaus movement and then émigré
to the United States, wrote to the Federal Republic of Germany’s Ministry of Economics
to intervene in the contemporary debate around state-funded design institutions.
Expressing his astonishment about the Federal Republic’s limited use of Good Design for
economic purposes to enhance the national prestige of its production, Gropius warned
that Germany was making an enormous mistake: “More than ever, I am convinced that
the solution to cultural-political questions touched upon by design belong at the center of
public interest, not the periphery.” After all, design movements such as the Deutscher
Werkbund and the Bauhaus had once instituted German leadership in modernist, socially
conscious aesthetics. Convinced that “the Bauhaus tradition has been appraised
inaccurately” by the political and cultural elites in Germany, the Bauhaus founder
identified “a lack of connections to power figures in government and economy after the
War” as the real reason for this negligence.28
While personally invested in the debate about German cultural identity, the
expatriate Gropius could not have been farther off the mark with his evaluation of
industrial design in Germany. After the end of the Second World War, Germans created a
new, democratic society particularly by drawing on their cultural resources of the preand interwar periods. One area in Germany’s cultural reconstruction that received much
attention due to pressing demands for housing, and consequently furniture, was interior
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design. The combination of scarce materials and the dire economic situation of the
immediate postwar years made economical production mandatory and placed design at
the center of the government’s political and economic considerations.29 Required to use
resources more efficiently, officials looked for institutional solutions to forge greater
coherence among the different participants in the production and consumption processes.
Cultural and political elites developed the idea of institutions that would professionalize
designers, acquaint producers with the merits of quality design, and educate consumers in
questions of style and taste to create the “right” demand. Contrary to Gropius’ assertion,
design specialists of the interwar years, the members of the Werkbund and Bauhaus in
particular, pioneered the process of aesthetic reinvention on the political and the
educational level. Moreover, the aesthetic, utilitarian philosophy of interwar modernism
served as a point of reference, both as an aspired ideal and a rejected foil, which framed
the German reconstruction effort (see figure 1).
What happened during this period of design institutionalization in the years 1945
to 1967 that led Gropius to assume that postwar Germany had light-heartedly passed up
the legacy of Bauhaus modernism? To answer this question this chapter follows debates
evolving around the politicization of aesthetics as well as their institutionalization in East
and West Germany from a comparative perspective. Looking at interlinking domestic and
international tensions in postwar culture and politics, this chapter explores the conception
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of the West German design council Rat für Formgebung and the East German Amt für
industrielle Formgestaltung, as well as its predecessors. It will become clear that more
was at stake than the most economical re-building of the two German states. Rather, these
debates illustrate the cultural and political reconfiguration of two divergent German
political systems, marred by their National Socialist past, whose attempts at rehabilitation
extended from the public sphere all the way into the homes of the population. While
much research has been done on similar themes from separate national sides, the
comparison adds an analytical layer that uncovers the ideological underpinnings of
postwar interior design in the context of the open German Question. As a unified future
moved out of reach, the two German states explored diverging aesthetic options to
develop identities for their part of the country. In dealing with the Nazi legacy, the
process resulted in different structures of state organization on the one hand and cultural
philosophies on the other. The comparison between East and West can thus further our
understanding of how political and structural differences influenced the ability of
modernism’s disciples to realize their vision of post-fascist modernity in democratic and
socialist societies.
While this chapter tells an economic-cultural story that connects the two postwar
Germanys, it casts the net of German aesthetic re-civilization wider to illuminate the
international context in which this took place. Swedish and British state design
institutions inspired the German institutionalization of design, a novelty in German
government structure. Especially the British example served as a point of reference for
both the West German Rat für Formgebung and the East German Amt für
Formgestaltung. Dedicated to quality control, consumer education, and national
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trademark promotion, these institutions were decisive in shaping a cohesive aesthetic for
their national design and projecting a modern image abroad.30 In 1944, Britain
established the Council of Industrial Design “to promote by all practicable means the
improvement of design in the products of British industry,” taking advantage of a
material new beginning during reconstruction.31 Facing similar challenges in turning a
war economy to peacetime production, the parallels with Britain influenced the German
institutionalization of industrial design. On the other hand, in both parts of Germany the
occupiers hampered the development of pronounced German designs as both the
Americans and the Soviets tried to envelop their part of Germany culturally into their
sphere of influence. Throughout the reconstruction period, the reception of American and
Soviet influences remained contentious. While the critique of Americanization in West
Germany became part of cultural debates, in the East open criticism of Sovietization
remained rare. Instead the GDR explored its socialist culture with consistent reliance on
its national cultural heritage. Benefitting from other national examples, yet pushing
against external forces, both Germanys used material culture to navigate their way out of
the long shadow of the Third Reich.
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The Long Shadow of National Socialism: Reinterpreting German Modernism
In contrast to painting or representative architecture, the Nazis never fully
coordinated the field of industrial design. Instead, the Third Reich integrated Weimar
modernism into its reactionary politics by instilling it with new meaning.32 In terms of
aesthetics, industrial design in Germany did not change very much from 1925 to 1965,
“what did change […] was the cultural meaning and representation of design, as the very
same objects were embraced by dramatically incongruous political regimes as visual
markers of their specific political projects.”33 This emphasis on aesthetic continuity opens
up a myriad of analytical avenues, which warrant exploration: how did this continuity
shape postwar relationship between politics and design, between people and things, and,
last but not least, between the two German states? All these arenas were highly
influenced by the activism of the East and West German political and cultural elites who,
in contrast to Gropius’ assertions, molded Germany’s post-fascist culture specifically
against the backdrop of Weimar’s classical modernism.
De-Nazification constituted one of the most important factors shaping the
aesthetic culture that emerged after 1945.34 In a turn away from the visual politics of
fascism that emphasized the aestheticization of the relationship between people in the
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public arena, such as Albert Speer’s grandiose productions for NSDAP mass rallies, the
post-fascist campaign to aestheticize the relations between people and things focused on
the private sphere.35 In an effort to overcome the administrative and economic divisions,
both the eastern and western zones of Germany encouraged the institutionalization of
design with the deliberate goal of maintaining a unified cultural identity. Personal
networks of architects and designers reconnected to work on the cultural reorganization
of Germany after the abyss of the Third Reich. Many of them had been students of the
Bauhaus or members of professional organizations, such as the Deutscher Werkbund, an
association of artists and esthete industrialists founded in 1907 with a long tradition of
involvement in German cultural politics.36
The Werkbund of the pre- and interwar years adopted the European turn-of-thecentury trend towards “social aesthetics” as the association’s cause. In order to realize
their vision for the age of mechanization, Werkbund members, theorists and practitioners
alike, looked to reconcile industrial production (standardization) and design
(spiritualization) in aesthetic, social and economic regards. In accord with contemporary
debates about the virtues and vices of production mechanization, the Werkbund
contemplated how design should adapt to industrialization, which was generally
perceived as a threat to traditional craftsmanship and the cultural value of goods.
However, they also stood against the, by then considered backwards looking, Arts and
Crafts principles: “Unnecessary ornament was avoided, and the quality of objectivity
could be achieved through adopting a rational approach to form-giving, guided by the
35
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requirements of engineering and technology, which were deeply respected.”

37

Debates

about the aesthetics of mechanization resulted in the rationalization of industrial shapes.
In later years, the credo “form follows function” united the Bauhaus with these
Werkbund ideas.38 Emphasizing the use of quality materials and simple, functional
shapes, the association promoted the concept of Good Design (Gute Form) as a middle
ground to introduce a material culture of modern everyday objects.39
The initial idea that encouraged the creation of the Werkbund was closely
connected to fears of German cultural and economic demise. In reaction to the late
nineteenth-century British disdain for German wares — the label “Made in Germany”
was first introduced with Britain’s 1887 Merchandise Marks Act to warn English
consumers of German low-quality products40 — the prevention of kitsch became a
guiding thought in the aesthetic reform movements of the early twentieth century.41 The
37
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unique existence. These copies can be put “into situations which would be out of reach for the original
38
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Werkbund’s approach to the kitsch problem focused on a correct use of resources that
rejected the unnatural, the pretentious, and the overly ornamented in both materials and
form.42 Products manufactured to look like something else, for example a cheap clear
plastic vase that is made to look like an expensive crystal vase, would fall into the
Werkbund concept of kitsch. However, the movement realized that enterprises would not
change their successful production patterns until the consumers would demand highquality products and, accordingly, Werkbund members concentrated their efforts of taste
education on the consuming population. Such sociological approach to kitsch prevention,
though, necessitated its adaptation to the ruling social order and economic system. While
the underlying aesthetic principles did not change much between the 1920s to the 1960s,
Germany’s tumultuous history in the first half of the twentieth century continuously
affected the political environment in which the Werkbund operated.
In order to fully appreciate the Werkbund’s ability to adapt their cultural concepts
to the ideological needs of the respective leaderships, this period of changing political
environments warrants closer examination. In the pre-1914 context of the empire, the
Werkbund emphasized the moral and educational value of everyday objects. In particular
leftists among the Werkbund members envisioned a social reconstitution of everything
“from the spoon to the city.”43 The post-WWI era saw an expansion and radicalization of
design conceptions, which came to the forefront particularly in urban planning and public
itself.” Walter Benjamin, Iluminations, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken
Books, 2007), 220-221. Displacement or unintended use of things create kitsch. For example, copies of
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housing. “Neues Bauen” in Frankfurt and the 1927 Weissenhofsiedlung in Stuttgart
remain the most consistent testimony to this period of state and municipal funded design.
The Depression abruptly ended state support in 1929, leaving many ideas for the
industrial age unexplored, and the Werkbund henceforth had to struggle with its
association to the vision of failed industrialism. Modern architecture stalled, but a
softened Bauhaus modernism became successful after 1929 in the new machine aesthetic
in everyday objects.44 The commercialization of modern design had a negative effect on
the social grounding of modernism as it “went hand in hand with the disappearance of its
former reform idealism. The once powerful political pathos of functionalism had given
way to a severe Neue Sachlichkeit divorced from any real social vision.”45 Furthermore,
the movement came under crossfire both from the political left and right. Throughout the
Weimar Republic, the Werkbund ideals for industrial modernism presented a provocation
to cultural conservatives who feared that industrialization would do away with distinctly
German culture. On the left, radical Marxist condemned Werkbund elitism as detached
from the masses, wasting their talents on designing luxuries.46 With the Nazi seizure of
power, the Werkbund ceased to exist as a private association and was brought first under
the jurisdiction of Goebbel’s Reich Chamber of the Visual Arts (Reichskammer der
bildenden Künste) and later under that of the Reich Chamber of Culture
(Reichskulturkammer).47 Contrary to their different political outlook, Werkbund
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industrial modernism and Nazi culture, despite its agricultural “blood and soil” ideology,
proved to be compatible at least in the realm of industry, rationalization, and
propaganda.48
Werkbund members continued their aesthetic mission under Nazi rule, at least
until 1939 when the war put a halt to the Werkbund ideal of quality work.49 Especially
the struggle against kitsch, which was directed against Nazi paraphernalia in the name of
a more dignified German material culture, presented a rich field of work for taste
reformers in the Third Reich.50 While the Nazis thus controlled the commercial exploit
of their political symbols, they re-appropriated leftist aesthetics of Neue Sachlichkeit for
their own goals, especially in the work environment. With Alfred Speer’s Beauty of
Labor (Schönheit der Arbeit) program, the Werkbund goals were turned on their head:
instead of the ennoblement of the worker, the aesthetic restructuring of the workplace
now adjusted the worker to the repressive labor system in factories.51 The resulting
aesthetic was a softened version of Neue Sachlichkeit, a Nazi modernism that
emphasized technological advancement and functionality with the ultimate aim of
increasing productivity in preparation for war.52
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It was this corporative and aesthetic legacy then, against which the Werkbund had
to reconstitute the movement after the Second World War.53 Indeed, its problematic
involvement with the Nazi regime was something that the Werkbund desired to leave in
the past. The tabula rasa of devastated and bombed-out cities of the Second World War
offered the Werkbund a new beginning and manifold opportunities for imprinting its
principles into the new material culture. During the years of want, the Werkbund
reconnected with its original moral and social vision, but transplanted it into a more
industrialized and globalized postwar era. An educational impetus as well as a purposeoriented aesthetic mission drove this reform movement, which meant a certain revival of
Weimar modernism.54

Reconstruction Design in the two German States
Immediately after the war, the Werkbund re-established itself in regional groups
in the eastern and western occupation zones in cities like Dresden, East and West Berlin,
Düsseldorf, and Stuttgart. The association quickly gained official recognition with the
western authorities. By the summer of 1948, regional governments subsidized the
Werkbund group West-Nord with 10,000 DM annually and the Bavarian cultural ministry
gave its regional DWB group considerably more with 60,000 DM per year.55 The
regional administration’s subsidies signify an acknowledgement of design as part of the
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reconstruction effort and illustrate an early flirtation with modernist aesthetics in the
West. This regional cooperation moreover considerably facilitated the Werkbund’s later
involvement in the foundation of a West German design council that would continue the
movement’s mission to prevent the production of kitsch and to continuously educate the
consumer about the “right” consumption.
Soon thereafter, the Werkbund started its bids for aesthetic leadership in the
Federal Republic with two domestic culture exhibitions put on in Cologne in 1949. New
Dwelling (Neues Wohnen) and New Architecture since 1945 (Neue Architektur seit 1945)
showed modernist solutions for the bombed-out cities in Germany’s west that design
historian Jeremy Aynsley describes as “prescriptive visions of design ideals.”56 “[The
exhibitions] were strongly influenced by developments in Scandinavia, Switzerland and
the United States since 1933,” but with its reliance on abstraction for the organization of
products in the displays, they still represented powerfully Werkbund ideals.57 Promoting
pure minimalism in furnishings, New Dwelling prescribed Germans modesty in their
consumer behavior based on moral choice and collective commitment to counter the
corrupting influence of materialism based on false abundance or pretentious
ornamentation.58 Right away, the Werkbund tied its tradition of taste education
(Geschmacksbildung) in with their struggle against kitsch and its implications for social
decay in postwar Germany.59 Photographs from this exhibition show multi-functional
room settings that no other term then “empty” could describe better. This asceticism
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stemmed from the poor state of the German economy, underscored by a product range
that started with furniture dating back several decades to hardly finished prototypes, as
well as the Werkbund’s renewed endeavor to lead in the invention of socially responsible
aesthetics. A placard with the words “Werkbund is no Luxury” (Werkbund ist kein Luxus)
advertised a new outlook on the failed interwar mission: to make affordable Good Design
products for the masses.60
At the same time, the eastern Werkbund increasingly lost its political influence
with the centralization of politics in the Soviet zone of occupation. The Soviet Military
Administration’s (SVAG) installed exclusive political leadership with the Socialist Unity
Party as early as 1946.61 Irritated by the following coercive centralization of most cultural
fields, prominent Werkbund members such as industrial designer Wilhelm Wagenfeld in
East Berlin and architect Egon Eiermann in Dresden moved to the West. Yet others
committed to the Werkbund and Bauhaus principles with stronger social(ist) ideals, such
as industrial designers Mart Stam and Horst Michel as well as the architect Selman
Selmanagic, remained in the eastern zone.62 The SVAG opened schools for the education
of designers, beginning with the Weimar University for Architecture and the Arts in
1946. Weimar, significant as the location of the first Bauhaus school, remained a
gravitation center for artists, architects, and designers after the Second World War. Horst
Michel, educated at the Berlin University for the Arts and an experienced member of
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architect and interior designer Bruno Paul’s studio, started an industrial design program
in Weimar in response to the deprived population’s material needs. Provincial Weimar
was the perfect location to reconstitute East Germany’s material culture as it afforded
Michel and the school with close ties to the local industries.64
In contrast to his West German counterparts who experienced practically
unlimited possibilities in their approach to industrial design, Michel’s work increasingly
became circumscribed by socialist ideology and constraints of nascent political
centralization. The challenge lay in materially expressing the immaterial virtues of
socialism, which, Michel recognized, entailed not only the aesthetic education of
designers in order to influence production, but also that of consumers to create the right
demand for a socialist domestic environment. In Michel’s eyes, durability, honesty,
effective use of materials, reduced storage and transportation costs, and the avoidance of
moral decay and pretension of value appreciation via “unauthentic” materials or
embellished surfaces marked good socialist design.65 These qualities fit perfectly with the
GDR’s plans for industrialization of the crafts in large-scale serial production. At the
same time, they aimed at preventing kitsch. Yet herein lay Michel’s problem, because
like other twentieth-century cultural critics, Michel blamed kitsch as a cultural
phenomenon on industrialization and mass production. The goal was to facilitate a
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product landscape that would uplift Germans’ defeated spirits and destroyed homes,
while circumventing the seemingly unavoidable implications for social and moral decay.
Michel faced the struggle against kitsch in mass production head-on, working with the
Thuringia Chamber of Crafts to improve production in regard to aesthetics and efficiency
as soon as 1946. His experience in arts and crafts made him an expert in household and
interior design. With the cooperation of local companies, he assembled household wares
and ceramics in large shows that a jury evaluated to create criteria for “good design”.
This practice continued in later years during standardization and Sortimentsbereinigung,
an effort to reduce the number of models for a given product to increase Plan efficiency
and industrial output.
Anticipating the GDR economic motto “if only good is produced, nothing bad can
be sold” of later decades, Michel drafted a “Law Against the Exploitation of the People
by Kitsch” and introduced it into the Thuringia regional parliament in 1947.66 This Kitsch
bill expressed Michel’s conviction that political action was needed to prevent severe
damage to the economy:
It seems to be necessary to fight increasingly rampant kitsch and its inherent
waste of resources at the level of the state and to influence the quality of products
from crafts and industry. The multiplicity of shapes, more or less resulting from
financial greed, the amassing of dishonest pomp on appliances of the everyday
and basic commodities, as well as the wasting of resources mean an exploitation
of the people and dissipation of the people’s wealth.67
Kitsch seen from Michel’s point of view embodied the reverse of socialist ideals, a
complex concept of profit-induced diversity that differs from today’s pedestrian
perceptions of kitsch.
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While the Kitsch bill never passed, Michel successfully introduced a quality seal
for crafts and applied arts in Thuringia, a white lily and hammer in a blue circle. Soon
thereafter the seal helped consumers across East German territory to differentiate
between good and bad design. Retail recognized the merits of the seal and priced the
awarded products higher, which in turn created incentives for industry and crafts to
produce better products. Starting in 1949, Michel and the Weimar Institute organized
several “Kitsch Exhibitions” to educate the broader public through comparison of well
and badly designed products.68 These early episodes illustrate Michel’s involvement in
such ideological and political debates about production and kitsch even before the official
founding of the German Democratic Republic. Moreover, his tactics continuously aligned
with the Werkbund’s aesthetic and educational principles, providing ties across the
political division into East and West. Pioneering a functional and modern aesthetic that
corresponded to the limited resources available in the postwar years, Michel had become
a design authority who greatly influenced developments in design education, the
economy, and even politics. While his take on socialist essentialism aligned with
economic policy, on closer examination, however, his aesthetic sensitivities went in the
opposite direction of official aesthetic development under Soviet influence, which soon
diminished his leadership.
Between 1946 and 1948, the Soviet Military Administration worked towards the
centralization of cultural politics in the eastern zone of occupation in cooperation with its
German partners.69 With the centralization effort, the SED hoped to ensure uniformity in
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the political reorganization process that accompanied the growing German division. By
May 1948 the SED announced and all-encompassing claim to cultural leadership at the
Party’s Kulturtag: “The Culture Conference has expressed the decisive cultural will of
the Party. It has illustrated the character of the Party as a party of culture [Kulturpartei] in
the broadest sense of the word as well as the leading intellectual force in Germany’s
democratic reconstruction.”70 Henceforth, principles of party control rather than artistic
and aesthetic concerns guided East German cultural and educational policies. Such
politicization of culture differed distinctly from West Germany’s more liberal and
decentralized conception of cultural responsibility. Until this day, cultural matters are
handled at the regional level in Germany; there has never been a Ministry of Culture in
the Federal Republic. Consequently, the Kulturtag hailed the end of any assumed or
aspired cultural unity between East and West. Extending the political division of
Germany, the decision to pursue a “socialist” culture in the eastern zone of occupation
allowed the SED to model its part of Germany in accordance with the Soviet example
and in contrast to the cultural fabric of the Federal Republic. In turn, these contrasting
approaches to cultural policy set the stage for similarly divergent national aesthetics in
East and West during the reconstruction period.

Separate Economies, Separate Aesthetics
The nascent political and cultural division between East and West increased when
the Western Allies took measures to solidify the war-damaged German economy that
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reparation payments had scarred even further. The Marshall Plan and the resultant
currency reform of 1948 cemented the separation by creating two German economies that
fell into dramatically different economic systems: capitalism in the West and socialism in
the East. Acting against the provisions for Germany’s economic unity at the Potsdam
conference, Britain, France, and the United States merged their occupation zones and
treated this territory of the so-called Trizone as a single economic unit while at the same
time deliberately excluding the Soviet zone of occupation. The Yalta and Potsdam
agreements between the U.S., the Soviet Union, Britain, and France had put Germany
under their joined control until a peace treaty was reached, but its de facto split into two
different countries with opposing ideologies and separate state apparatus complicated
reaching a consensus concerning German matters and the status of Berlin.71 Eventually,
the Soviet blockade of Berlin between June 1948 and May 1949 effectively foreclosed
Allied cooperation in Germany. Moreover, these events weakened hopes for a unified
future, leaving Germany to emerge as the ideological battleground of the superpowers.
As a result of the increasing divide, the two German states focused on developing
diverging social and political systems that increasingly sought to demarcate from each
other.
When East Germany achieved statehood as the German Democratic Republic in
the midst of heightening Cold War tensions in the fall of 1949, cultural delineation from
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the West became an ideological concern in developing a distinct national profile. Such
process of state formation included the socialist remaking of society and all its underlying
structures. Toward these ends, early state socialism and its artistic proponents provided a
comprehensive approach to the human environment: new ways of feeling, thinking and
living specific to the working class had to be created.72 In the early 1920s, a Soviet avantgarde movement known under the name “Constructivists” shifted their interest from art
for art’s sake to an active engagement in processes of socio-political restructuring
inspired by the goals of the Bolshevik Revolution. During the first years under Soviet
control, their ambition went beyond simply turning artistic projects into political
messages. Rather, the Constructivists created a specific type of artistic-political discourse
in which every decision regarding the aesthetic construction of art became a political
one.73
Constructivist cultural expression allowed for the aesthetic visualization of the
utopian socialist project, yet it further served as a way to communicate to the Soviet
population its new relation to things in the realms of production and consumption. In her
study of Constructivism’s most prolific phase between 1923 and 1925, Christina Kaier
shows that the avant-garde’s devotion to “reintegrating art into the life process” and
regaining “social use value for art” by creating democratic objects for the everyday.74
Their emphasis thus lay more on integration of art into the everyday than domination
over the everyday – a clearly functionalist perspective. The aspired artistic production, as
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the avant-garde theorist Osip Brik explained, meant to express “the conscious creative
relationship to the productive process. We would like every worker who gives an object a
particular form and color to understand why that form and color is necessary.”75
Although the Constructivist projects paved the way for politicized art in socialism, they
were less successful in implementing their vision of this new way of life and materiality.
The problem was perhaps that their radical avant-garde idea of the socialist New Man
resembled more a utopian work-machine than a human being, or that their Bolshevik
negation of individual possession overreached human possibility. In the end, the
Constructivist bond between politics and culture remained, yet the carefully crafted
relationship between art and the everyday was replaced by an aesthetic remodeling of
material culture that favored form over function.
Artistic expression under Stalin rediscovered human emotions and reintroduced
them into the productive process.76 Boris Groys describes Socialist Realist art as the
means to recognize reality, or the utopian Soviet reality that was to be created. The
artistic conception of production lost its centrality, and instead the ways of utilization and
the attitude towards the productive means gained importance under cultural Stalinism.77
The direct connection between form and function dissolved, and with it disappeared the
avant-garde ideas of the Constructivists. In contrast to the earlier negation of personal
possessions, Socialist Realist architecture explored its extremes, achieving monumental,
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heavily ornamented, and pompous aesthetics.

78

The furniture inside these buildings

invoked bourgeois styles such as Biedermeier, adding a cozy feeling to the interiors of
the revolution. Instead of integrating art into the everyday, art came to dominate the
everyday. And the artist became the locus of this process since cultural Stalinism
understood design to express his inner reality, “his ability to inwardly identify with the
Party’s and Stalin’s volition, to amalgamate with it and to create an image or, more
exactly, a model of this willed reality [...].”79 According to Groys, it was the Socialist
Realist artist’s task to develop the utopian dream of the avant-garde with “non-avantgarde, traditional, ‘realistic’ means.”80 Aesthetic expressions were meant to act upon the
New Man in his evolution toward revolutionary consciousness. Art and the material
environment therefore played an important role in the education of the socialist individual
and the creation of collective socialist identity. Similarly, the GDR arrived at such
juncture in its revolutionary development about twenty-five years later, but the outcome
of its cultural quest was predetermined by the Soviet example.
With the Soviet Union as an ideological foil, the leadership of the SED modeled
itself and most aspects of the East German state after the Stalinist dictatorship. During the
years of occupation, as Norman Naimark illustrates, the SVAG demanded German
recognition of Soviet cultural superiority.81 The SED thus continued the political and
cultural work that the Soviets had begun in 1945 in constructing the first communist
German state. While Soviet influence in the East remained considerable after 1949, East
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Germans increasingly commanded their own state apparatus and decision-making, at
least in regard to domestic policies. Consequently, the SED government faced the task of
creating the parameters of a German socialist culture, which not only encompassed high
culture forms of the arts in literature, painting, and music, but also the culture of everyday
life. Industrial design, at the crossroads of applied arts and economic planning, as the
environmental manifestation of socialist thought, became part of this aesthetic
reinvention. Partially in reaction to these centralized efforts of cultural reconstruction in
the East, the Federal Republic continued and fortified its endeavor of rebuilding the
country. Western pluralism, meanwhile, included interest groups representing political
factions, business elites as well as the population, into the state-building process. This
associational culture (Verbandskultur), however, quickly succeeded at turning the tables,
making the institutionalizing of industrial design a governmental responsibility.82
The Werkbund, a well-connected representative of West German associational
politics, set to work with its lobbying with the two exhibitions in 1949. Not only did the
“Neues Wohnen” and the ”Neue Architektur seit 1945” shows educate consumers in
Cologne, they also made officials increasingly aware of the economic potential in
promoting a modern aesthetic nationwide. By supporting this exhibition effort, the
Economic Administration for the Tri-Zone officially embraced the Werkbund.83 Such a
structural transfer of cultural responsibilities from the regional administration to the
central economic administration heralded the dawn of national solutions to problems of
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Germany’s postwar housing crisis, including fitted furniture for the limited spaces.
Despite regional efforts, entire families often had to share one room where they would
cook, eat, and sleep. Earlier that year, the Economic Administration had entered
negotiations with the Werkbund about a “committee for design,” but the plans had not
come to fruition because of unsettled finances and an alleged lack of dedication on the
part of the Werkbund. Nevertheless, Werkbund members publicly announced the idea for
a national “council for industrial design” at their annual congress in June of 1949 in
Cologne, emphasizing its claim to national leadership in material culture once more.84
Because the occupation status limited political activity on the highest level, the
realization of a council for industrial design hinged on the formation of the West German
state as well as events that created a political necessity to act. Such motivation
materialized with the growing reappearance of German products on the global market.
Along with the currency reform of 1948 came Germany’s gradual international
economic reintegration. Ready to contribute to the reconstruction of Europe and the
development of international trade, West Germany longed to rekindle export relations. To
test the waters, the Trizone participated in an industrial exhibition in New York in 1949.
It was the first time since the Second World War that the occupiers granted German
industrialists permission to present their products at an international event. While recent
currency reform heralded the liberalization of the trizonal economy, international trade
events such as the New York Germany 49 industry show offered a forum for
communicating to the international community that West Germans now subscribed to
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western capitalist principles and peaceful economic competition.
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In the opening

remarks to the exhibition catalogue, Ludwig Erhard, then the director of the Economic
Administration of the Tri-Zonal Area of Germany, expressed his hope that the West
German display would prove to the world that “the German people’s only desire today is
to strive diligently for the improvement of human and social welfare and to show that
they have kept their strength and ability for the accomplishment of this desire despite all
the mistakes and the terror of the previous decade.”86 It is interesting to note that Erhard
downplayed the materialistic and capitalistic components of Germany’s participation in
the fair. In doing so he missed an opportunity to establish a cultural bond with the West
in general and the United States in particular based on shared attitudes toward trade and
consumption. Instead he placed German economic recovery in a moral and social context,
thus emphasizing the ethical importance for aesthetic reinvention. New German
aesthetics should display industriousness and efficiency in the service of the common
good, turning away from the pompous aesthetics connected to the public displays of
National Socialism. Moreover, Erhard’s statement expressed the perhaps naïve sentiment
among the West German political and economic elite that economic prosperity could
replace, if not redeem, the vices of the Third Reich in public memory. In this way,
politicians began to instill German products with symbolic meaning that went beyond
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economic values. Erhard embraced these material promises for a better future and
promoted them abroad as new West German virtues. He proposed that the New York
exhibition displays served the express purpose of conveying the “honest work of German
hands and minds.”87 The German show participation in New York marked a watershed in
strategy of cultural diplomacy, which was henceforth rooted in the belief that aesthetic
quality was tantamount to moral transcendence that would yield external approval. These
initial years of western economic activity coupled with a new morality laid the
foundation for a West German democratic identity based on economic success, which
came to fruition during the “economic miracle” of the late 1950s.
While the catalog presented the message of a re-civilized Germany in a clear
language, materially the content of the New York displays failed to convince.88
Unfortunately for Ludwig Erhard and West German industrialists, the industry exhibition
proved not to be as successful as they had hoped. Furnished with curved, heavy recliners
and an embellished display cabinet made of mahogany, the German exhibition received
reviews that ranged from ridicule to outrage at what was regarded as impractical,
pompous kitsch.89 Insecure about what kind of aesthetic could best show Germans’
postwar attitudes, exhibitioners relied on best-selling Bavarian arts and crafts and Louis
XV-style furniture. Their spacious designs and extravagant use of materials, though, felt
inappropriate amidst the postwar scarcity of resources and living space. Moreover, the
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critique of West German material culture, Betts finds, “suggested a host of awkward
impressions that West Germans desperately wanted to dispel: first, that West Germany
remained culturally backward and/or arrogant; second, that it had made no cultural break
with Nazism; and third, that it had inexplicably turned its back on its affirmative heritage
of international modernism.” 90 Clearly, aesthetic recivilization as a holistic remake of the
German cultural fabric warranted more organized approaches, now that there were
external incentives to act on. The New York opprobrium further raised awareness for
aesthetic considerations in product development among West Germany’s political and
industrial elite, offering the Werkbund a vantage point for lobbying in industrial design.

Institutionalization in the West: Coordinating State and Business Interests
With the ratification of the Basic Law, West Germany achieved statehood as the
Federal Republic of Germany in 1949, which ended the occupation status and enabled
West Germans to politically organize themselves. Right away, the Werkbund began to
work political channels to introduce concerns about national aesthetics into parliamentary
debate. In October 1950, Werkbund member Heinrich König presented the organization’s
plan for a national design council before the Bundestag Committee on Cultural Policy.
Reminding the parliamentarians of the embarrassment at the New York exhibition, König
connected Germany’s international reputation to domestic reconstruction needs: “Instead
of handy, functional, and comfortable things to furnish the small apartments of public
housing, producers offer heavy, pompous show-pieces of impractical arrangement.”
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König concluded that this kind of “production circumvents the real needs of the masses
(An dem wirklichen Bedarf der breiten Massen wird vorbeiproduziert).”91
Pressures to become active in Germany’s cultural reconstruction also came from
other quarters. The Western Allies, the American military administration in particular,
intensified efforts to integrate West Germany culturally into the ranks of western
democratic nations. Financed by the Marshall Plan, a traveling exhibition called “We
Build a Better Life,” introduced modern home design to the West German population. In
its three week run, it drew half a million visitors (40 percent of them from the East) in
Berlin, Hannover, and Stuttgart. Nationally diverse displays offered a common Western
material aesthetic reflecting “the same taste, same needs, and same interests [that] bond
the Atlantic community tightly together.”92 This “same taste” was a commitment to a
modernist aesthetic reminiscent of the Bauhaus with clear lines, sparsely furnished
rooms, and the limited use of patterned fabrics and ornamented household wares (see
figure 2). Werkbund member König was highly critical of the exhibition, observing that
“the products displayed at the Marshall Plan’s “New Home Furnishings” show were not
‘representational’ in style” of what was to be German design in his eyes.93
Generally speaking, the West German attitude toward American patronage in
design was conflicted. In the case of educational institutionalization, West Germans
highly depended on American financing. One great example of this ambivalence toward
cultural American influence is the Ulm Institute of Design (Hochschule für Gestaltung)
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in Baden-Württemberg. Inge Scholl, the younger sister of Nazi resistance leaders Hans
and Sophie Scholl, joined forces with Swiss designer Max Bill, a Bauhaus student and
head of the Swiss Werkbund, in 1953 to found a school that provided a model for
responsible political education that addressed the materialization of policies through
design, giving design a moral authority in defining the character of postwar life.95 Their
goal was to “educate a democratic elite as a counterforce against the tides of
intolerance.”96 Revealing its aspirations within the legacy of German design, the school
labeled itself the “New Bauhaus” in 1955, thus signaling to the world that antifascist
resistance and international modernism were alive and well in the Federal Republic.97 It
moreover established West Germany’s claim to Bauhaus modernism as its cultural
heritage. The project was mostly funded by the Scholl foundation, but among others the
regional government of Baden-Württemberg and the American High Commissioner,
General McCloy, supported the effort. While they took American money, Ulm’s design
vision quickly developed an anti-American stance that objected to Western consumerism.
Rather, Bill, Scholl, and her graphic designer husband Otl Aicher strove to develop
designs that were driven by the rational and systematic, rather than style and fashion.
“Within this,” Aynsley observes, “the notion of timelessness was invoked as an important
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criterion, defined against the phenomenon of conspicuous consumption and in-built
obsolescence of the American system of industrial styling.”98 Caught between the
western Allies’ visions for a new Germany and the ever-present communist alternative of
East Germany, the Federal Republic needed its own strong central institutions that could
shape its post-fascist identity.
The creation of a national Werkbund umbrella organization in 1950 under Hans
Schwippert’s leadership decisively shaped the course of events in the institutionalization
of design.99 United, the Werkbund successfully impressed upon the Adenauer
administration the notion that a centralized governmental institution should define West
Germany’s commodity aesthetic. Through its interwar experience in promoting a German
product culture as well as through its close ties to the Bonn political elites –Theodor
Heuss, the first President of the Federal Republic of Germany, held membership– the
Werkbund enjoyed access to the federal government. Aside from talks between
Werkbund members and representatives of the Federal Ministry of Economics,
Werkbund member König and parliamentarian Arno Hennig (SPD) lobbied for the design
council in Bonn.100 While economic connections between design and export rates
dominated the discussion, the aesthetic weight clearly lay on shaping a national style.
Referencing the national products of world renown, such as Murano glass, Brussels lace,
and French luxury commodities, expert witness Max Wiederanders demanded similar
German industrial excellence: German quality production that German consumers could
trust. Assimilation to foreign tastes in order to increase exports, however, he regarded as
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secondary: German workmanship in quality products should speak for itself.

101

What the

Werkbund wanted was a national institution executing a prescriptive and holistic
aesthetic reform program. This paternalistic attitude toward consumers in regard to style
and taste represented continuity with the earlier decades of the century in the Werkbund’s
self-conception: aesthetic education and the struggle against kitsch in the everyday.
In the early years of the Federal Republic, however, parliamentarians’ questioned
the legitimacy of such centralized “taste paternalism” vis-à-vis the population. West
Germany not only upheld cultural liberalism, but had also inscribed the decentralization
of culture into the Basic Law, making it the responsibility of the individual states rather
than the federal government. Yet the term “taste paternalism” encapsulates the
missionary zeal with which the Werkbund took up its self-assigned task of enlightening
the population about aesthetic principles instilled with democratic values. The inherent
contradiction in this rigid approach toward recivilizing Germans to become responsible
democratic citizens, though, was not apparent to the Werkbund members. The association
put its best efforts forward to ease politicians’ concerns about the illiberal implications of
their goals, but instead expert witness Wiederanders confirmed the elitist philosophy of
Werkbund circles: “The ‘audience’ (Publikum) has neither good nor bad taste. Its taste
always refers to that of the ‘powerful’ (Mächtigen der Erde), who shape the Zeitgeist, the
meaning of life and mankind’s ambitions and illusions.”102 This top-down approach stood
in stark contrast to West Germany’s socio-political goals of democratization and
liberalization in all areas of cultural, economic, and public life.
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Meanwhile, the Cold War climate and the East German socialist alternative added
suspicions regarding leftist agendas to parliamentary concerns about the possible effects
of socially and morally implicated political aesthetics. Taking into consideration that the
Werkbund was historically linked to leftist reform movements, official hesitation to
embrace the plans for a national design institution seemed plausible to contemporaries.
Thus, increasingly aware of the state’s apprehensions, Werkbund strategy changed to
playing into the government’s two main interests in industrial design: export increase and
the diplomatic value of material culture. At later parliamentary hearings in 1950 and
1951, Werkbund representatives repeatedly invoked the embarrassment of the New York
fair to stress the economic gains that the Federal Republic could acquire through the
sponsorship of design. Eventually, the evident economic opportunity trumped
parliamentary apprehensions about violating democratic principles through centralization
of cultural policy-making. The Bundestag voted in favor of the initiative with only one
opposing vote in 1951.103 This event put the Federal Republic’s claim to Weimar
modernism swiftly in place ensuring Werkbund control over design politics and sending
the country on its way to finding a West German aesthetic that could withstand
overbearing Americanization. The initiative furthermore offered a democratic alternative
to socialism in the East and helped to overcome the Third Reich aesthetics of power.
Concerned about moral decay of the country’s cultural fabric, the fight against kitsch as
its aesthetic manifestation in mass production connected design politics increasingly to
the economic realm. Encountering similar challenges, the GDR fought out its own battles
about cultural policy and its role in turning East Germans into socialist citizens.
103
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Politicization of Design: The Struggle to Create Modern German Aesthetics
In the GDR of the early 1950s, the Formalism Debate (Formalismus Debatte)
started an ideological-artistic dispute about a more holistic approach to the aesthetics of
the socialist material environment. Deeming Socialist Realism the official aesthetic, the
Party announced a radical reorientation in all areas of cultural activity at the third SED
party convention on July 20 – 24, 1950.104 By displaying cultural coherence with the
Soviet Union, the GDR government strove to demonstrate its “otherness” in contrast to
West Germany. From the beginning, Socialist Realism strove to connect artistic
expression to the task of enlightening and ideologically re-educating the working
population in the spirit of socialism. Its method relied on the depiction of reality and its
revolutionary development from the perspective of socialist partisanship. Dealing with
modes of socialist production and class struggle, Socialist Realism focused on everyday
work heroes, who built the socialist utopia, to inspire popular ideological identification.
This artistic expression received its national substance through the reliance on folk
culture, materially articulated in artisanal traditions.105 By contrast, East German
politicians, led by General Secretary Walter Ulbricht, a cabinetmaker by trade,
denounced modern functionalism as artless, international, and cosmopolitan. Its lack of
ornamentation, according to the government, signified the missing element of national
culture and the limitation of design to simple shapes made this aesthetic formalistic in the
eyes of officials. The fact that West Germany chose functionalism as its official aesthetic
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during the years of East Germany’s Formalism Debate only reinforced the political nature
of the GDR’s decision to reject Germany’s interwar modernism.
For a centrally organized state, this cultural reorientation had far-reaching
implications regarding the freedom of artistic expression. To avoid censorship, the artistic
community challenged the Party’s sweeping decision publicly. Over the course of three
years, the government repeatedly defended its stance in public forums such as
newspapers and symposia. In this way, the Formalism Debate became decreasingly
cultural and increasingly political in content. At a time of growing Cold War antagonism
between East and West, bloc alignment outpaced the search for a modern socialist
aesthetic and, eventually, the nationalistic values in the realist aesthetics of cultural
Stalinism held sway. In January 1954, an order by the GDR Council of Ministers
commanded the furniture industry to develop aesthetically pleasing furnishings “based on
the national cultural heritage.”106 Reminiscent of the style and ornamentation of the
Gründerzeit (c. 1870 – 1890, literally: Founders’ Period), the German cultural heritage in
the GDR was henceforth expressed in artful decorations, curved lines, and expensive
handicraft techniques. East Germany’s first major public housing project in East Berlin,
the Stalinallee, displayed wedding-cake style facades, heavily adorned with sculptures
and mosaics depicting workers and farmers. A coherent vision for the apartments’
interiors followed in a 1952 exhibition held in the first finished high rise. The furnishings
were bulky with patterned upholstery fabric. Pleated lampshades, lace curtains and squat-
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shaped porcelain added a curious petit-bourgeois feeling (see figure 3).

107

This emphasis

on ornamentation simultaneously represented a search for a politically untainted past, a
demonstration of integration into the Eastern bloc, and aesthetic delineation from West
Germany.
Considering the political realities in the GDR, historians have treated the
Formalism Debate as a predetermined affair or ignore it altogether.108 Martin Bober, for
example, argues that the debate was merely the Party’s attempt to create the illusion of a
pluralistic public sphere in the GDR.109 Yet there exists evidence to the contrary, that the
debate comprised an openly fought battle between political thinkers and functionalist
designers. As shown above, a number of schools founded on Bauhaus teaching principles
already existed in East Germany by 1950. Esteemed socialists like Horst Michel led these
interior design schools, on which the country depended, to create commodities for
reconstruction. Second, the fact that the debate lasted about three years and was
conducted in public speaks to the earnestness with which politicians and cultural elites
immersed themselves in the making of East German official culture.110 By discarding the
Formalism Debate as a predetermined affair, Bober misses the initial stage in
negotiations between designers and the state over the place of Bauhaus modernism in
GDR design and the struggle against an unfamiliar culture of Soviet provenance.111
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Bauhaus modernism and its students nevertheless comprised the main target of
the political campaign. At the risk of losing its livelihood, the GDR Bauhaus community
resisted state intervention in artistic expression. Mart Stam, a Dutch architect appointed
as the first director of the new School for Applied Arts (Hochschule für angewandte
Kunst) in Berlin Weissensee in 1950 became the most prominent casualty of the conflict.
Stam, a socialist idealist who had worked with architect and urban planner Ernst May on
the Neues Bauen public housing projects in Frankfurt a. M. in the 1920s and went with
the May Brigade to help build the industrial cities of Magnitogorsk, Makeyevka and Orsk
in the Soviet Union, had introduced the Bauhaus curriculum and methods in
Weissensee.112 Stam additionally founded and headed the Weissensee Institute for
Applied Art (Institut für angewandte Kunst) to respond to the immediate needs of East
Germany’s postwar production.113 The three years of the Formalism Debate with cultural
Stalinism eventually gaining the upper hand, however, ostracized Stam and his wife.
They left the GDR in 1953, disenchanted with the country where Stam had hoped to
contribute his vision for a socialist way of life to a true Marxist state.
Stam’s departure from Weissensee marked the final stage in the Formalism
Debate as well as the institutionalization of cultural Stalinism in East Germany. The
remaining Bauhaus community viewed this development critically. In a 1985 interview,
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Selman Selmanagic, a former Bauhaus student, highly regarded interior designer, and
architect who worked with Stam at both the Institut für angewandte Kunst and the
Hochschule, lambasted the transformation of the institute into a government agency.114
He saw Walter Heisig, Stam’s successor at the institute, as a person “without
comprehension,” who “designed florets on ceramics and such kitsch.”115 Labeled as
“German cultural heritage”, this naïve representation of reality was henceforth the official
aesthetic of the GDR. The remaining Bauhaus disciples in East Germany, as Eli Rubin
astutely observes, left Berlin and went into artistic exile in the provincial centers of the
GDR.116 For example, Stam’s student Martin Kelm started the independent Halle Institute
for Design and Development with fellow Stam student Günter Reissmann in 1958.
While the sun was sinking on functionalism in the East, it rose for their
counterparts in the West who fortified their political and cultural influence in the early
1950s. On April 4, 1951, the Bundestag resolved to create a design council to enhance
Germany’s image abroad and promote the country’s exports.117 Its official tasks included
“to advise industry by procuring qualified creative minds, to reestablish Germany’s
competitiveness at international exhibitions and trade fairs, to support the education of
new designers in arts and crafts schools and professional schools, and to take all
measures necessary that benefit the instruction about quality and shape as well as the
education of traders and consumers.”118 Therefore gaining official avenues of power as
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the arbiter of West German good taste, the Werkbund seemed to have finally reached its
goal. By exerting aesthetical influence over both industry and consumers, the design
council revived the Werkbund’s elitist reform project of the prewar years.
This centralization of cultural power in the hands of the Werkbund, though, was
compromised by two factors: the funding situation and the decisions concerning
personnel. After the period of cultural streamlining in the Third Reich, the founding years
of the Federal Republic saw a flurry of activity by lobby groups, particularly in the arts.
Industrial design, emerging as a new profession in Germany after World War II,
competed for state funding with high culture. While the Federal Ministry of the Interior
financially supported the arts, industrial design did not fall under their jurisdiction, being
at the intersection of arts and production.119 The connections politicians drew between
industrial interests and design considerations resulted in the subordination of the Rat für
Formgebung under the Federal Ministry of Economics. Henceforth, this decision,
primarily based on budget considerations, linked design to export promotion. In June
1953 the West German Rat für Formgebung finally set to work in Darmstadt, Hesse, as a
non-profit foundation of public utility under the auspices of the Federal Ministry of
Economics.120 With the exception of international exhibitions, West German economic
interests, not the Werkbund’s cultural hegemony, outlined the state’s plan for the design
council. This initial conflict in founding the design council continued to generate strong
infighting until the Werkbund officially retreated from the Rat für Formgebung in 1968.
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The second problem affected the make-up of the Rat für Formgebung. The
original goal had been to create an advisory body of distinct personalities that took on
cultural leadership in the young republic. Yet the Ministry of Economics soon abandoned
this plan and, instead, pushed for including representatives from all economic fields.
Minister of Economics Ludwig Erhard (1949-1963, CDU) initially appointed sixteen
designers and industrialists to the council. These appointments almost exclusively
included Werkbund and esthete industrialists, indicating the state’s faith in industry as a
partner in social reform. But Erhard appointed twenty more unsalaried consultants—
representatives of varying backgrounds such as crafts, labor unions, consumer
organizations, and public administration to democratize the new institution—which
started the discord between the government and the initial council members.121 The
Werkbund especially objected the appointment of Eduard Schlafejew as director.
Schlafejew had been a competent economic administrator under Erhard’s Ministry of
Economics, which made him a “puppet of industry” and lacking in design expertise from
the point of view of the Werkbund.122 Instead of an aesthetic mission then, the council
would become a pawn for economic interests, a “second Federal Trade Office.”123 This,
the Werkbund feared, would strip the design council of cultural assertiveness and
diminish its leadership in the aesthetics of material culture.124 Lobbyist König, worried
about a loss of control and influence, likened the situation to the Werkbund’s first
experience with failing state-cooperation in the Weimar Republic under the Reich Art
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Supervisor (Reichskunstwart).

After more than a year of negotiations with the ministry

and threats of withdrawal from the project altogether, the Werkbund chose the lesser of
two evils and compromised. They accepted Schlafejew’s appointment on the condition
that one of their own, long-time Werkbund members, Mia Seeger, would fill the position
of general secretary. With her appointment, the Werkbund gained lasting artistic
influence over the Rat für Formgebung. Seeger was an experienced “cultural broker of
German modernism” whose expertise had been proven in her organizational work for
important Werkbund exhibitions, most notably the 1927 Weissenhofsiedlung.126 In the
end, instead of insisting on their vision for the design council and risking to alienate the
ministry, leading Werkbund members decided to work within the ministerial framework,
a framework that they believed to be a watered down version of their design
institution.127
The legal status of the design council remained contested within the Federal
Republic. In a pamphlet introducing the council and its task, the presidium labeled it a
government-initiated “self-administrated organization” instead of a state institution. Both
the federal government and the Bundestag had operated “from the assumption that wide
circles in the German economy will recognize the importance of industrial design and
support it respectively.”128 Generally speaking, the Werkbund’s success in Bonn can be
accredited to their connections to the economic elites represented in the Federation of
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German Industries (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, BDI). Its membership
consisted of professional architects, designers, and urban planners who often worked
closely with the industry. The progress made in production technology and methods
prescribed private enterprise a broadening of political activism to include theoreticaleconomic areas. After initial hesitation, the business community strongly supported the
Rat für Formgebung. Leading industrialists, such as Siemens and AEG, set up a
foundation “in support of design,” from which the design council drew some funds.129
Through overlapping membership the BDI was well represented in the Werkbund
and vice versa.130 This overlap in membership shows further how a small group of
designers and entrepreneurs strove to exert influence over the artistic and economic
policies in the inception of this national design institution. As the government
increasingly set the terms in negotiations about the council in 1951 and 1952, industry
looked for alternative means to promote their companies’ design. The BDI founded a
project similar to the national design council, the Committee for Industrial Design
(Arbeitskreis für Industrielle Formgebung) in 1952, illustrates this influential group’s
multilayered efforts to realize their aesthetic and economic ambitions. Fourteen of the
thirty-six associations represented by the BDI were present at the constituting assembly
of the Arbeitskreis, which shows considerable interest for questions of form and design
among industrialists. This initial success quickly resulted in the BDI’s involvement in a
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second, much more practically involved area of activism in design.

Gustav Stein, the

BDI’s lawyer, became a prominent figure in this process as he pulled the strings behind
the scenes by connecting potent and willing industrialists with the opportunity to
advertise their wares – as long as they subscribed to the principles of Good Design. The
BDI Arbeitskreis organized special shows of selected, well-designed products at the
annual industrial fairs in Hannover, Frankfurt, and Cologne.132 To publicize their work,
the BDI Arbeitskreis started the non-profit organization Industrial Shape (Industrieform)
in the city of Essen, whose cause evolved around displaying well-designed goods.133
These permanent exhibitions with industry-sponsored displays aimed at improving sales
by educating the public about Good Design. Within three years of its opening in
November 1955, more than 492,000 visitors saw the exhibition, which was put together
by a jury headed by no other than Werkbund president Hans Schwippert.134 Such
successes, showing the popular demand to learn about the features of modern appliances,
encouraged the industry to retain its efforts alongside the design council throughout the
economic miracle years and well into the 1960s.
Perhaps this dual activism of entrepreneurs in both the Rat für Formgebung and
the BDI Arbeitskreis caused the financial footing of the design council to remain a major
problem. As mentioned before, in its inception the Rat took organizational cues from
similar institutions in other countries. One of the reasons why the British design council
impressed the initiators of the West German equivalent in particular was its stable
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financials. The British Council of Industrial Design was a state-supported agency with a
budget of over 6 million DM (West German Marks) of which the state provided 3.5
million by 1967.135 The GDR, for comparison, financed its later design institution with
state subsidies of 796,000 DDM (East German Marks136) in 1963, its first fiscal year.137
In contrast, in the first five years after its inception in 1952/53, the West German Design
Council received only 70,000 DM yearly.138 This amount grew steadily to 220,000 DM in
1967 – still a fraction of the funds available to the British Council of Design and a less
than a third of what the East German industrial designers had. Part of the problem was
that the West German industry did not keep up with its formal promise to support the Rat
für Formgebung financially in later years. This lack of continued commitment might have
resulted from the success that industry-controlled initiatives, such as Industrieform,
achieved. Industry’s initial dependence on the design council as a state institution seems
to have decreased proportionally as the significance of the BDI projects increased.
The years of 1950 through 1953 are therefore an important period for German
state-guided industrial design. Though lacking constructive material results in either
Germany, this period set the tracks for official aesthetics and established the structural
parameters in which the design councils operated throughout the years of division. From
the Rat für Formgebung’s inception, the Bonn Republic worked against any kind of
centralist scheming, although the council’s mission was, paradoxically, all-encompassing
135
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in design matters. Despite the limitations set by the state, for the Werkbund it was now or
never. Ultimately, after decades of lobbying, 1950-53 were the years when the Werkbund
goals finally intersected with state interests to create a modern identity for a German
state. The Formalism Debate, which happened in the GDR at the very same time, had a
similar effect on the design landscape in the East. The Institut für angewandte Kunst in
Weissensee became a proponent of cultural Stalinism after Stam’s departure in 1953. But
the GDR continued its efforts to centralize design, which eventually resulted in the same
conceptual shift that had already come about in the West, allocating design as a part of
the economic reorganization process.

Institutionalization in the East: Regrouping after the Formalism Debate
In the GDR, the creation of a central design institution comparable to the Rat für
Formgebung began with the Weissensee Institut für Angewandte Kunst, which had been
added to the Ministry of Culture as an advisory body in 1952. However, the practical
implications of this institution under Heisig’s leadership remained limited and the
archives are silent about its ability to guide the search for an East German national
aesthetic.139 The necessary addition of another advisory body to the Ministry of Culture,
the Council for Industrial Shape (Rat für Industrieform) in 1962, points toward the
Weissensee institute’s weaknesses in the economic realm. Assigned to ensure the
“implementation of state initiatives in the field of industrial design,” the council had to
“supervise their realization through economic institutions, trade organizations and
139
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The main objective was to bring design into agreement with

state economic planning while complying with the principles of East German cultural
politics. Located at the intersection of manifold economic processes, the representatives
on the council included all sectors of the economy: up to 25 designers or representatives
of analogous universities and specialized institutes, one representative each from the
Ministry of Culture, the National Economic Council (Volkswirtschaftsrat), the State
Planning Commission, the Ministry for Trade and Supply, the Ministry for Foreign Trade
and inner-German Trade, the German Construction Academy, the German Office for
Material and Product Testing, the Office for Standardization, the Association of German
Fine Artists, the Chamber of Technology, and two to three representative from the
People’s Owned Companies.141 Horst Michel became a member of the council’s board;
Martin Kelm, the Mart Stam student who had been working in Halle, received the
Minister of Culture’s call to serve on the council as a representative of a specialized
institute after which he moved quickly onto the council’s board.142
In contrast to the West, the East initially thought design to be purely a part of
cultural issues in the development of a socialist society. The initial positioning of the Rat
für Industrieform under the Ministry of Culture indicates that the East German
government still categorized industrial design as applied arts and did not immediately see
it as an asset to economic development in the early 1960s. This notion possibly originated
with the country’s focus on heavy industry in the early years of reconstruction. To fulfill
reparation payments to the Soviet Union while at the same time following the economic
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principles that had catapulted the Soviet Union from an agricultural country to an
industrial powerhouse, the GDR put most of its resources into coal mining and steel
production.143 Yet after the experience of the June 17, 1953 workers’ uprising that spread
like wild fire from Berlin throughout the country after the government raised construction
quotas but failed to fulfill consumer demands, the Party became increasingly aware of the
political dimension of consumer goods. Fulfilling demand became a way to gain public
support through material means. Eight years later, the closing of the German-German
border on August 13, 1961 heightened the political profile of consumer goods. By
building the Wall as a manifestation of German division, the GDR not only kept its
population from leaving, but also temporarily cut off the flow of western goods. This step
actually aggravated the GDR’s consumption dilemma, because the Berlin Wall
underscored the line between a prosperous Germany in the West and one pressed to fulfill
basic consumer demands in the East. Accordingly, creating a distinct aesthetic in
commodities different from the modern project in the West, increasingly became a means
of working towards a national identity that could forge a feeling of belonging.
International developments further contributed to a new attitude toward the ideological
meaning of material culture. The policy of peaceful coexistence as “the new mode of
global conflict” after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 revived the struggle for a socialist
culture: “Peaceful coexistence has at its root the decisive, forceful battle against all
manifestations of bourgeois ideology. Specific artistic problems are also to be classified
in this broader political context.”144
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At this critical point, Martin Kelm reinvigorated the Institut für angewandte Kunst
and increased its political responsibilities under the name “Zentralinstitut für
Formgestaltung” in 1963. Kelm thus returned from his artistic exile in Halle to Berlin and
brought new vigor and control in the centralized efforts to direct industrial design.145
Shortly thereafter, the Zentralinstitut with Kelm as its head began its ascent to
prominence within the East German planned economy, foreshadowing the eventual
success of functionalist design within East Germany’s production industries. Although
the earlier Rat für Industrieform was the first attempt at creating an advisory body that
connected all areas of the East German economic apparatus, the Ministry of Culture had
no control over economic planning. Meanwhile, the Zentralinstitut was the first East
German government body committed to forging a cohesive aesthetic with increasing
influence in the planning process. Throughout the 1960s, industrial design proceeded to
become more deeply anchored in the economic structures of the GDR.146 In 1965, the
Zentralinstitut moved to an institution dedicated to standardization and product testing,
the German Office for Standardization and Product Testing (Deutsches Amt für
Messwesen and Warenprüfung, DAMW) together with the council, which was renamed
“Rat für Gestaltung”. The transfer from the Ministry of Culture to the DAMW signaled a
significant change in perception of industrial design’s role in East Germany’s economy.
Rather than being thought of as a beautification of products, politicians began to see
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industrial design as part of a scientifically measurable process to enhance products and to
make them competitive in the international market.

The Politics of Design
The putsch deposing Walter Ulbricht from power in 1971 facilitated Kelm’s next
step up the career ladder. The new first party secretary General Erich Honecker changed
the Zentralinstitut into a government institution in its own right in 1972 and renamed it
“Amt für industrielle Formgestaltung.” Kelm had already become a member of the
Council of Ministers with the Zentralinstitut‘s 1965 transition to the DAMW, but as the
director of the institute he officially became part of the economic planning apparatus.
Given the far-reaching implications of his authority in design decisions, Rubin concludes:
“Kelm now had power over other ministers of the economy, and was elevated to the
position of State Secretary, making him almost untouchable by any aesthetic
criticism.”147 Two laws ensured that the central design institution remained the main
arbiter of taste in the GDR.

First, the 1965 law that required all People-Owned

Companies (Volkseigene Betriebe, VEB) in the production industries to employ designers
and, second, the 1973 law that obliged all factories to “‘outsource” their industrial
designing work exclusively to the Amt für industrielle Formgestaltung became crucial
stepping stones for Kelm’s lasting influence over East German industrial design and the
tipping point of the power scale in favor of the functionalists.148
The possibilities of one-party rule and the mechanisms of the planned economy
enabled Kelm’s increasing hold on power. Contrary to the competitive associational
147
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environment that shifted cultural leadership in the West, SED nomenclature added to the
upward mobility and endurance of GDR office-holders.149 Günther Mittag, a member of
the Politbüro since 1958 and Secretary of Economics in the Central Committee since
1962, took Kelm under his wing. Mittag oversaw Kelm’s dissertation about the role of
industrial design in socialism and vouched for his party credentials as well as his
aesthetic vision for a socialist way of living.150 Meanwhile, passionate socialists like
Selman Selmanagic, the director of the Weissensee School, felt that Kelm betrayed
socialist cultural principles. Selmanagic summarized his low opinion of Kelm’s
qualification in industrial design: “Unfortunately, it’s the case here [in the GDR, the
author] that Kelm pats himself on the back self-congratulatory. But nobody knows him.
And when I see objects, I see where he finds his inspiration. That upsets me as a
comrade. I want that the capitalists to copy from us, and not we from them. That is my
goal, but I did not reach it, unfortunately.”151 Whereas not many people in the GDR
design scene took notice of Kelm for his artistic vision, he definitely was known to the
political elites as an excellent bureaucrat with good connections. Kelm thus personally
benefited from the standardization of industrial design and its separation from the arts in
the East.
Nevertheless, Kelm’s ascend to power completely contradicted GDR cultural
policy. As logical as the relocation of the Zentralinstitut under the DAMW may have
sounded in the general climate of standardization and production streamlining, an
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exclusively linear interpretation of this event as the ‘natural’ outcome in the East’s
progress toward economical production would undervalue the ideological determination
among the political elite. The earlier, triumph over the struggle against kitsch,
spearheaded by designers like Michel who were trained in the tradition of Weimar
modernism, show that the ideologist had the power to dominate cultural debates. In fact,
the party apparatus was painfully aware of the ideological inconsistencies among the
industrial designers. In 1964, the Culture Department at the Central Committee reported
attitudinal problems among the Ministry of Culture’s industrial designers: “Revisionist
attacks from the applied arts against the cultural policies of the Party are supported by
some of the Zentralinstitut für Gestaltung members of staff.” With openly functionalist
arguments, the industrial designers argued “against a connection between applied arts and
our socialist ideology as well as the designer’s task to work according to the newly
developing aesthetic necessities of socialist men.”152 Fearing that these challenges from
within would unhinge applied arts from the “edifice of socialist aesthetics” and could
even result in attacks on the principles of Socialist Realism in the fine arts, the Culture
Department demanded adequate strictness to get the Zentralinstitut back in Party line. In
a way, Kelm and his unruly institute thus were kicked upstairs to avoid further meddling
in cultural politics, though the Culture Department knew that “the supporters of this
wrong opinion will interpret the Zentralinstitut breaking away from the Ministry of
Culture as a confirmation of their opinion.”153 It becomes clear that the SED never
entirely succeeded in controlling the aesthetic-ideological vision in the field of industrial
152
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design. There was room for practical arguments that favored functionalism because of its
more economical use of resources and production facilities objecting to the
embellishments in Stalinist aesthetics. Eli Rubin argues that the Party realigned its
aesthetics as early as 1953 with the events of June 17th.154 Yet rather than a change in
official policy, what one can detect here is a softening of aesthetic guidelines in practice,
not in discourse. The Culture Department’s conflict with the industrial designers about
socialist cultural principles points to a (ideologically and discursively) well and vibrant
Socialist Realism. It seems that a practical dilution of cultural Stalinism falls into the
early 1960s, in correlation with Nikita Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization during the Thaw.155
Kelm became a member of the Council of Ministers in 1964 and advanced to a good
standing with Erich Honecker, whose personal secretary was Kelm’s wife. His
minimalistic vision for interior design, however, was not yet trend-setting in the GDR. It
took another decade until Kelm was able to design the interiors of Honecker’s state
guesthouses using nothing other than Bauhaus furniture.156
Whereas East Germany experimented with different German styles in the first two
postwar decades, the Federal Republic developed its national aesthetic slowly,
continuously testing international reaction. International representation was at the core of
154
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the Rat für Formgebung’s mission and it took most of the 1950s until they arrived at a
clear vision of their moral message. The design council dismissed the international style
of Nierentisch organicism, which was very popular in West Germany, and instead created
a design style that was grouped around functionalist principles. Tracking the aesthetic
development from the 1954 Milan Triennial, the 1957 Milan Triennial, and the 1958
World Exposition in Brussels, one can see an increasing emphasis on humility and
transparency distinct from the monumental architecture and folkloristic home design had
become the aesthetic legacy of the Third Reich.157 The number of arts and crafts objects
shrunk while a growing number of industrial designed goods were put on display (see
figure 4). Betts assesses this aesthetic as functionalism that blended old and new
Sachlichkeit.158 By the late 1950s, the materials featured in the German pavilion at
Brussels were clean and modern, such as glass, tubular steel, concrete, and wood.159
While eyed with suspicions by the national media, this new, subdued West German
aesthetic won acclaim from the foreign press. Captivated by its “spiritual functionalism,”
the London Times hailed the German Pavilion at Brussels as elegant, transparent, and
radiant.160 West German simplicity, and, most importantly for its diplomatic value,
openness won international recognition. These three groundbreaking exhibitions affirmed
that the West German linkage between industrial design and antifascism worked in the
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international arena, setting new standards for how West Germany utilized interior design
and architecture to communicate its postwar identity.161
The work of the West German Rat für Formgebung, however, came to a complete
standstill between 1964 and 1965. The government’s uneasiness about cultural centralism
limited the opportunities for unified industrial design in the West, a situation drastically
different from the place that East Germany’s design institutions held in its state
apparatus. As early as 1960, as Christopher Oestereich has noted, the Federal Republic’s
government was reluctant to turn the design council into an exclusively public agency.162
Business involvement and private sponsoring remained a prerequisite for the continuation
of the design council. Yet, with its existence threatened by the lack of governmental and
industrial financial commitment, the president of the Rat für Formgebung, Ernst
Schneider, acting also as the president of the BDI Arbeitskreis persuaded the designers in
the institution that only a merger with the industry’s Arbeitskreis could solve its financial
and personnel crisis by showing a united front. In 1965 Schneider wrote to the Minister
of Economics Kurt Schmücker (CDU, 1963-1966) regarding his conviction that the
council would be able to tackle its growing challenges given a new organizational and
financial basis. Schneider put the council’s national significance in a global perspective:
“The idea that the German Rat für Formgebung fulfills a socio-political function has been
recognized as a state task and honored as such in the Federal Republic as well as in many
161
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other industrial countries.”

But the government refused more funds pointing to the

responsibility of the specific industries, which would financially benefit from the
council’s work. With no bargaining power vis-à-vis the government, the council
attempted to work the Cold War angle between East and West Germany to attain more
state funding. Yet even comparisons with the GDR’s well-financed design institution
apparently lacked political sway. The negotiations and mutual blaming resulted in a new
constitution for the design council, in which the Arbeitskreis attained administrative
control over the Rat für Formgebung. Werkbund members feared that the design council
would be sidestepped and felt their cultural ideals betrayed by industry interests.
In June 1967, the Rat für Formgebung sent a report to the Ministry of Economics
assessing different options for reorganization and extension of its responsibilities. The
ministry, though, found that the work of the last three years had been ineffective (only
two thirds of the budget was put to use in 1966 and likewise in 1967) and saw little
promise for success in the changes proposed by the council. The Minister of Economics,
Karl Schiller (SPD, 1966-1972), and his staff identified the council’s personnel structures
as the true impediment for successful restructuring.164 The personnel problems of the
Design Council culminated in a public fall-out between the Werkbund and the BDI
Arbeitskreis in 1968-9. The Werkbund maintained publicly that the Design Council had
been “swallowed by the industry (von der Industrie geschluckt worden).” In a transition

163

Ernst Schneider (president of RfF) to Bundesminister für Wirtschaft, 28 June 1965, B 102/151283,
BAK.
164
Britsch to Schiller, von Dohnanyi, Rat für Formgebung; Re: Denkschrift des RfF vom 8. Juni 1967,
Besprechung bei Staatssekretär von Dohnanyi, 22 August 1968, B 102/151284, BAK.

70

period, the BDI and the Werkbund shared leadership in the council.

165

Yet, the Werkbund

demanded a “complete institutional and personnel separation” from the Arbeitskreis and
reassertion of the Rat für Formgebung’s democratic legitimacy.166 Instead, the
organizational structures, including Ernst Schneider’s joint presidency of both
institutions, remained unchanged.167 As a result, the Werkbund publicly stepped away
from the design council in the summer of 1969. The Werkbund board of managers
published a statement lamenting that “the Werkbund cannot identify with the Rat für
Formgebung as it once had been able to” under the given circumstances.168 The feeling
was mutual. A promotional pamphlet that the design council produced two decades later
in 1989 to inform the general public about its history made this evident by completely
omitting the Werkbund’s integral role in the inception of the design council.169
In a parallel development, functionalism as a socio-political and moral agenda
underwent a crisis. The HfG Ulm presents a prime example of the institutional
repercussions caused by this change in intellectual climate. Ulm, having developed a
dogmatism of austerity that became its trademark for success in the years of want,
suddenly faced strong public criticism, which became its eventual downfall during a
period of increased consumption in the 1960s.170 Situated on the Kuhberg Mountain, a
hill overseeing the city, the school was not only physically, but also conceptually
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removed from the life of the people “below” them. The HfG Ulm nevertheless
represented an institutional stronghold of die-hard functionalism that correlated with the
Design Council’s aesthetic postwar vision for a liberal Federal Republic. Neglecting
popular taste and consumer demands, Ulm found itself increasingly criticized in the
press.171 Especially a highly critical article about the institute in the West German
political magazine Der Spiegel caused the Baden-Württemberg government to review its
financial commitment to the school.172 These tensions in the relationship between Ulm’s
design principles and wider societal trends led to the loss of funding from the regional
government in 1968 which resulted in the institute’s closing in November of that year.
The criticism of Ulm was not a singular instance of popular critique vis-à-vis elite
institutions in general and functionalism in particular.173 1967/68 saw worldwide social
change that expressed the end of a democratic consensus, which in Germany the HfG
Ulm and the Rat für Formgebung claimed to materially express in their functionalist
aesthetics. The closing of the Ulm institute marked the disillusion with the reformist and
moral power of functionalism as a distinct West German aesthetic.

Conclusion
Postwar Germany’s institutionalization of industrial design offers insights into
more than the challenges of reconstruction. It also reflected larger concerns of the Cold
War division: competition for cultural leadership in Germany, the alignment with the
Western and Eastern Blocs respectively, and a way to create integrative concepts for
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popular identification with the new states. Most successfully, though, it expressed a
cultural policy of demarcation in the German Question, affirming that unification had
moved out of reach. The subsequent aesthetics, functionalism in the West and
Gründerzeit styles in the East, were thought of expressions of official national culture.
However, the political means with which they approached this problem differed between
the two German states. Party control in the East led to a system of personal patronage that
suppressed a truly socialist conception of the material environment. Meanwhile, the
Federal Republic’s parliamentary debate and questions of state subsidies resulted in an
associational battle for institutional control. These structural, financial, and political
challenges contributed to watered-down versions of the initial institutional goals in the
GDR and the Federal Republic alike. Whereas the initial commitment to a certain
aesthetic became evident in the political battles won by cultural elites in the early 1950s,
both the Amt für industrielle Formgestaltung and the Rat für Formgebung underwent
drastic changes that did not stop short of ending aesthetic visions.
Having considered these specifics of the politicization and institutionalization of
industrial design in postwar Germany, Walter Gropius’ 1967 plea for institutionalized
industrial design becomes more comprehensible. He reconnected with his home country
at a time when domestic forces contested the legacy of the Bauhaus and the Werkbund
movement. In the Federal Republic, the official financial commitment to the Institute of
Design in Ulm and the Rat für Formgebung collapsed. Both strongholds of functionalist
design suffered institutional blows exacerbated by the general crisis of functionalism in
West Germany of the mid-1960s. At that time, the GDR aesthetics only began to develop
into a modern direction. The ascent of functionalists like Kelm and Michel successively
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hollowed out Socialist Realism from within the state apparatus, but until the mid-1960s,
political elites held on to cultural Stalinism as official aesthetics in the East. Yet as the
reconstruction years came to an end, the protest movements of 1968 challenged the
political purity that functionalism had occupied in the West and the Prague Spring
disillusioned true believers in communism in the East. These events put two decades of
overcoming the Nazi past and German-German demarcation into question.
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CHAPTER 2: INDUSTRIAL DESIGN AND THE GERMAN QUESTION’S
SOCIAL DIMENSION
Introduction
At a time when Germany was in the process of democratizing itself, the
Werkbund initiative for a design council was only one attempt among many to find an
all-German (gesamtdeutsche) aesthetic. Werkbund member Wilhelm Wagenfeld, one of
Germany’s most influential Bahaus-trained designers who had recently left the East,
initiated a similar institution in the new state of Baden-Württemberg.174 In this context,
he warned the state administration in 1949: “I am from Berlin and, therefore, from the
Germany beyond the zone border. I have seen that we can counter the East only with a
new intellectual world and, thus, with new social empathy [neues soziales Empfinden]
and thinking.”175 Wagenfeld understood the intellectual appeal of socialism as he himself
held leftist political views and had remained loyal to the Werkbund mission that
promoted designers’ social responsibility. Most importantly though, by suggesting that
Western material culture was inscribed with moral meaning, Wagenfeld opened up a new
way of thinking about design in the context of the German Question. Specifically, he
pointed to the need for a deeper rethinking of social and cultural structures to counter the
lure of socialist material collectivism. At the same time, his remarks show that industrial
design became a competitive field in the German Cold War, which contoured the West
German discourse in contrast to the quickly developing socialist alternative in the East.
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More than a loose assemblage of voices, discourse between politicians, designers
and cultural critics grappled with the meaning of these aesthetics in the everyday. In the
early reconstruction years, elites had focused on pronounced national aesthetics for
political rather than social purposes. Alongside the cultural identification with the West,
such aesthetics expressed Adenauer’s “policy of strength” on the German Question,
based on the logic that Westbindung, rearmament and membership in the NATO would
eventually bring about German unification. In reaction to Bonn’s position, the GDR
followed a policy of demarcation from the West by showing allegiance to the Eastern
Bloc both ideologically and culturally. However, when one examines design discourse
beyond initial bloc alliances, it becomes evident that the ideologically loaded Cold War
climate limited the elite’s ability to inscribe material culture with a spirit of social reform.
To understand how material necessity related to social ideas, this analysis of
German design discourse under capitalism and socialism is interested in the actual
communication of aesthetic principles to the population. While the Federal Republic tied
large parts of its material culture to the Werkbund reform ideals of the interwar years, the
philosophical underpinnings of this aesthetic were lost on many onlookers. Meanwhile,
the GDR reached back to the late nineteenth century, a time of stark social stratification,
expansionism, and aesthetics reminiscent of Prussian classicism. However, while GDR
politicians and designers tried to inscribe material culture with socialist humanist values,
the systemic political and economic centralization effort soon overshadowed any
philosophical interest in a more humane material environment. How did the two German
states and their cultural representatives navigate these contradictions on a discursive
level? What did these prescriptive visions of domestic modernity mean for the
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populations’ everyday life as an integral part of cultural rebirth? More specifically, did
Germans still know how to live in their homes, rather than to purely inhabit them? These
concerns became a pivotal point of the German public discourse, centering on the place
of emotions in opposition to rationality and technological progress that came with
economic modernization. The decoration of interiors in particular featured in the
discourse of emotional reaction to shapes and colors in material culture. Theoretically,
privacy and emotionality replaced the public “aesthetics of power” of 1930s Nazi
Germany.176 Yet this personal dimension of official design aesthetic faded into the
background as larger questions of economic reconstruction and delineation in the German
Question became more urgent.

Social Discomfort of Reconstruction Design
Wagenfeld’s warning to the Baden-Württemberg administration echoed West
German intellectuals’ early anti-fascist campaigns for a complete break with the German
past. Their vision included an alternative material and social philosophy in West
Germany, one that stood in opposition to the so-called war-mongering forces of
nationalism and capitalism. Coming from the left political spectrum, they envisioned a
social revolution, which would give birth to a humanized, non-Marxist Germany in the
middle of a united Europe. These intellectuals saw the potential for cultural rebirth in
Germany through the young generation and “its perceived condition of alienation from

176

The aesthetics of power in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union under Stalin have been excellently
explained in the exhibition catalogue Berlin – Moskau, 1900-1959 (Munich: Prestel, 1995).

77
177

the German past.”

Yet this radical new beginning did not occur.

The Weimar

generation took control in Bonn, marginalized the antifascists, and established a capitalist
economic system with the help of the Western Allies. In turn, they brought with them
aesthetics that evoked the cultural elitism of their interwar prime. Aesthetics, then,
became just another issue where the political leadership both avoided a confrontation
with the legacy of the Third Reich and ignored the opportunity for necessary sociocultural remaking of Germany.
The West German Bauhaus Debate in 1953 reflected similar concerns in the realm
of architecture. Church architect Rudolf Schwarz started the debate when he rejected
Bauhaus rationalism for the rebuilding of Germany.178 He targeted especially radically
leftist practices and avant-garde projects, while promoting a conservative “modernism of
the middle.”179 These ideas, however, were hardly new and Schwarz attacks failed
because his contemporaries recognized his arguments from political battles that had been
fought over the closing of the Bauhaus in the Third Reich.180 However, participants in the
1950s discourse on architecture and design developed an underlying uneasiness about
functionalism as a revisionist official aesthetic. The debate evolved around the digression
of functionalism from a social program aimed at reforming societal stratification through
material uplift into an iconic form, a style that covered up persisting social relationships.
As Frederic J. Schwartz noted, in the public sphere of the FRG, Bauhaus modernism
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served as shorthand for everything that National Socialism opposed.

181

Accordingly, this

invention offered postwar designers safe aesthetic references that distinguished West
Germany culturally from the Third Reich. On the one hand, this enabled both
theoreticians and practitioners of design to circumvent any serious consideration of social
function. However, functionalism’s association with an untainted past made it difficult
for the intellectual elite to critique the aesthetic and its political utilization. Associated
with western democratic values, Schwartz concludes, Bauhaus aesthetics left the FRG
without the necessary reference points, concepts or terminology to move beyond its
past.182 Caught between its history and the communist alternative in the East, West
Germany faced more than a rhetorical problem – the discourse warranted a new language
that carried social significance.
The lack of a material philosophy informed by the social dimension greatly
affected the way West German design politicians communicated the everyday merits of
official postwar domestic culture. Early exhibitions struggled to persuade the population
that they should welcome functionalist furniture into their homes. A pragmatic
terminology developed that had no social reference point, but rather echoed wartime
appeals for perseverance. One of the first exhibitions that proposed a new West German
Wohnkultur went up in Stuttgart in 1949. How to dwell? (wie wohnen?) was a
collaboration of the regional Werkbund with the local chamber of commerce.
Acknowledging popular ambitions of home ownership in his contribution to the
exhibition catalog, the chamber’s deputy president wrote: “A house for the family is the
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dream of many. Rightfully so! A people that cultivates domestic culture does not give up
on itself.”183 Given postwar reality of bombed out urban areas, however, the attentive
reader also learned that, for the time being, Germans had to content themselves with
smaller apartments. “The occurring changes require completely different things. […] The
small apartment is not transitional, it is constant.”184 The hardships of the changed
housing situation engendered nostalgia for a comfortable past that the war had put out of
reach. In an effort to make their new apartments feel like home, many West Germans
acquired furnishings that reminded them of better times, much to the disdain of design
politicians. Their consumption choices, guided by sentimentality rather than the actual
limitations of the postwar situation, only confirmed the Werkbund in its task of regulating
consumption. Advancing a practical attitude toward furnishings, the exhibition catalog
promoted the advantages of modern materials such as glass, metal and plastics in
furniture design. To illustrate their point, the organizers chose Egon Eiermann’s wicker
chair. A light but uncomfortable piece, Eiermann’s chair would be featured in the
German pavilion at the Brussels World Exposition years later in 1958, to embody this
break with an iconic past.
Rather than embracing the challenge of instilling material culture with the means
for reform, even Werkbund members, once firm in the terminology of social uplift,
struggled to describe any underlying welfare concepts of West Germany’s striving
Wohnkultur. In anticipation of the 1957 Interbau architecture exposition in Berlin, a
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milestone in international modern public housing construction, the Rat für Formgebung
showed the furnishings for one of the projected apartments at H55, an interior design
summit in Swedish Hälsingborg. Instead of explaining how the exhibited solutions would
improve living conditions for the masses, however, some Werkbund members voiced
frustration with the exhibition’s limitations that had resulted in the jury’s design choices.
For example, Mia Seeger limited her description of the presented interior design solutions
to the fact that both the exhibition space and the requirement to display exclusively
serially manufactured products had restricted the German committee to space-saving
furniture.185
With her professional expertise, Seeger should have been able to articulate the
new West German social outlook in design, had there been one. At Erhard’s request,
Seeger became a member of the Rat für Formgebung in 1951 and became its first
executive manager of in 1954.186 She had earned her place as an organizer and juror
among progressive architects and designers during a long assistantship with the Stuttgart
Werkbund office before the Second World War.187 However, her expertise only
underscored the social ignorance of West German domestic culture in the H55 catalog.
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Other European countries, particularly in Scandinavia, were much more advanced in
respect to public housing and general welfare. In comparison, the West German
application of interwar modernism looked insubstantial. It had lost the reform component
that once propelled the members of New Objectivity and Neues Bauen to the top ranks of
Europe’s leftist visionaries.
German intellectuals from the political left, motivated by the general population’s
rising concerns about capitalism’s shortcomings over the course of the 1960s, reignited
the critique of its material markers. The Cold War’s escalating arms race and the politics
of nuclear deterrence had shown that trade and collective prosperity failed to fulfill the
promise of world peace.188 Modernist design began to stand for this failure of a
humanistic capitalist order. In his 1965 critique of “functionalism Today” at the annual
Werkbund conference, leftist philosopher Theodor Adorno discussed the emptiness of
postwar modernism.189 He historicized the functionalist rejection of ornamentation,
emphasizing that one era’s indispensible design feature could easily turn into obsolete
ornamentation for the next generation.190 To Adorno, its negative historicism uncovered
functionalism as a political dogma. The prescriptive idea inherent in functionalism, the
defined relationship between form and utility, Adorno argued, rendered the functionalist
object “unfree.” To include society into the process of cultural reinscription, he suggested
to open up materiality to unknown functions, thus yielding more humane objects.
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As the debate continued, the design periodical Form published a series of articles
that became increasingly critical of functionalism over the following years. This
discourse highlighted some decisive shortcomings in the first inception of functionalism.
One fundamental problem was that the designers considered to have fathered
functionalism, Henri Labrouste and Louis Sullivan, who coined the term “Form follows
function,” had never actually defined what function meant: the practicable, the useful or
the technically optimized?191 On closer examination, functionalism started to look more
like an ideology than an aesthetic truth. Contributors to this design discourse demanded
the sacrifice of the “sacred cows” of functionalism. By 1969, the Form pronounced
“grandpa’s functionalism” dead. 192
The legacy of functionalism’s shaky foundation, however, did not end here. The
Weimar designer generation’s inability to address the social function of design multiplied
through its teaching, thereby created generations of “socially unconscious” designers.
Germany’s only educational institution founded on the assumption that material culture
necessarily represented political consciousness, the Hochschule für Gestaltung in Ulm,
closed its doors in 1968. Even if the school had remained open, its functionalist
dogmatism had lost its attraction by the late 1960s.193 In the first postwar generation,
many industrial designers had a practical background in the crafts. Rolf Heide, one of the
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most influential neo-functionalist designers in Germany to date, began his career in 1950
as a cabinet-maker.194 He studied architecture at the Muthesiusschule in Kiel, which was
named after one of the Werkbund founders Hermann Muthesius. His colleague Peter
Maly followed a similar path.195 When asked about the social vision behind their designs,
both responded that a consideration of social function was not important to their design
process. Rather, they made things to be beautiful, not socially responsible.196 Maly and
Heide embodied the absence of a social philosophy in the West German discourse on
material culture.
At the end of the 1960s, it becomes clear that functionalism, with its fetishization
of geometric forms, had been uncovered as being inherently production oriented, while
ignoring the consumer. At the same time that Bonn withdrew its commitment to the Rat
für Formgebung, the FRG grew unable to conceal its decision to follow a less humane
economic program. In an effort to salvage the national functional aesthetic, the debate
moved on to consider Adorno’s proposed extended functionalism (erweiterter
Funktionalismus), one that designs objects to serve humanity rather than maltreat it with
sharp edges.197 Wagenfeld had worried that the Federal Republic on its path toward
capitalism would lose sight of the significance of materiality. This concern had not only
manifested itself in the language of functionality, but also multiplied through the
teachings of his contemporaries. To theoreticians and practitioners of design, these
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conclusions presented a disillusioning bottom line to two decades of reconstruction
discourse and its failure to instill West German material culture with an agenda that stood
for human improvement. Any motivation to think about the human aspect of design, it
seemed, originated from the socialist German alternative across the border.
Within socialism, designers intrinsically considered how their designs improved
the human condition. At the center stood the new socialist man and his material
environment, a theoretical and practical challenge for socialist societies since the
constructivism of the 1920s. Yet in the case of the German postwar socialism, the line
between collectivist theory and individualistic practice was blurred. West German
economic success, along with the legitimacy that the Federal Republic derived from it,
forced the GDR to soft-peddle on the question of consumer goods in order to convince
the population of the merits of socialism.
In an effort to culturally align with the Soviet Union and to differentiate itself
from the Federal Republic, Ulbricht purged Weimar modernism and its disciples from
cultural and educational institutions between 1951 and 1954. The “Formalism Debate”
established a cultural consensus supportive of German cultural heritage, in contrast to
“artless and cosmopolitan” modernism in the West. While Socialist Realism became the
main artistic expression in the GDR, its backwardness often produced products that taste
reformer Horst Michel described as Kitsch. In the applied arts, historical styles such as
Rococo, Classicism, and Biedermeier inspired the cultural rebirth of the East German
state. This style also favored ornamentation over functionality and hygiene – an
especially important aspect for household wares. After dealing with the scarcity of
furniture in the late 1940s, the 1950s reintroduced personal comfort (Behaglichkeit) into
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the discourse.
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over economic considerations and production ethics. His self-appointed mission to
provide the GDR with honest, unassuming designs seemed jeopardized by the very
policies that the Party decreed. From the beginning, Michel was at odds with the new
culture doctrine. Already in late 1950, he stated that “the person who buys Rococo china
in 1950 shows bad taste.”199 He reiterated this position in 1952 at the first conference for
interior design at the Deutsche Bauakademie: “This [cultural policy] cannot end in
providing “princely” furniture to the working people. We shouldn’t talk them into things
that look like bourgeois riches, instead we need to give them real riches that serve
humanity.”200
With such a contrary view on socialist material culture, it is somewhat surprising
that Michel remained an influential figure of national importance. His work gained
recognition abroad in 1957 when the West German Institut für neue technische Form in
Darmstadt organized an exhibition that featuring the designs of Michel and his Weimar
colleagues. West German designers perceived Weimar’s designs as the East’s “return” to
functional shapes, celebrating the emergence of a “functionalist German style” on both
sides of the German-German border.201 However, this was a premature celebration of a
shared aesthetics. At the Culture Conference of 1957, the SED renewed the claim for a
“socialist-realist culture.” It declared cultural work a political mass phenomenon for the
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working population, a view contrary to the elitism in the West. The following year the
political leadership connected cultural renewal with its economic goals and “declared” a
cultural revolution for the victory of socialism at the fifth SED Party Congress 1958 in
East Berlin.
In the spring of the following year, the Bitterfeld Conference, a conference of
writers with representatives of the government, the Party, workers, and the intelligentsia,
discussed the prospects of assimilating workers and peasants into Socialist Realism. A
resulting politico-cultural program that aimed at overcoming the previous detachment
between the arts and workers became known as the Bitterfelder Weg.202 This new attitude
diffused through all areas of the state, even the economy. By holding official industrial
design competitions across industrial sectors, economic planners attempted to include the
working people in the process of finding a socialist culture that corresponded to the needs
and taste of the population.203 In this way, they believed, waste and kitsch would be
avoided. At Bitterfeld, Ulbricht himself spoke about the evils of kitsch, calling it the
“heritage of capitalism,” implying that profit-oriented mass production ignored cultural
responsibility.204 In the same vein, Michel wrote the pamphlet The Industrial Designer on
the Bitterfeld Path (Der Industrieformgestalter auf dem Bitterfelder Weg), in which he
criticized the lack of cooperation between designers and workers in socialist production.
Arguing that only the laborers truly knew their needs, Michel maintained that the state
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should rely on them to eliminate the production of “commodities that do not comply with
our Zeitgeist. Bourgeois kitsch, modernist Formalism, decadence and snobbism are not
befitting for us.”205 The Bitterfelder Weg pursued a more holistic approach to mass
production, implying the possibility of responsible socialist manufacturing.
Meanwhile, economic planners struggled with the implications of economic
socialism for the consumption of the population. This discourse developed parallel to the
cultural debates at the Bitterfeld Conference and tried to bring centralization,
rationalization, and standardization in line with the level of cultural significance that
Ulbricht had required. Fearing that a rigid restructuring of production would flatten the
cultural value in socialist materiality, the question of how to retain a “domestic culture
despite standardization” arose.206 At the occasion of the first standardization show in
Leipzig in 1959-1960, the GDR interior design journal Kultur im Heim initiated a
prophylactic discussion to combat the impression that standardization would necessarily
lead to uniform apartment furnishings.207 Alongside pictures of the first standardized
living room furniture sets, the journal asked its readers “Would you have guessed that
these are standardized pieces?” However, no matter how tasteful the execution,
standardization and assortment streamlining (Sortimentsbereinigung) logically resulted in
limited choices for consumers.
To quell consumer discontent, the Zentralinstitut needed to justify the monotony
caused by standardization. By introducing leftist cultural intellectual Giulio Carlo Argan
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into the debate, designers and policymakers tried to reconcile the paradox of uniformity
with individuality. Designer and Zentralinstitut employee Ekkehard Bartsch quoted
Argan’s formalistic critique of Weimar modernity, stating “when industry exclusively
reproduced shapes that were meant for crafts, that is as singular pieces, monotony
resulted from the repetition of these formal specialties.” On the contrary, he argued,
standardization celebrated the generalized shape because “the machine has no other job
than to make a thousand pieces of it” and thus “identity and not uniformity results,
because every object will keep the character of an original.”208 According to this
interpretation, uniformity was only present in form because of its assigned function.
Identity, on the other hand, was inherent in standardization, because it was left to the
owner to ascribe a product’s specific function, thus leaving the object to fulfill individual
expectations:
The individual can develop freely and creatively only on the basis of standardized
production. Only when humans stop seeing the fruits of their material ambitions
as a marker of their social status and attitude will they finally be able to benefit
from technological innovation. Products become real servants of his [sic]
existence, he himself stands in the center, not his supporting equipment.209
This position had much in common with Adorno’s suggestion for an extended
functionalism that considered the human being. In other words, the FRG and the GDR
faced very different challenges in changing social relations through material culture, but,
by the mid-1960s, they arrived at similar ways of thinking about the place of objects in
industrial society.
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In practice, however, GDR planners and designers soon realized that the
production and efficiency-oriented organization of mass serial production rendered a
small number of furniture models ubiquitous. This, in turn, led to the feared “moral
deterioration” (“moralischer Verschleiß”) of the individual designs and thus a loss of
their cultural identity.210 The challenge here was to find a happy medium between
industrial productivity and socio-cultural demands. It was neither in the interest of the
GDR leadership nor its goal to make public and private life entirely uniform – the GDR
always wanted to keep the appearance of a dictatorship with a human face.
A concept for a GDR design retrospective under the working title “From Bauhaus
to Bitterfeld” (Vom Bauhaus bis Bitterfeld) attempted to describe design around 1960.
Yet even the design politicians involved in these decisions could not sufficiently explain
the ambiguity of GDR design politics of the early 1960s, because of the blurry line
between official design verdict and production reality.
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While the diversity of

permissible forms increased again, some formal, if arbitrary, limits continued to exist, as
the later generation of designer discovered. They unsuccessfully tried to make sense of
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official distain for designer Hubert Petras cylindrical, plain white vases, which had been
exhibited at the fifth Dresden Art Exhibition in 1962: “The strict, compromise-less
cylinder shapes delineated themselves from shallow industrial mass production. Yet
officials agreed that they run counter to the optimistic attitude towards life of a civilized
people with a happy future.”212 Each object thus was judged on its own merit, without
considering the context. Only in 1965 did the Zentralinstitut put on an exhibition that
featured multiple objects in completed interior design settings. Titled Modern Dwelling
(Modernes Wohnen) the exhibition constituted an experiment in Hoyerswerda, Saxony.
Furniture that had come under scrutiny in the 1950s, such as Hellerau’s Model 602, was
prominently featured in the display.213 Sponsored by the Zentralinstitut, the 15,000
visitors saw the exhibition for free. For the first time in a decade, their opinions were not
only recorded, but also coveted to evaluate the success of the new, holistic exhibition
concept. Not so surprisingly, the modern way of living found broad acceptance, but the
limited availability of the displayed products frustrated the population.214 As the
increasingly centralized economy tried to catch up in the realm of consumer goods in the
1960s, exhibitions presented material possibility instead of reality. People in rural areas
understood the modern lifestyle from an aesthetic and practical point of view, yet the
markers of progression remained largely unavailable.

212

DWB exhibition “Vom Bauhaus bis Bitterfeld,” Frankfurt a.M., December 1990, n.d. “Ausstellungen
AIF, diverse Fotos,” Sammlung industrielle Gestaltung [hereafter referred to as SiG].
213
Abschlussbericht zur Austellung “Modernes Wohnen” in Hoyerswerda, Tiergartenmuseum, 8 November
1965, “Ausstellungen AIF, diverse Fotos,” SiG.
214
Folder, 1965 Ausstellung “Modernes Wohnen” Hoyerswerda, Zentralinstitut für Formgestaltung, 1965,
Ausstellungen AIF, diverse Fotos,” SiG. These visitor comments echoed the sentiment expressed at an
exhibition that the Zentralinstitut organized in Neubrandenburg earlier that year. Folder, Ausstellung
“Form” Neubrandenburg, Zentralinstitut für Formgestaltung, 1965, Ausstellungen AIF, diverse Fotos,”
SiG.

91

After years of fighting kitschy ornamentation and outdated lavish designs, the turn
in cultural policy from Socialist Realism to modern idioms confronted taste reformers
such as Michel with the opposite extreme – fashionable and modish designs that outlived
their aesthetic lifespan within a few years. In response, Michel shifted from criticizing
backward-looking stylistic historicism to warning against exaggerated originality and
avant-gardism. Michel reiterated his concerns in 1964 on the occasion of the
Zentralinstitut’s reorganization under the roof of the DAMW, which included the
implementation of standardized design criteria for technological product evaluation.
Pointing out that quality in mass production was difficult to maintain, he rejected the
argument advanced by producers and retail that “products are designed badly because of
popular taste and demand.”215 The guest books of the aforementioned exhibition attest to
the fact that at least parts of the population liked modernist-inspired designs. Though
Michel acknowledged the sincerity behind this line of argument, he suggested that until
this point the efforts undertaken to achieve better designs were insufficient. After all, “in
every type of taste, in every style, tasteless products exist. It is the task of the designer to
create something decent in every individual or seasonally conditioned taste.”216 Rejecting
doctrinaire one-sidedness that favored a specific style or slavishly followed official
cultural policies, Michel saw material socialism play out in the relationship between the
product and its user. His plea for moderation as a guiding concept in a country that tried
to propel its economy forward with centralization and Five-Year Plans, though, did not
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align well with communist ambitions for membership among the leading industrial
nations.
Toward the end of the decade, GDR design politicians fully embraced the leftist
politics of interwar modernism. To honor the 1968 twenty-year anniversary of the state’s
founding, the Zentralinstitut organized an exhibition that put GDR design at the
intersection of the Bauhaus/Werkbund tradition and Soviet constructivism. The historical
section addressed a range of artistic expressions that the GDR designers saw themselves
indebted to: 1840-1895 historicism and eclecticism, 1895-1915 arts and crafts reform
movements and stylistic art such as Art Nouveau and Neoclassicism, and finally 19181933 New Objectivity, Expressionism, and Functionalism.217 This exhibition plan was
the first to list the latter two among the roots of socialist design in East Germany and paid
special attention to the leftist politics of some of its protagonists. In contrast to the West
Germany, the social program of interwar modernism fit right into the GDR discourse on a
socialist way of life.218
With the abolition of Socialist Realism as artistic maxim, the Zentralinstitut’s
internal communication shifted course from cultural definitions to questions of socialist
scientific progress in the 1960s and 1970s.219 The main prerequisite in the institute’s
work remained the improvement and design of the socialist way of life within the GDR,
but technological and economic considerations took over. Walter Ulbricht laid out the
agenda in his presentation on “Basic Tasks for the Year 1970” accordingly: “The quality
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of housing influences work productivity and development of the socialist identity. People
reproduce their labor mainly in housing areas. With the evolution of a socialist mode of
life, though, qualitatively new demands on housing develop.”220 The design of the home
and of kitchen furniture was to be purposeful and pragmatic in order to free up time to do
“more pleasant and useful things, such as cultural activities or educating ourselves.”221
Nonetheless, some aesthetic concerns joined this practical approach to the housing
environment: “Bad shape and color effects of tools, home textiles or furniture limit our
joy of habitation.”222 The government thus understood the home to be an important part
of the workers’ state, a place of recuperation and recovery from and for work as well as a
locus for self-improvement -- socialist aesthetic concepts were thought to greatly enhance
these processes. Yet the Party continued to fail in providing a clear definition of everyday
needs for a “socialist way of life.” Determining these markers of socialist life was left to
the Zentralinstitut and later the Amt für Formgestaltung, which approached the problem
through research as their assignment was to “influence the scientific determination of
requirements in future living in order to create the basis for future designs of the living
environment.”223 By turning the aesthetic reconstitution of East German material culture
into a scientific experiment, the GDR aligned its conception of the human environment
with its general scientific-economic interpretation of socialism. At the same time, it
caught up with Khrushchev’s rationalization of the Soviet everyday, which proclaimed
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technology as the locus of communist modernization.

224

Once again, the population took

the backseat to larger considerations of international and economic importance.
Moreover, the GDR made the decisive move to engage West Germany in the struggle for
economic preeminence in the German Question and gave up its advantageous position as
the Germany that, in a complete break with the past, built its material culture around
socialist ideals.

Leading by Example: A Visual and Tactile Experience of Wohnkultur
Without a convincing social message behind material culture, the problem of how
designers and design politicians could communicate national aesthetics to the population
emerged. “Show and tell” became a popular method in the two German states to generate
public acceptance of their respective modern domestic cultures. The Werkbund and the
Zentralinstitut in cooperation with regional administration put together a range of
activities that brought the message to the people. These endeavors targeted all ages to
ensure the education of present and future consumers to buy the “right” products for the
building of socialist and capitalist society.225
In 1954, the West Berlin Werkbund was the first to initiate taste education
(Geschmackserziehung), a form of consumer education that relies on clear distinctions
224
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between good and bad design, in secondary schools of the divided city.

To provide

teachers with materials for demonstration, the Berliners invented so-called “Werkbund
Boxes” (Werkbundkisten) that they filled with exemplary objects for the students to see,
touch, and utilize in the classroom. The Werkbund arranged the objects in the boxes
according to their material, function, utility, technology, shape, and color. Different
thematic foci – “work space”, “kitchen appliances”, and “the set table” – engendered
among the students a sense of utilitarian order and emotional context for the products in
each box (see figure 5). Teachers could borrow the Werkbund Boxes free of charge and
integrate them in the arts curriculum as they saw fit. In 1967, Lower Saxony was the last
to join in with the states of Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, which had been lending
similar boxes to primary and secondary schools since 1956. Often, the boxes contained
design of Werkbund members Heinrich Löffelhardt and Wilhelm Wagenfeld, and firms
close to the association, such as Zwiesel glass, Arzberg china, and Carl Pott cutlery.227
Teachers received instruction manuals for discussing how the design corresponded to the
function of the objects. Again, material culture’s potential for social reform was not an
issue, but the assembled products represented for social norms. Some of the boxes, like
the ones that focused on table settings, not only provided objects to look at, but also
encouraged students to utilize them in simulations of family meals. In this way, the
younger generation learned about the social traditions of objects while receiving an
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aesthetic education, thus perpetuating conservative concepts of family and social
relations.228
With the intellectual critique of functionalism, which in later years went by the
moniker of “Good Design,” the Werkbundkisten initiative began to lose momentum in the
early 1970s. One state after the other ended the program in the general climate of antiauthoritarianism and youth protest. At the same time the art education curriculum moved
away from the fetishization of function as the guiding principle for instruction on form
and “good taste.” A final report of the Werkbund in Lower Saxony stated that “Sociopolitical demands in school and the youth’s skepticism toward things that they perceive
as representations of the establishment lead to a loss of their binding character or even to
an urge to fight them - which make conventional art education impossible” when they
ended their short-lived box program in 1970.229 As with Adorno’s critique of
functionalism only a few years earlier, the Werkbund had to realize that their prescriptive
vision of the relationship between people and their material environment had become
outdated.
In the GDR students’ education in their relationship to the material environment
took a completely different point of departure. After the secondary school reforms of
1958, the curriculum required poly-technical education and industrial apprenticeships.230
The underlying principles of this program had similar intentions as the Bitterfelder Weg
by acquainting school students with the means of production in connection with the
228
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cultural value of objects.

It also aimed at introducing university-bound students to the

everyday experiences of workers, familiarizing them with the social foundations of the
German socialist state. In the West, professional internships became increasingly
common in later decades, but here the goal lay in preparing young people for their
vocations.
To target the adult population who possessed actual buying power, both the
Werkbund and the Zentralinstitut started interior design counseling.232 The so-called
Wohnberatungen developed around the Federal Republic, starting in 1953 in
Mannheim.233 By 1972, sixteen Werkbund-affiliated Wohnberatungsstellen received
subsidies from the Ministry for Housing (Ministerium für Wohnungswesen) and
municipalities across the republic.234 As such political support indicates, interior design
counseling had an educational mission tied to welfare and social reform. However, the
usual discrepancy between assertion and reality caught up with the Werkbund. Instead of
explaining ways of creating a humane living environment with limited resources, the
mission fell back on cultivating a West German domestic culture by impressing the
functional aesthetic of Good Design on the population.235 Customers brought blueprints
of their apartments to trained interior decorators who used model furniture, samples
ranging from wallpaper to tea sets, and continuously updated product indexes to help
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them find space-saving solutions for their home. Some of the Wohnberatungen further
offered exhibitions that displayed examples of Good Design or presented an idealized
apartment setting. At the 1957 Interbau exhibit in Berlin, the Werkbund not only offered
advice for the home in similar exhibitions, but also for leisure time consumption. This
involvement in all areas of the material environment epitomizes the Werkbund’s
paternalistic claim through taste and consumer education to regulate the way in which the
population led its life.236 As the dogmatism of functionalism came under increasing
critique with the social protest around 1968, the Werkbund eventually joined the critique
and changed the counseling in Wohnberatungen to consider the social context and to
move away from “the taste of an elite of sensitive esthetes.”237 Michael Andritzky, the
Werkbund member most involved with Wohnberatung, finally demanded that interior
design counseling should divorce itself from politics and economic interests.238
While the West German Werkbund tried to distance itself from the political order,
the socialist order of the GDR practically produced Wohnberatung. With a change of the
economic orientation from heavy industry toward consumer good production under
Ulbricht’s 1963 New Economic System of Planning and Steering (NES), furniture retail
morphed from fulfilling the most basic needs of the population to a more service-oriented
organization. For example, the Wohnberatung in Karl-Marx-Stadt, Ulbricht’s idealized
socialist industrial city both in regard to urban planning and architecture, joined the retail
organization in the district in 1964.239 Just like their Western counterparts, interior
designers advised customers with the help of samples, product catalogs, and mini236
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exhibitions that promoted ideologically correct furniture and advertised new synthetic
materials, such as Melafol. As part of the service, interior designers distributed
information about where the customers could find specific designs, no small
accomplishment in the state of chronic consumer product scarcity of the East German
planned economy.240
The head of the Dresden interior design department Furniture Retail District
Dresden, Hans Lindemann, exemplifies how Wohnberatung was interlinked with the
economic system.241 Aside from counseling consumers, Lindemann also published texts
about good taste in socialism, traveled around the district and paid house visits, educated
other interior designers and functioned as liaison to the council that decided over the
product range rationalization. Within the constraints of the planned economy, the mission
of the Wohnberatung was to create domestic environments that enabled and supported
new experiences as well as ignite the population’s joie de vivre.242 These services were
free unless the customer asked for the conception of an entire apartment. Nevertheless,
the personal comfort of the home came second to the overall economic goals.
Wohnberatung belonged to an entire institutionalized system that “ ‘trained’ consumers
to ’want’ what the government decided that they ‘needed.’ ”243 Since many customers
moved into the new standardized, prefabricated high-rises that arose across East
Germany, many of the new apartments had the identical blue-print. Thus, the problem of
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moral degeneration linked to standardization that contributed to a loss in cultural value of
GDR industrial design reemerged.
Despite, or even because of, the failure of design politicians and intellectuals to
develop a terminology that could give East and West German domestic culture a
profound socio-cultural meaning, the market for interior design publications boomed by
the mid-1960s. This medium communicated trends, new ideas, and tastes through images.
, thus amending the discourse’s silence with pictures that showed how one should live in
modern postwar Germany. In a survey conducted in 1962 and 1963 in Cologne and its
suburbs, sociologist Alphons Silbermann, found that among the design interested
Cologne inhabitants with basic schooling, 39 percent read articles on furnishings and
living spaces. Among those with a secondary education (Gymnasium), this number
increased to 69 percent.244 Readers usually referred to special interior design magazines,
the daily press or (lifestyle) magazines for information on interior design.245
Consequently, the media catered to a broad audiences ranging from experts to the
generally interested.
Looking through the design press in postwar Germany, three types of design
magazines emerge that differed in focus and target audience. The West German design
magazine Form moved gradually toward a specialized and professional audience. When
it first was conceptualized in 1957, it strongly connected to the Werkbund’s general
mission of educating the public about Good Design. Jupp Ernst and Wilhelm Wagenfeld
served on the board of editors. Over the following years, renowned architects and
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designers such as Max Bill, Marcel Breuer, Walter Gropius, R. Buckminster Fuller,
Misha Black, Fritz Eichler, Luigi Nervi, and Herbert Read assembled around the editors’
table at the Form offices. Initially named Internationale Revue – Form, which signified a
broader interest in shapes in the everyday around the globe, the editorial board changed
the name to Form – Zeitschrift für Gestaltung in 1966, which indicates a target shift away
from a general audience to professionals and the design-interested. Along with this
specialized audience came increasingly specialized debates, such as the critique of
functionalism in the late 1960s. Before, these debates had taken place exclusively in the
Werkbund newspaper Werk und Zeit, shielded from the actual people who were the
subject of these discourses. Rather than offering concrete advice as how to furnish
German homes, the journal depicted images of new design trends and artistic
developments that mostly remained highly abstract. In this regard, Form took on a hybrid
form of half specialist, half generalist medium that was available at newsstands across the
country and even on the other side of the border. There, GDR design professionals also
read Form to stay informed about the developments in the West.246
Prior to the first issue of Form, the Institut für angewandte Kunst (later renamed
Zentralinstitut and Amt für industrielle Formgestaltung) published the first volume of its
specialized industrial design journal Form und Zweck (Form and Function) in 1956. The
publication became a forum for institute employees and design professionals to show the
connection between politics, ideology, and industrial design.247 While designers
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presented and described the scientific data for their designs, Form und Zweck did not
provide advice on how Germans should furnish their homes. The debates remained
largely scientific and ideological, without any application to the real living conditions of
the masses.
Interior design magazines, on the other hand, developed a broader, popular
appeal. In 1957, Kultur im Heim (Culture at Home) showed the early concern of
socialism for the domestic environment and its affect on the New Man. The editors put
great emphasis on images for presenting new designs. The pictures usually provided the
context of arranged living situations, though most of them stemmed from company or fair
displays. The logic behind orchestrated displays aimed at achieving emotional reactions.
Horst Michel explained the merits of using a holistic approach to interior design with
complete displays: “A vase does not hover in a vacuum. It stands on a piece of furniture,
perhaps on a patterned table cloth, next to another object in front of a colored wall with
pictures, and there are flowers in the vase […] Only in accord with other things does an
emotional impact arise.”

248

Such settings demonstrated a cohesive socialist domestic

culture in contexts that the population could easily apply to their homes, where
furnishings created a sense of repose, comfort, and, in the years of Honecker’s party rule,
privacy.249
The most successful West German interior design magazine Schöner Wohnen
(Better Living) utilized similarly idealized settings. The magazine has influenced West
German tastes from 1960 until today. After a successful first issue in 1960, its readership
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quickly grew to two million.

250

Filled with pictures of the newest trends in furniture

design, color palettes, and room arrangements, Schöner Wohnen brought interior design
to the masses in an effort to promote aesthetically cohesive German living environments
(see figure 6). Studio photographs populated the pages of the magazine, an art form in
and of itself as the founding-editor-in-chief Josef Kremerkothen noted: “Small rooms
could not look cramped, improvisation could not seem primitive – they had to appear
lively […], light had to create atmosphere […], colours had to be finely matched with
materials.”251 Interior designer Peter Maly, fresh out of school in Detmold, joined the
magazine in its start-up phase and developed into one of the most talented studio
designers. As the furniture industry was still recovering from the war, some prized pieces
remained unavailable to complete the “look” of a room. Maly, therefore, began designing
the missing furniture himself, which led to a number of collaborations with high-end
furniture producers, launching his career as an internationally successful furniture
designer.
The practice of arranging settings created an entire generation of interior
designers in the FRG who knew how to find the best light, up-to-date color combinations
and leading designs. These new designers, however, did not take into consideration their
actual human utility.252 After Rolf Heide finished his architecture studies in Hamburg, he
started working for Germany’s most successful women’s magazine Brigitte in 1959. He
oversaw a magazine section dedicated to giving practical advice in response to reader

250

With a distribution of more than 3 million readers in 2011, it has grown into one of the biggest European
lifestyle magazines. AWA 2011. http://www.gujmedia.de/print/portfolio/schoener-wohnen/profil/ accessed
on 2/18/2012.
251
Kremerskothen, “ Wegstücke,” 25.
252
Kremerskothen, “Wohnen wie noch nie,” 14.

104

questions. However, his designs incorporated real world problems, such as how to
combine antique with new furniture or cheap furniture with designer collector’s items
(see figures 7 and 8). This column’s success inspired the publishing house Gruner and
Jahr to publish Schöner Wohnen, the first magazine to exclusively focus on the domestic
environment, which Heide joined in 1970.253 Henceforth, he also created idealized room
arrangement and exerted tremendous influence in the shaping of population’s interior
design taste.
In the GDR, the utilization of studio pictures took a completely different
direction. By the late 1970s, Kultur im Heim, the East German counterpart to Schöner
Wohnen, abandoned ideal room arrangements in exchange for actual apartments. This
development has been associated with the loosening of the Party’s hold on every facet of
public and private life.254 On closer examination of the magazine itself, it becomes
evident that this change in imagery developed alongside the stagnation of GDR furniture
design. In order to create a smokescreen of consumer choices and options, the editors
often resorted to showing the same furniture in the same standardized pre-fabricated
apartments, but in the context of different subcultures and lifestyles, hoping readers might
not notice. As the East German state overextended itself with Erich Honecker’s the
consumer promises of the 1972 Unity of Economic and Social Policy, the publication
changed focus from showing the population the unavailable possibilities of socialist
production to the make-do ideas of their neighbors. In this way, the publication avoided
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causing the kind of public disgruntlement that the earlier interior design exhibitions had
created.

Conclusion
By exploring the avenues of communication between theoreticians, practitioners,
and consumers of design, this study captures debates surrounding the social significance
of design in general, and domestic culture in particular. The demise of functionalism as
an aesthetic truth affected the two German states in different but related ways. As
functionalism fell from grace in the Federal Republic in the late 1960s, it had just found a
platform in the GDR. Not surprisingly, initiatives to bring this national aesthetics to the
masses flourished during this period. By visualizing the emotional context of furniture in
arranged displays and on blueprints of family homes at Wohnberatungen, the Werkbund
and the Zentralinstitut brought their vision to the people. Students in East and West
experienced material culture in art and poly-technical instruction. Here, they received
lessons not only about aesthetics but also about the social relations in their respective part
of Germany.
Design publications, exhibitions, and interior design magazines played an
important part in official style diffusion throughout the two German societies. In the early
1950s, alongside the establishment of design institutions, a flurry of publication activities
commenced in both Germanys. At first, print materials about new aesthetics became
available through design exhibitions. Such communication channels then solidified
through a robust magazine culture in East and West supported by practitioners of
industrial and interior design, as well as those interested in home-decor. Moreover, these

106

readers used journals and magazines to learn about design innovations in the respective
“other” Germany. Lost for words, the press and professional design journals created
idealized studio photographs to promote the appearance of the new national culture.
Designers, politicians, and retailers hoped that consumers would internalize these images
and make their consumer choices in support of the aspired national aesthetic.
But the discursive developments in the GDR are not as much a result of a lacking
social reform idea as in the West. Socialism inherently pushed for a revolution of the
social and cultural fabric. While this debate began with the cultural concerns surrounding
Socialist Realism, namely integration in the Eastern Bloc and demarcation from West
Germany, it received a new quality when the principles of production became the leading
influence in policy-making. Following Michel’s aesthetic interventions allows insights
into the changing meaning and function of socialist material culture, as Michel
condemned the same kitsch products that the government promoted as the epitome of
GDR national culture. With an aesthetic of moderation, Michel continuously contested
East German state socialism’s material and political ambitions, while pursuing a
consciously socialist production.
Whereas Michel was a proponent of centralized industrial organization, he
promoted only small and medium scale production to keep social responsibility a part of
manufacturing. With the standardization of product ranges, he hoped to have more
control over what was produced as well as distributed to the East German home.255 This
attitude did not foreclose diverse styles, as long as they moderately interpreted a taste or
fashion. Michel did not believe in coercion and taste dictation. He rather strove to
255
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enlighten retail buyers and consumers to positively influence production with the right
demand. Michel helped establish a modern vision during the reconstruction years and the
Bitterfelder Weg in the late 1950s and early 1960s, he was unable to leave a mark on the
Formalism Debate and the later years of modish production. In these phases, which of
course overlapped not coincidentally with heightened Cold War tension and deteriorating
German-German relations in the early 1950s and1960s, moderation contradicted GDR
ambitions. A distinct national culture and mass production presented two ways in which
East Germany aimed to earn a higher profile in the postwar world.
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CHAPTER 3: PRODUCING MODERN GERMAN HOMES:
THE ECONOMY OF NATIONAL BRANDING
Introduction
The goal of turning the discourse on official aesthetics into practice set both
German states on a track that business historians have called “national branding.”256 This
term describes the efforts of a network of designers and producers to create a narrative of
political significance around their products. The urge to give greater meaning to their
works fits well within the political climate of the Cold War period, when an important
component of German-German relations emphasized competing ways of living.
Designers and producers created a narrative that took “home furnishings and associate[d]
them with established cultural categories and principles, moving meaning from the
culturally constituted world to the consumer good.”257 Like a product brand, divergent
ways of living not only offered both German populations a sense of belonging, but also
promoted their cultural achievements abroad.258 A coherent aesthetic, however, hinged
upon strategic cooperation and communication between the political leadership,
designers, industrialists, and consumers in East and West – an endeavor that, over time,
proved quite difficult to accomplish. In the end, rivaling ideas about German modern
Wohnkultur undermined the necessary narrative coherence for the promotion of East or
West German “corporate identity” at home and abroad, which left the two German states
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vulnerable to external influences and set the stage in the late 1960s for their unintended
aesthetic convergence.259
Taking into consideration the fundamental structural differences between the
economic and political systems of the FRG and GDR, this chapter compares how
policymakers interacted with the industrial sector and consumers to link ideologically
conforming ways of living to economic reconstruction and prosperity. The problem under
consideration here is one of political rhetoric versus economic reality: why, after decades
of cultural delineation, did both states fail to assert an official style, a “national aesthetic”
in German workshops and homes? This chapter is especially interested in exploring
economic and political mechanisms in East and West Germany that impaired the
consistent implementation of official aesthetics in everyday life. First, it looks at the
economic-cultural structures established in East and West to put their respective aesthetic
goals into practice. In a second step, it examines the practical limits of official aesthetic
influence on industrial production and consumption. In the process, both Germanies
moved away from rigid functionalism and Socialist Realism respectively to a shared idea
of economical production and living comfort.

Economic Prosperity and Political Legitimacy
Competition for popular support tied the creation of a coherent national narrative
of postwar German aesthetics directly to economic prosperity, an important sphere of
German-German relations. Material wellbeing and its cultural denominators became
259
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proxies for economic preeminence. Following the example of Richard Nixon and Nikita
Khrushchev’s famous Kitchen Debate at the American National Exhibition in Moscow in
July 1959, the German Democratic Republic entered into competition over standards of
living with the Federal Republic of Germany.260 At the height of the Berlin Crisis in
1959, an “Open Letter to Furniture Workmen in the German Democratic Republic”
explained the workers’ role in the German Cold War for hearts and minds:
In this situation, West Germans look to us. They observe how we live. Our
successes in the social and cultural arena are great and lack an equivalent in the
Bonn Republic. We have made progress in the field of material consumption as
well. And it is in material consumption where we must advance faster to overtake
West Germany.261
At the time, the well-oiled GDR propaganda machine most likely distributed letters such
as this above to all major industries. For workers in the furniture industry, though, the
connection between the socialist way of life, expressed in Wohnkultur, and the fruits of
their labor was especially evident. The idea behind accelerating the development and
production of a distinctly socialist furniture culture aimed at counteracting images of
abundance coming from West Germany.262 Officials of the GDR projected confidence in
their ideological superiority vis-à-vis the West mainly through the display of cultural and
social achievements, such as the integration of the female workforce in the production
process.263 At the same time, politicians could not deny that an impediment to East
260
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German hegemony in the divided country manifested itself in their backward economy –
the Achilles’ heel of state socialism. While the letter identifies slow growth as the cause
for the underperformance of industry, it remains silent about any practical cure. Rather,
economic planners assumed that economic problems could be overcome using willpower
alone – an attitude characteristic of socialist command economies.264 With this letter, the
East German state eventually aligned its economic and political agendas by asking
workers to increase productivity as an expression of progress, and to reach a leadership
position rather than simply membership among industrialized nations.
Part and parcel of this plan was the economic overtake of West Germany, yet its
“economic miracle” gave the Federal Republic a competitive advantage over the GDR.
While literature on the Federal Republic of Germany approaches the West’s foundation
in various ways, historians agree that the prosperity of the social market economy
(soziale Marktwirtschaft) generated support among the population.265 Such popular
support contributed to West Germany’s political legitimacy at home and abroad. Since
many had lived through the stock market crash of 1929 and the resulting global financial
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crisis, which had shaped popular memories of the Weimar Republic and informed
suspicions about democratic rule in the postwar period, economic progress and the
acceptance of a new democratic state went, for a cautious population, hand in hand.266
Therefore, the unprecedented social improvement of the 1950s generated a positive
attitude toward the new democracy. West Germans eventually “identified with the
economic benefits of the Federal Republic of Germany rather than with any political
institutions or traditions.”267 As Mark E. Spicka’s examination of Christian Democrats’
election campaigns in the 1950s reveals, the Adenauer government understood popular
sentiment and used it to form consensus by forging national identities deliberately around
economic policies and the social market economy. With a political culture in place that
evolved around a prosperous and successful economy, the West posed a great challenge
to the relatively economically weak GDR.
The partition of Germany facilitated the western economic miracle. Because of its
diversified national economy, geographical factors as well as structural development
favored the Federal Republic. Traditionally agricultural areas in the east were cut off
from industry in the west, especially in the Ruhr region, southern parts of Lower Saxony,
the Rhine-Main region with continuation to the Rhine-Neckar Region and the region
surrounding Stuttgart in the south. Furthermore, the Rhine river system enabled the
transportation of consumer and bulk goods towards the northern ports. Meanwhile,
because of its location at the edge of the Eastern bloc, the GDR lost its former importance
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in the east-west traffic. The FRG held most of the coal and ore resources, while the
resource-rich areas in the east had been surrendered to Poland. West Germany also had a
larger percentage of climatically favored and consumer-oriented agricultural areas, and
ice-free ports.268 Moreover, the partition prevented the West from having to support the
agrarian East. These favorable conditions, coupled with a modified free-market economy,
left the West well-positioned to quickly increase production to satisfy consumer demand
and to regain foreign markets, beginning with the Korean War in 1950, which led to an
industrial boom that lasted well into the 1960s.269
Years into the reconstruction period, the GDR continued to suffer additional
disadvantage because it shouldered the larger portion of Soviet war reparation claims
after 1945.270 Economic planners countered this weakness in the 1958 collectivization of
industry into “People-Owned Businesses” (Volkseigene Betriebe, VEB) to improve Plan
coordination and increase individual output. One after the other, most every industry
joined the coordination effort to eradicate overlapping production and waste of resources.
Subsequently, the superficial restructuring of regional clusters of furniture industry was
successful in densely industrial areas such as Zeulenroda, Dresden, Themar, Neugersdorf,
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and Oelsa-Rabenau.
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However, where industry was thinly spread out, these attempts at

concentration and specialization did not take hold until the second wave of
collectivization in the 1970s.272
Inferior conditions alone cannot explain the increasing gap between East and
West German economic performance during the Cold War. Economic historians have
offered different explanations for the failure of the GDR economy. Jaap Sleifer blames
the slow improvement of low labor productivity, whereas André Steiner finds the Plan to
have been the cause for bad economic results in the GDR.273 Steiner’s findings suggest
that the Plan set “soft” goals because economic policymakers were never fully
knowledgeable about the real potential of material and human resources, which, he
argues, could have yielded much higher returns.274 As I will show, imperfect linkages
between the production and consumption systems represent another area of
underperformance, which not only negatively influenced technological development, but
also sabotaged the East German national brand narrative and undermined the
population’s identification with the state. Because of the inefficiencies in the GDR
economy, East Germans voted with their feet, steadily migrating westward in search of
better economic and more liberal political conditions. In April 1961 alone 30,000 GDR
citizens fled to the West. This exodus marked an enormous brain drain, since the average
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GDR refugee was young, educated, and highly adaptable.

The general loss of GDR

competence interrupted the country’s technological and scientific development, deeply
undermining its industrial progress. The construction of the Berlin Wall on August 13,
1961, however, abruptly halted this refugee flow.
While many were willing to risk their lives trying to cross the newly fortified GermanGerman border in later years, the number of successful escapes remained extremely
small.
The Berlin Wall stood witness to the economic dissatisfaction and political
disagreement that weakened the GDR’s legitimacy domestically and internationally to
such a degree that the Party felt forced to take extreme measure in order to prevent people
from leaving. Equipping the Iron Curtain with barbed wire and automated machine guns,
the Soviet Union, at Ulbricht’s request, cemented the status quo of a divided Europe with
a divided Germany at its center.276 Chances for German unification became even more
remote, though neither side stopped paying lip service to the general idea. Rather, the
fortified border further severed economic ties between the GDR and the FRG, not to
mention family relations, thus further integrating East Germany into the COMECON.
The years 1958-1961, then, not only marked a turning point for the already difficult intraGerman relations from the Berlin Crisis to the construction of the Wall, but also set the
stage for an open confrontation over superior industrial prowess.
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Centralism vs. Regionalism in the Struggle for Aesthetic Coherence
Curiously, the German-German competition for superiority in industrial design
and material culture had first and foremost domestic implications. While the actual rival
was on the other side of the zone border, at times opposing goals of the central
government and the regional administrations caused internal struggles in design and
production. In most cases, centralism and regionalism ought to strike one as forward
concepts of political and social organization, involving the assignment of specific
responsibilities to different levels of governance. In the German case, however, regional
and federal powers have always been muddled, leading back to the contested conceptions
of authority enshrined in the German Confederation (1815-1866).277 In terms of postwar
national branding, these opposing forces undermined the creation of a cohesive identity
narrative.
A considerable body of scholarly literature has examined the effects of German
cultural regionalism on questions of identity. For example, the idea of Heimat (homeland)
is often contrasted with the nineteenth-century struggle for a German national state.278
Meanwhile, the significance of regional and centralized administrative structures in
politics and the economy for cultural concepts has remained largely unexplored,
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especially in the postwar period. One possible reason for this neglect may be scholars’ a
priori conception of the Federal Republic as a decentralized, federal state that was deeply
anchored in its federal constitutional structure, with the GDR perceived conversely as a
controlling, centralized state that modeled its totalitarian aspirations after the Soviet
Union.279 By looking at the intertwined history of the post-German states, however, the
paradigms of centralism and regionalism bring to the fore conflicting trends in political
culture that undermine simplistic characterization of either Germany.
To clarify the usage of terms in the context of industrial design, I have developed
two archetypical definitions, whose terminology can be applied to both the federally and
the centrally organized German states. Regionalism in industrial design I understand to
be activism originating with regional cultural institutions and economic structures that
shape design principles in order to economically and politically assist the region, thereby
favoring a regional aesthetic identity over a coherent national style. Design centralism,
then, is the attempt to create central structures that define and execute cultural and
economic policies for the entire nation, thereby suppressing regional activism and
aesthetic diversity.
Dualism between center and region in post-1945 West Germany generally worked
to assign differing sets of powers to either level, but at times these overlapped. In cases of
overlapping powers or abrogation, however, the more powerful center won out over
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regional objectives.

280

For example, cultural policy was an especially contested field

during the Cold War years. While cultural policymaking powers lay with the region, its
reverberations were felt in the areas of diplomacy and national economy, two political
areas directed by the federal government. In the GDR, political centralization only slowly
percolated down to economic structures and, apart from mass organizations, even less to
the realm of everyday culture.281 As the history of these tensions between region and
center well predated the German partition of 1945, a strong culture of regionalism was
present in both Germanys when they reached statehood. The following discussion of East
and West German design policy traces the lines between central and regional powers in
the realms of culture and economics, which were blurred at best, or even completely
sidestepped at times.
From the beginning, West German industrial reconstruction led to the creation of
novel local organizations. They were the result of changed regional conditions, the
refugee problem, and the reorganization of transportation routes caused by the German
partition. In contrast to the centralized economy of the Third Reich, these new
organizations remained anchored at the regional and municipal level, where they became
“essential control elements.”282 In the scarcity of the postwar years, regional development
took precedence over national planning, and a competition for investments and national
subsidies ensued. The foundation of the West German design council Rat für
Formgebung, a national institution dedicated to supervise industrial development in the
280

Arthur B. Gunlicks, “The German Federal System Today: National, State, and Local Relations in an Era
of Cooperative Federalism,” in Louis A. Picard and Raphael Zariski (eds.), Subnational Politics in the
1980s: Organization, Reorganization and Economic Development (New York: Praeger, 1987), 89-102.
281
For an analysis of the role of mass organizations in the GDR see Mary Fulbrook, Anatomy of a
Dictatorship: Inside the GDR, 1949-1989 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 21-86.
282
Hottes, “Regional Variations of the Economic Development in the Federal Republic of Germany,” 42.

119

field of design and marketing, stood in stark contrast to these regional tendencies. The
fact that its foundation articulated the seemingly contradictory notion of cultural
centralism in a federal liberal state was also not lost on contemporaries. “It may seem
surprising that government-controlled agencies should act as arbiters of taste in industrial
design and assume a frankly partisan or even doctrinaire attitude in promoting modern
design,” observed art historian Lorenz Eitner, a 1957 Humboldt fellow in West Germany.
“This is possible in Germany (where the State has often played an active role in such
matters) because since 1945 the weight of official approval has come to rest on the side
of modern art, modern architecture, and modern design.”283 The Rat für Formgebung thus
claimed to represent a social and political consensus on modern design. However,
because the West German economy was not centralized, informal agreement with
industry about which aesthetics could best visualize the spirit of a postwar Germany was
crucial to the Rat für Formgebung’s success.
Fortunately for the design council, organized industrial interests, embodied by the
Federation of German Industries (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie, BDI), shared
with it an aesthetic inherited from Weimar modernism. The BDI became a trusted ally in
the conservative government’s economic policies of the early 1950s.284 By 1950, a lack
of capital, multiple allied production restrictions and decreased domestic demand worked
against the structure of the liberal economy. These conditions caused the unemployment
of more than two million workers. Conjuring up images of Weimar, depression, and the
danger of political radicalization, the Adenauer government came under fire from the
283
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political opposition. When the Marktwirtschaft experiment threatened to fail, the West
German government felt American pressure to institute some degree of state regulation.
Adenauer turned to industrial associations to avoid reversing the principles of the postwar
economy. Consequently, the BDI took on the task of distributing scarce resources and
organizing exports, demonstrating their indispensability in the young republic.285
Corporate traditions thus found their way back into the liberal economy of the Federal
Republic, which, as Wolfrum puts it, raised the question of whether the republic would
be able to withstand strong economic corporatism in the long run.286 In regard to its
history of industrial design, this question certainly needs to be answered with a clear no.
The role that industry played in West Germany's cultural revival cannot be
overemphasized. Beginning with the foundation of a philanthropic committee, the
Culture Council (Kulturkreis) in 1951, the BDI awarded fellowships and organized art
shows to support the arts in Germany.287 The BDI lawyer and art enthusiast Gustav Stein
largely initiated this cultural engagement. As the executive manager of the BDI and the
Kulturkreis he published a booklet in 1952, which invoked the historical responsibility of
entrepreneurs as patrons of the arts. For example, big-business names, such as Thyssen,
Krupp, and Reemtsma, re-introduced the concept of the collector-benefactor.288 Yet the
motivation behind this kind of cultural philanthropy was not entirely altruistic. Patronage
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helped the industry to polish its image, which years of collaboration with the Nazi regime
had badly damaged.289 Stein himself believed that art was a socio-political force that
connected people. The diffusion of everyday life with cultural objects, in his opinion,
could prevent the disintegration of society – a process that he had witnessed in the
Weimar Republic.290 While the Kulturkreis members’ taste in art was as diverse as its
membership, Werner Bührer has found that the BDI followed official aesthetics in its
award practices and, in this way, became Germany’s biggest patron of abstract modern
art. This inclination toward modernist taste carried over into the BDI’s work with
industrial designers, who were eventually included in the award structure of the
Kulturkreis in 1957.291
In the early years of its existence, the Rat für Formgebung held a mediator
position between business and large-scale consumers. Serving as a source of information
for government institutions in particular that were in dire need of office furniture, mess
kits and flatware for cafeterias, and art to put into the new administrative buildings in
West Germany’s new capital Bonn, the Rat connected producers and large customers.292
Gatekeeper to prestigious projects such as furnishing German embassies abroad or
displaying products at numerous international exhibitions, the Rat possessed considerable

289

Werner Bührer, “Der Kulturkreis im Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie und die ‘kulturelle
Modernisierung’ der Bundesrepublik in den 50er Jahren,” in Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau: Die
westdeutsche Gesellschaft der 50er Jahre, ed. Axel Schildt and Arnold Sywottek (Bonn: Dietz, 1993), 584;
S. Jonathan Wiesen, West German Industry and the Challenge of the Nazi Past, 1945-1955 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 165-170.
290
Gustav Stein: Sammler – Förderer – Freund, ed. Wilhelm-Lehmbruck-Museum Duisburg (Duisburg:
Stadt Duisburg, 1983), 13.
291
Gustav Stein, “Das sechste Arbeitsjahr,” in Jahrestagung Lübeck 57, ed. Kulturkreis im Bundesverband
der Deutschen Industrie e.V., n.d., 24.
292
Annual reports by the Rat für Formgebung provide a detailed description of the Rat’s activities and
consulting contracts. For example Mia Seeger, Rat für Formgebung – Darmstadt – Bericht für das Jahr
1956/1957, Darmstadt 8 April 1957, Bibliothek des Rat für Formgebung [hereafter referred to as BRfF].

122

power over industry between 1952 and 1965. The more or less voluntary cooperation
between industry and economic policymakers under the leadership of Economic Minister
Ebert strengthened the national brand at first, as the BDI and the Rat für Formgebung
worked on the same modernist narrative. However, the foundation of a BDI group
specifically dedicated in industrial design (Arbeitskreis) in 1952, organized to directly
represent industrial interest in questions of design, eventually disrupted this peaceful
cooperation between policymakers and big business. Like the design council, the
Arbeitskreis set as its task the education of designers and the encouragement of rational
and socially responsible industrial design.293 As previously illustrated, because of the
similarity of their mission, the Arbeitskreis was very involved in the activities of the Rat
für Formgebung and had attained a leading role by the mid-1960s when Ernst
Schneider’s dual presidency of both associations began to infringe on the independence
of the design council in a fashion that could be termed a hostile takeover. Thereafter, the
mission of the design council became increasingly industry-oriented at the expense of its
cultural mission.294
By the mid-sixties, the BDI Arbeitkreis’s reconstitution as the Design Circle
(Gestaltkreis) in 1965 signaled an emerging divergence of state and business interests.295
Entrepreneurial debate pinned this difference in perspectives on attitudes toward the
utility of industrial design. The secretary general of the Study Group of Industry for
Product Design and Product Planning in Stuttgart, Baden-Württemberg, implicitly
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commented on the emerging tension between the government’s vision of product design
and that of the business community: “Our study group came together to help members
replace unclear will with methodological thinking. They don’t want to speak any longer
about the design-idea and its cultural-political goals, but want instead to search for
practicable ways toward its realization.”296 While in earlier years the visions of the Rat
für Formgebung and the BDI had overlapped when industry interest supported the
“entrepreneur as patron of the arts” concept, they diverged at this juncture, because of
business’s more profit-oriented interpretation of design as a selling point rather than a
cultural message.297 In the everyday, West German design thus lost the initial simplicity
and rigidity of postwar functionalism. Consequently, the official aesthetic survived in
government-sponsored exhibitions, yet production gravitated towards catering to
consumer tastes. Unfolding strife between the Werkbund and BDI factions on the board
of the Rat für Formgebung between 1968 and 1969, coupled with a lack of decisive
management after Mia Seeger’s departure, furthermore added to the Rat’s decline in
economic significance for the business community.
Even more so, the business community’s vision for German design as a national
brand had a more pragmatic emphasis than that of the Werkbund-inspired Rat für
Formgebung. During the Weimar years, Werkbund and Bauhaus designers had sought to
create design solutions that would elevate the lower classes. Despite these lofty goals,
however, their designs ultimately became collector’s items that only the affluent could
afford. Members actively involved in the BDI Arbeitskreis, on the contrary, often came
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from middle-class enterprises and family companies.

298

Because the scale of small- and

medium-sized businesses allowed for the combination of traditional craftsmanship with
serial production, Mittelstand entrepreneurs were more likely to consider questions of
design and premium materials than were mass producers.299 In particular, the furniture
industry upheld these standards because technologies of wood processing had not
advanced enough to mechanize production entirely. In this light, the then-contemporary
observation that “German design is for the middle class” pointed to both the production
and the consumption-related aspects of West German industry.300
In their postwar development, Mittelstand industries differed decisively from big
business, which scholars have discussed predominately as an example of West
Germany’s economic Americanization.301 While aspects of American marketing and
management permeated big industry, smaller businesses, such as in the furniture industry,
were less prone to Americanize their business methods.302 Instead, German Mittelstand

298

Christopher Oesterreich, Die “Gute Form” im Wiederaufbau, 230-231.
While the term cannot be directly translated, Hartmut Berghoff defines the Mittelstand as “the ‘golden
middle’, something that strikes a balance between grinding poverty and immoral riches.” Membership of
the Mittelstand remains an attractive social concept until today, because it projects the notion of solid, but
legitimate wealth. Hartmut Berghoff, “The End of Family Business? The Mittelstand and German
Capitalism in Transition, 1949-2000,” The Business History Review 80, no. 2 (2006): 264.
300
See Lorenz Eitner, “Industrial Design in Postwar Germany,” 17.
301
Anselm Doering-Manteuffel defines the concept of Americanization as “the dominance of US American
cultural patterns in a different national-cultural (nationalkulturellen) context.” Anselm Doering-Manteuffel,
Wie westlich sind die Deutschen? Amerikanisierung und Westernisierung im 20. Jahrhundert (Göttingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999), 15. See also Konrad Jarausch and Hannes Siegrist, ed. Amerikanisierung
und Sowjetisierung in Deutschland, 1945-1970 (Frankfurt: Campus, 1997). For discussions of economic
Americanization see Paul Erker, “ ‘Amerikanisierung’ der westdeutschen Wirtschaft? Stand und
Perspektiven der Forschung,” in Amerikanisierung und Sowjetisierung in Deutschland 1945-1970, ed.
Jarausch and Siegrist, 137-145; Susanne Hilger, “Amerikanisierung” deutscher Unternehmen.
Wettbewerbsstrategien und Unternehmenspolitik bei Henkel, Siemens und Daimler-Benz, 1945/49-1975,
(Stuttgart: Steiner 2004); Harm G. Schröter, Americanization of the European Economy: Comparative
Survey of American Economic Influence in Europe since the 1880s (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005).
302
For an in-depth discussion of the restructuring of West German industry after 1945 and its integration
into the world market see Volker Berghahn, The Americanisation of West German Industry 1945-1973
(Cambridge, UK: University of Cambridge Press, 1986). Edgar Wolfrum notes, though, that this slow
299

125

entrepreneurs shared their belief in durable materials and timeless shapes with other
European countries that had developed socially conscious design movements in the first
decades of the twentieth century, such as the Swiss Werkbund (1913) and the Dutch De
Stijl (1917). By necessity as well as by intention, reconstruction design embodied
German such values by combining the aesthetic with the utilitarian and social
responsibility with economic accessibility. Concerned with satisfying urgent needs rather
than speeding up consumption cycles, German industrialists in the early republic despised
the American production practices that consciously cut short product lifespan with
superficial styling and mediocre quality of materials and construction.303 This attitude
persisted until well after reconstruction and was affirmed in 1965 when the BDI
Arbeitskreis reconstituted itself as the Gestaltkreis. Gustav Stein summarized its renewed
mission as follows: “If everybody took part in the conscious quality reduction coming out
of America, then there is only one recipe for success for us: technological quality with its
‘Made-in-Germany’ seal shaped by ‘good design as a quality factor.’ ”304 Business elites
thus envisioned their own narrative of a West German national brand that rested on
quality production. Perceiving themselves as the guarantor of these quality standards with
a commitment to value, in their mind, German aesthetics and production ethics stood in
opposition to American ones.
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Like industrialists in the Federal Republic, the economic planners of the GDR
aimed for quality design and quality products. East Germans upheld durability and social
responsibility as the underlying principles of production, as evidenced by the DAMW’s
attempts to prolong product lifespan via quality control.305 Economic planners expected
living room and bedroom furniture to last fifty years. As late as 1984, almost a third of
the East German population maintained that furniture should be bought only once in a
lifetime (see Table 3). The fact that Germans in East and West opposed the American
“throwaway society” (Wegwerfgesellschaft) suggests that the historiographical debate
about Americanization is not able to explain all facets of Germany’s postwar cultural and
economic development.
From the 1950s onwards, several industry-sponsored institutions in West
Germany strove to establish modern standards in permanent design exhibitions, most
notably the Institut für Neue Technische Form in Darmstadt and the Haus der
Industrieform in Essen. The furniture industry section of the BDI hosted a reception for
the press in which presenters elaborated on topics such as “On good and bad taste,”
“Serial furniture and its significance for today’s apartment,” “Thoughts on the issue of
‘modern’ ” or “On the meaning of furnishing.”306 Munich’s Neue Sammlung, a taxsupported gallery of modern design, and the regional chambers of commerce, especially
in Stuttgart, not only maintained permanent collections of well-designed products, but
also put together traveling exhibitions. On top of these enterprises, West German cities
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funded a network of Wohnberatungen, information centers equipped with pattern books
where interior designers counseled West Germans on how to furnish their apartments. By
1961 these Wohnberatungen could be found throughout the Federal Republic.307 Most of
the initiatives for a modern “German” taste correlated with the furniture boom of the
1960s, when 40 percent of all households were buying furniture.308 Fueled by such
demand, the 1960s and 1970s became the most exciting decades in West German
furniture development.
Yet this myriad of regional initiatives soon began to weaken the Rat für
Formgebung’s initial attempt at centralizing industrial design in the Federal Republic.
Conflicting interests of industry and designers as well as differing perspectives on
economic progress within industrial associations chipped away at the West German
national brand narrative. For example, design centers in Stuttgart (Baden-Württemberg)
and in Essen (Nordrhein-Westfalen) developed strong particularistic notions with
powerful ideas for industrial development in regions that were already economically
more successful than the rest of West Germany. In the 1970s, Stuttgart’s design center
applied repeatedly for membership in an international design organization, the
International Council of Societies of Industrial Design (ICSID), where the Rat für
Formgebung was a founding member and representative of German interests.
Relations between the Stuttgart Design Center and the Rat für Formgebung hit a
new low when the latter became involved in Stuttgart’s ICSID candidacy process.
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Throughout the Cold War, most countries appointed only one design society to this
international body to project a cohesive national cultural policy. After all, the ICSID
provided an international forum for promoting the national brand in the realm of
industrial design. Stuttgart’s application triggered a letter exchange between the ICSID
board and the Rat für Formgebung, in which information about the relationship between
the Rat and the Stuttgart Design Center was solicited in order to determine membership
fees. If the Rat vouched for a close relationship, the Design Center would only pay
reduced fees. Herbert Ohl, head of the Rat für Formgebung, however, was unwilling to
make the case for such a relationship. “I should think also,” Ohl sarcastically added, “that
they would themselves not like to be regarded as part of the Rat für Formgebung, since
we are a federal state.”309 Ohl’s reaction seems indicative of the adversarial nature
between the two institutions. The higher membership fees, as Ohl well knew, had not
been budgeted in the Stuttgart Design Center’s annual finances, and he knowingly
jeopardized a stronger German presence in this international body. In trying to save the
national brand cohesion, Ohl deepened the petty rivalry between the center and the
region. Nevertheless, the Stuttgart Design Center reached an agreement with the ICSID
and became a member in 1979 without the support of the Rat für Formgebung.
Eventually, Stuttgart even attempted to desert the national brand altogether by
unhinging economic policy in Baden-Württemberg from the national context. In the
1980s, the region explored supranational European alternatives. Its regional design
politics created the pretext for interregional cooperation with three industrial and
technological powerhouses in other western European countries: Italian Lombardy, the
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French Rhône-Alpes, and Spanish Catalonia. Together they established the “Four Motors
for Europe.”310 Lacking an institutional structure and mutual borders, these four regions
nevertheless established an alliance for regional economic growth and increased political
influence in European Union (EU) committees.311 The committees collaborated in the
fields of culture, education, research and science, environmentalism, and other sectors.
Stuttgart’s Design Center played an important role in coordinating cultural and economic
events.312 This interregional cooperation offers a radical example of anti-centralist, antifederalist policymaking in Europe. It shows how competing concepts of economic and
cultural governance muddled the narrative of the West German brand. Instead, BadenWürttemberg and its Design Center contributed to a multinational brand that competed
with the national narrative.313

310

Peter Frank (former head of the Essen and the Stuttgart design centers) in conversation with the author,
22 April 2009.
311
Michèle Knodt, “Vier Motoren für Europa, Symbolische Hochglanzpolitik oder erfolgversprechende
regionale Strategie des Landes Baden-Württemberg?” in Jahrbuch des Föderalismus 2000: Föderalismus,
Subsidiarität und Regionen in Europa. Vol. 1. Europäisches Zentrum für Föderalismus-Forschung
Tübingen (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2000), 405-416; Michèle Knodt, “Die Entwicklungsfähigkeit der
Arbeitsgemeinschaft im Rahmen eines ‘Europas der Regionen,’ ” in Baden-Württemberg und seine
Partnerregionen, ed. Thomas Fischer and Siegfried Frech (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2001), 239-255; Silvia
Raich, Grenzüberschreitende und interregionale Zusammenarbeit in einem “Europa der Regionen:”
Dargestellt anhand der Fallbeispiele Großregion Saar-Lor-Lux, EUREGIO und “Vier Motoren für
Europa.” (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1995), 164-183; Petra Zimmermann-Steinhart, “Die Entstehung der
Initiative ‘Vier Motoren für Europa.’ ” in (eds.): Baden-Württemberg und seine Partnerregionen, ed.
Thomas Fischer, Siegfried Frech (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer 2001), 48-61; Petra Zimmermann-Steinhart,
Europas erfolgreiche Regionen. Handlungsspielräume im innovativen Wettbewerb (Nomos, Baden-Baden
2003), 165-178.
312
Peter Frank (former head of the Essen and the Stuttgart design centers) in conversation with the author,
22 April 2009.
313
The “Four Motors for Europe” are a multinational example at the subnational level countering the
preconceived notion that federal structures are invariably linked to the central government. Moreover, this
subnational multinationalism also stands testimony that European politics do not always depend on the
structures of nation-states to implement European policies.

130

Modernizing the GDR Brand: Streamlining, Mechanization, and Standardization
Economic centralism theoretically equipped East Germany’s political elite to
squelch regional diversity. In contrast to West Germany, the creation and maintenance of
a coherent national brand narrative based on socialist realist aesthetics seemed like a
reasonable task. This endeavor was supported by the design institute’s progression
toward the center of economic planning. By 1965, the renamed Zentralinstitut für
Gestaltung, came under the jurisdiction of the German Office for Standardization and
Product Testing (Deutsches Amt für Messwesen and Warenprüfung, DAMW).314 Sitting at
the insection of culture, technology, and economics, the Zentralinstitut’s institutional
history echoes the leadership’s belief that artistic quality determined the cultural value of
commodities in the new socialist society. By including the production process and the
workforce as the most important ideological building bloc of East German socialism, this
new society was precisely what the GDR wanted to envelop into the national narrative.
As the new name implied, the Zentralinstitut became part of the central planning
apparatus, thus consolidating cultural and economic power under one roof. However,
starting in 1963, economic considerations of the New Economic System of Planning and
Steering (NES) took precedence over the cultural facets of a coherent narrative inscribed
in material culture. NES was Prime Minister and General Secretary of the SED Walter
Ulbricht’s plan to put the GDR back on international markets after a period of extreme
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isolation directly following the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961.

315

Economic levers

played an important role in NES, which attempted to combine traditional command
planning with indirect steering of enterprise via mostly monetary incentives. These
economic levers, including net profit deductions, taxes, prices, the cost and availability of
credit and fund formation, became methods for indirectly aligning enterprise with the
Plan.316 Some of the levers aimed directly at motivating a workforce that received set
wages separate from their performance. With bonuses and other financial incentives,
economic planners tried to enliven workers to increase their output.
Some of these lessons had been learned in earlier attempts to centralize aesthetics
in the realm of production in order to create a cohesive national brand. The GDR had
experienced setbacks early on because of regional opposition within the production
sector. One of the largest furniture companies, the Saxon furniture complex in DresdenHellerau, continued to follow a simplistic aesthetic. Dresden-Hellerau’s functionalist
tendency was rooted in the reformist background of the parent company, Deutsche
Werkstätten Hellerau, a former Mittelstand business. Its founder Karl Schmidt had been
an influential leader in the turn-of-the-century Werkstätten reform movement, which
strove to combine social responsibility, craftsmanship, and industrial production.317
Bruno Paul, the famous Art Nouveau interior designer and architect, was one of the most
brilliant minds who worked for Hellerau. From 1930 on, he conceived Hellerau’s first
serial furniture program, the “Growing Apartment” (Wachsende Wohnung), which
315
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complemented the strict functional aesthetic of Neue Sachlichkeit. This standardized
program offered different furniture pieces that could be assembled as a living or dining
room set according to the customers’ individual needs.318
To combat Hellerau’s failure to conform to the Party’s demands, Ulbricht
personally tried to suppress the company’s aesthetic influence. In 1953, he stopped the
publication of a booklet about Hellerau on the grounds that the furniture displayed in the
book contradicted the GDR’s official aesthetic guidelines.319 The population, however,
liked the practical furniture that Hellerau produced. For example, at a home furnishing
exhibition in East Berlin’s Alexanderplatz in 1953, which lacked stylistic cohesiveness
and exhibited a tendency to bulky proportions, visitors asked for Bruno Paul’s
Wachsende Wohnung. Confused by the display, visitors demanded furniture that they
considered to be well-proportioned and cheap.320 A year after Ulbricht’s disapproval of
the company’s product line, Hellerau’s head of development emphasized that, while the
artistic department endeavored to follow official guidelines in developing a modern
socialist living culture, “it ought to be our goal to maintain Deutsche Werkstätten
[Hellerau]’s noted good style or, rather, to win it back.”321 Surely, Hellerau represented
an exception to the ultimate goal of streamlined furniture production in the GDR. But
Ulbricht’s reaction and the subsequent collectivization of industry starting in 1958-59

318

Bruno Paul designed his first serial furniture in 1908 in cooperation with the Vereinigte Werkstätten für
Kunst im Handwerk München. This program could be customized to customer tastes and needs. For a
detailed treatment of Paul’s pioneering aesthetic in standardized furniture see Sonja Günther, Bruno Paul,
1974-1968 (Berlin: Gebrüder Mann, 1992).
319
Walter Ulbricht to Amt für Literatur und Verlagswesen, 30 November 1953, DC20/3945, BAB.
320
Hans W. Aust, “Hausfrauen wollen keine Diplomatenschreibtische,” Berliner Rundschau, 22 November
1953.
321
Kant (head of development Hellerau) to Wurzler and Weber (Combine Dresden-Hellerau), 11 October
1954, 11764/3131, SStD.

133

attempted to circumvent the individual character of singular businesses such as
Hellerau.322
Paradoxically, the collectivization process, which was meant to overcome
incoherence in the national brand, created even more regional activity and new problems
for a national narrative of cultural reinvention. Despite efforts to collectivize and
centralize the national furniture industry in the GDR the process continued to take shape
slowly. The Thuringian furniture industry was the first to unite private and state-owned
furniture factories in the Gera and Jena area under the name VEB Ostthüringer
Möbelwerke Zeulenroda/Triebes in 1959.323 Cooperative relations between enterprises of
all ownership forms, the underlying theory suggested, would yield increased efficiency of
resources and organize entire economic branches horizontally. Zeulenroda offered an
attractive test case for the streamlining of the furniture industry alongside the successful
implementation of cultural centralism in the GDR. With its production centered on
stylistically overwrought furniture (Stilmöbel), Zeulenroda positioned itself well to
uphold the official East German aesthetic. At the first exhibition of GDR interior design
in the West in 1959 in Munich, Zeulenroda furniture represented the national brand
because design politicians were convinced that its “progressive” furniture production
served “the cultural prestige of [the German Democratic] Republic in any case.”324 With
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successful streamlining of the industry, so the theory went, the product range from East
German industry would cohesively display a socialist vision for Germany.
Yet by 1962 collectivization proved to be more complex than expected, because a
myriad of ownership forms still existed across the country (see table 1). The biggest
problem lay in the fact that about 96 percent of smaller furniture companies, employing
48 percent of the manpower, only produced 34 percent of the national production
volume. This mismanagement of manpower represented a fundamental problem of the
GDR command economy: waste of resources. For the furniture industry it also
represented a technological challenge. In furniture production a large portion of
companies were artisan businesses, which could rarely be transformed into large-series
producers (Großserienproduzenten). However, from the 1950s onward, the ultimate goal
of any restructuring of furniture production had been the creation of Großserien to fulfill
the demands of the population.
Form
of
Ownership
(Status
31
December 1962)

Production
Volume
in Million
MDN/UPP

GDR
Industry
VEB
HSB
Private Company
Co-operative
Small Trade/Crafts
PGH
Priv.
Small
Trade/Crafts
And Small Industry

1,730
1,143
866
218
58
1
587
225
362

Share (%)

100.0
66.0
50.0
12.6
3.3
0.1
34.0
13.0
21.0

Number of
Companies

14,520
563
178
228
156
1
13,957
415
13,542

Share (%)

100.0
4.0
1.3
1.6
1.1
0
96.0
3.0
93.0

Number of
Employees
;
excl.
Apprentice
s
92,250
48,015
32,705
11,670
3,590
50
44,235
14,325
29,910

Yearly
Average %

100.0
52.0
35.5
12.5
3.9
0.1
48.0
15.5
32.5

Table 1: Ownership forms in the Furniture Industry, 1964.325
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To effectively control regional industry and maximize efficiency, the Planning
Commission needed intermediate-level institutions located between the ministry and
enterprise that could organize industry transregionally. In the late 1950s, the Planning
Commission created the Association of People’s Owned Companies (Vereinigungen
Volkseigener Betriebe, VVB).326 These administrative units coordinated production by
redistributing “tasks to allow greater specialization, standardization and the use of spare
capacity,” providing the economic leadership with greater control over research and
development, which was heretofore located at the individual firm level or that of the
combines. 327 However, the introduction of the VVBs created rivals to that of the central
planning institutions. Focused on their own industry, the VVBs did not work communally
toward upholding a cohesive narrative of national branding. Furthermore, the VVBs
remained subdivided in districts that did not cooperate to cover consumer needs across
East Germany’s entire population, a problem that would become increasingly difficult to
overcome with continued specialization and compartmentalization between and within
districts.
In 1964, the VVB Möbel started yet another attempt at restructuring furniture
production. A Basic Concept (Grundkonzeption) listed the shortcomings of the industry
thus far and explored options to counter them. Until 1963, furniture production
constituted about 2 percent of the GDR’s total industrial production, which testified to an
immense underutilization of this industrial branch. This can especially be seen in the
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GDR’s technological standards, which could not withstand international comparison. The
mechanization of furniture manufacturing lagged far behind, due to years of paying
Soviet war reparations and implementing an economic policy that favored investments in
heavy industry over light industry. Furthermore, the report noted a large variety of styles
and furniture models. For example, there were between 1,200 and 1,400 different
versions in the upholstery sector, which undermined efficient serial production and scale
economies. Economic planners shifted to mechanization, standardization, and
modernization of furniture manufacturing, opening a new chapter in the provisioning and
supply for both national retail and foreign trade.328 Until 1970 the list of goals for the
restructuring included: eliminating fragmentation in productive capacities; specializing
production by increasing the degree of mechanization; applying modern processing and
manufacturing technologies; dealing in materials that corresponded to world quality
standards; and the implementation of serial production and Großserienproduktion.329
These modernization measures also shifted focus in national branding: instead of the
“keeper of German heritage” narrative, the story developed in a direction that would
reconnect East Germany’s cultural vision to other industrialized countries. After all, the
1960s was the decade of the space race, great leaps, new frontiers, and new societies,
concepts that embodied a global hope for human and material progress.330
Alongside the structural reorganization of the furniture industry in the GDR, more
efforts were made to standardize its production aiming at reaching higher efficiency.
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Again, in theory, these measures intended to bring all parts of the production and
consumption processes into the narrative of the East German national brand, which was
changing from historic references to a modern aesthetic. The measures that the planning
apparatus implemented included the standardization of measurements in cooperation with
the

construction

industry,

the

nation-wide

streamlining

of

assortments

(Sortimentsbereinigung) – a specific type of product range rationalization based on
cultural and political motivations – , and close quality control.331 Sortimentsbereinigung,
in particular, was a radical process that dramatically reduced the numbers of models in
the market, yet allowed the furniture industry to venture into mass production.
In the end, modular storage furniture (Schrankwand) answered these calls for
resourceful mass production, responding to the demands of standardization and
heightened efficiency. The furniture “modularization” program that designer Rudolf Horn
conceptualized for the Hellerau combine in 1966, called MDW, perhaps embodies this
change in production attitude best (see figure 9). Instead of creating one variant of a
hundred types, Horn changed the underlying concept to producing a hundred variants of
one furniture type by substituting one distinct function with multiple functions for a piece
or part of furniture. Boards and panels constituted the basis of the construction concept,
which relocated production from the work- and resource-intensive furniture industry to
wood pre-fabrication that simply provided the wooden panels.332 Consumers could
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assemble the pieces at home. In this way, the Zentralinstitut hoped to gain more
efficiency as well as conserve raw materials in the furniture industry.
The program was based on a vertical modular grid that optimized storage
functionality and warehouse turnover. The pieces aligned by 96 mm vertically and 600 or
800 mm horizontally and included shelves, doors, tabletops, desktops, and drawers. Its
aesthetic appeal lay in the combination of matte-finished surfaces on the basic structure
and shiny veneers with real-wood visual appearance on the frontal pieces. MDW became
a best-selling item because of its modularization, availability, flexibility, and the degree
of customization provided to the final user. The system’s simple modular assembly and
disassembly made it easy to move the furniture to new quarters or to add supplementary
parts as needed. MDW basically grew, or shrunk, over the course of the consumer’s life.
Horn redesigned it twice in the 1970s and 1980s, ensuring its production until the mid1980s. To date, MDW ranks as one of the longest-selling and most successful furniture
lines in pre-Ikea Europe.333
MDW also stood for the complete rethinking of relations between production,
retail, and montage. Retail had to be reorganized to provide first-time buyers with the
Wohnberatung that would lead to the best solution for any given house, apartment or
room, and to offer assembly in a timely manner. Consumers could choose to assemble the
pieces themselves without professional help. However, Horn envisioned close
cooperation between furniture stores and industry. He quoted Walter Ulbricht’s
guidelines from the seventh Party convention: “It is here that retail fills out its role as
contributor to the People’s economy – for the good of the economic efficiency. The
333
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economic laws of socialism are better put into effect.”

Wohnberatungen had existed in

the GDR before, but the projected MDW counseling exceeded prior institutions in scale
and ambition, revealing a systematic attempt to promote both an aesthetic and a utilitarian
vision to the broader public.335
MDW also exemplifies the division of labor that marked the new sine qua non in
the modernization of the GDR economy. Between 1964 to 1970, the economic Planning
Committee increased investments to concentrate production in local networks. Starting
with 30 million Ostmark (East German Marks) in 1964, yearly investments assigned to
the furniture industry rose to 35 million Ostmark in 1965, and from 1966 to 1970 to 50
million Ostmark each year.336 Existing infrastructure had to suffice, as plans did not
foresee new buildings or annexes. Furthermore, the funds allocated for equipment
exclusively went to machines fit for serial production.337 These provisions made the
furniture industry an integral part of Ulbricht’s NES between 1963 and 1970. The
restructuring of the furniture industry included the forced “concentration” of forty local
companies in 1965. While big companies saw to the mass production of serial furniture,
the small crafts businesses were to respond to short-term changes in demand and fill gaps
in the product range.338 Consequently, companies specialized either in a certain model or
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furniture ensemble, in certain technological processes or steps in the production process,
or in assembling certain parts.339
With NES in place, the reality of production and consumption increasingly
dictated aesthetic developments. These qualities fit perfectly with the GDR’s plans for
industrialization of the crafts in large-scale serial production. By using statistical analysis
in economic planning processes, the GDR government mapped out all possible
production and consumption scenarios at five-year intervals. Design increasingly marked
the starting point for the manufacturing process. Working from model designs, economic
planners could allocate the materials needed, order the required machinery for
production, assign the manpower necessary to operate the machines, organize the product
packaging as well as the transportation of parts and finished goods between factories and
retail, and coordinate distribution within the sale areas. To control the design process as
well, furniture collectives received financial bonuses for successful export products,
which heightened the incentive for factories to put their best effort forward in producing
quality “East German” goods. For example, the Zentralinstitut and the DAMW handed
out the quality seal “Good Design” and assigned medals at the semi-annual Leipzig trade
fair starting in 1964. The quality seal allowed GDR companies to increase the product
price for domestic retail as well as for export thus reaching their annual Plan goal faster.
Accordingly, NES measures also motivated an increase in aesthetic and technological
development on the part of companies.
For the future, the planning commission’s basic concept expected that the
furniture industry would produce a complete and continuous range of functional and
339
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modern furnishings. The economic planners demanded “superb quality, technologically
state-of-the-art” furniture that should contain a higher “moral” value, meaning that it
should be more durable, display greater functionality, and be of a simpler and lighter
construction to achieve a better handling and design.340 Eventually, GDR manufacturing
thus practiced the principles that taste reformer Horst Michel had envisioned for honest
production, which provided a material environment for the ideological education of
society in German socialism. Modern “productive” materials were designated to increase
moral value. Chipboard and fiberboard, new surface materials, and chemical
manufactures, were used to reach these new standards. Rather than safe, traditional
materials like wood, the planners favored man-made materials, such as plastic and
synthetics (Plaste und Elaste) for drawers, doors, frames and entire chairs.341 Eli Rubin
describes this alternative, synthetic East German modernity as a construction of socialist
economic superiority.342 But more than just an economic program, theoreticians saw the
chemistry program as a cultural one as well. Horst Redeker’s 1960 pamphlet “Chemistry
provides Beauty” (“Chemie gibt Schönheit”) set the tone for this period.343 In the
furniture industry, synthetics found application mainly in the finishing of products. While
the ultimate goal was an enhancement of the socialist surface, it mostly resulted in
glossing over the lack of quality materials. Moreover, these new guidelines revised the
previous emphasis on ornamentation and arts and crafts in furniture production. In this
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way, the leadership changed the GDR national brand from a backward-looking cultural
heritage narrative to a forward-looking synthetic modernity.

Family Businesses, Esthete Producers, and Industrial Espionage
The 1964 restructuring of the GDR furniture industry strongly related to the state
of West Germany’s furniture production. Investments in mechanization technology had
of late propelled the Federal Republic to the top of storage furniture-producing nations.
West Germany’s successes became the implied benchmark for the GDR furniture
industry.344 To complete the modern brand narrative, however, the GDR planners
depended on the cooperation of the industrial sector, just like Western design politicians
needed to work hand in hand with entrepreneurial elites. However, the GDR missed the
mark on one of German capitalism’s important actors: the family business.
In the postwar era, a number of German family businesses that produced furniture
grew from small firms that competed in niche markets into international companies.
Nonetheless, they preserved their family ownership as well as influence on business
culture and leadership. Yet few scholars have acknowledged the economic strength of
these businesses and thus overlooked how financial and personal involvement in the
company created specific organizational structures.345 Gary Herrigel, however, notes that
344
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the growing family business was one of Germany’s two separate paths into industrial
modernity, thus linking this form of enterprise to the narrative of German capitalist
success.346 In creating specialized regional networks of artisanal work through
associational cooperation, a “decentralized industrial order” emerged alongside big
business strengthened by the distinctive social ethos of the Mittelstand entrepreneurs. In
the realm of design, personal involvement of family members and the ability to draw on
regional artisanal skills often made family businesses drivers of innovation.
In West Germany, most of the furniture industry developed in clusters in BadenWürttemberg, Bavaria, and North-Rhine Westphalia.347 By the 1980s, the industry
mechanized with remarkable speed, resulting in more output using less manpower in a
decreasing number of businesses. Most of these firms were medium-sized family
businesses with a workforce of less than one hundred. In 1977, Bavaria 267 wood
furniture producers earned more than two billion DM with exports amounting to 120
million DM with 24,000 employees. Four years later, 264 firms earned 2.25 billion DM
and export revenues of 180 million DM with roughly 23,000 workers.348 Seventy-seven
upholstery companies that employed 11,500 furniture makers completed the industry’s
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landscape in Bavaria. They earned an additional 1.5 billion DM, of which 136 million
DM resulted from exports in 1981. With such regional networks in place, collaborations
between different branches of the industry contributed to the efficiency optimization. For
example the collaboration between upholstery and storage furniture manufacturers led to
attractive modular programs that offered solutions for the entire house and enticed
consumers to spend more money on one purchase. While only 20 percent of the
population bought furniture at the beginning of the 1980s, compared to 40 percent during
the furnishing boom of the 1960s, the amount that they spent doubled from 318 DM to
646 DM per purchase.349 Through mechanization and mutual support in regional
networks, the industry had found creative ways to sustain itself even during times of
economic downturn and the dawning saturation of the market. Continued technological
reinvention of West German living environments added to the sustainability of the
medium-sized furniture production.
At the forefront of modern furniture design in the FRG stood the NordrheinWestfalen family company Interlübke. Founded by brothers Hans and Leo Lübke in
1937, the company became a household name by the 1960s. Based on the ideas of Swiss
interior designer Walter Müller, the Lübke brothers developed an “endless” closet and
shelving system in 1963 that revolutionized the German living room: the Schrankwand, a
modular furniture system that could be rearranged or added to as needed (see figure 10).
While there were other people working on similar solutions to provide flexible storage in
the living room, the Lübke closet system, called Interlübke 63, won over consumers with
its durability and simple elegance. It shaped the identity of the company to such an extent
349
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that the family decided to rename their entire business “Interlübke.” Well aware of, but
ignoring Stilmöbel enthusiasts in Germany, Interlübke did not follow trends or listen to
consumer polls. Rather, the company leaders relied on their own tastes to create
progressive and modern high-end furniture.350 As trendsetters, the Lübke family
represented the ideal type of esthete industrialists in the Federal Republic: a middle-class
family business that excelled in quality design and whose interests aligned with the
aesthetic mission of the industry-dominated West German Rat für Formgebung. One of
the founders’ sons, Helmut Lübke, even served as the council’s president from 2001 to
2006. However, companies that could afford a selective and exclusive clientele were the
exception and not the rule. Expensive, modern taste remained a luxury for most middleclass families.
Sharing a business ethos with their West German counterparts, East German
entrepreneurs took pride in their personal involvement with their company, which
included a drive for self-determined innovation. An expanding body of literature has
looked at the causes for economic underperformance in the GDR with the main focus
often lying with large-scale industries, such as machine tools, optics, chemicals, and
electronics, which are overseen by boards that share decision-making and strategy.
However, little attention has been given to the entrepreneurial spirit of the Mittelstand
business owners as a factor for innovation and success in the socialist economy.351 Yet
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GDR economic planning also affected entrepreneurial opportunities and family
businesses during the period of intensified collectivization and standardization,
threatening to turn away crucial members of the national brand.
The new narrative of synthetic modernity put even more pressure on the planning
commission to keep up with other industrial countries. With a mix of paranoia and
hunger for success, the GDR fostered its technological development through industrial
espionage. While this is not the place to speculate about the real impact of espionage on
the East German economy at large, it is well worth exploring the intersection of
entrepreneurial spirit, expert knowledge, and spy activity in the family business
Bruchhäuser in Güstrow, Brandenburg. The case of Axel Bruchhäuser serves as an
example to show how even a respected and financially well-situated family could feel
stifled by the overbearing state machinery of economic planning, with its intrusive policy
changes that looked for one-size-fits-all solutions to advance the technological edge of
East German production.
Axel Bruchhäuser’s espionage story began in 1969, when he requested to be
assigned the status of a “travel cadre” (Reisekader).352 Reisekader were persons who are
granted official permission to travel outside of the GDR for business and/or political
purposes without undergoing the GDR’s typically long visa process. This permission
especially included the Federal Republic, where Bruchhäuser wanted to travel to visit his
business contacts in the furniture industry. His father, Werner Bruchhäuser, had built a
furniture company in Güstrow before Axel’s birth in 1943. Already as a young boy, Axel
1997); Raymond Stokes, Constructing Socialism: Technology and Change in East Germany 1945-1990
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352
Company-Party Organization and Company Leadership Fa. P. Bruchhäuser & Sohn KG, 23 July 1969,
BStU File “Axel Bruchhäuser,” Axel Bruchhäuser Private Collection.

147

took great interest in furniture construction. He patented a design for a chair made of
tubular steel and wicker while still in secondary school. After his engineering studies at
the Technische Universität Dresden, he joined his father’s firm, where he took over
responsibility for technological development and marketing, among other areas. During
the standardization efforts of the early 1960s, the DAMW took note of the high quality
standard and the continued improvement of production technology in the Bruchhäuser
company.353 By the late 1960s, this enterprise, a private firm with majority state
shareholding, produced couches, chairs, and other seating furniture that was successful on
the export market. In the FRG, it counted RKL Möbelwerkstätten Neukirchen, in nearby
Nuremberg, and Arthur Haendler GmbH, Düsseldorf in the FRG among its biggest nonsocialist customers.354
Werner Bruchhäuser, Axel’s father, had been a Reisekader ever since the
company started exporting furniture to West Germany in 1966. It may have been either
the request for the seemingly unnecessary doubling of travel permits for one firm that put
the Bruchhäuser family on the radar of the GDR intelligence service Stasi (Ministerium
für Staatssicherheit, MfS) or the fact that the father had not turned out to be a good and
reliable Stasi informant.355 After long deliberations, and an extensive background check
that included school documents and character evaluations from Bruchhäuser’s former
peers at the university, the Stasi decided not only to grant Axel the travel permission, but
also to hire him as an Inoffizieller Mitarbeiter, an unofficial informant and collaborator of
353
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the intelligence service, with the alias “Axel.”

His research in synthetic fillers for

upholstery cushions coupled with his technological knowledge made him an ideal
candidate for industrial espionage. Moreover, Axel had never openly criticized the
regime, he had a clean record in the required socialist youth groups, and he had been a
great student in school and at university, where he had become an expert in chemical
technology for the furniture industry. Even the fact that he had no particularly political
background and came from a middle-class family, which is to say “bourgeois” from the
point of view of the Stasi, helped his case. The Stasi concluded that this profile would
make him even trustworthier in the eyes of western business partners, who would thus
speak to him more openly.357 Once his acquisition and IM training had been completed,
the Stasi showered Bruchhäuser with attention and financial incentives to work for them.
The intelligence service actually purchased a West German car, an Opel Commodore, for
him to travel around the Federal Republic with more ease.358 For two years everything
went smoothly. Bruchhäuser and his father both went on trips to Western Europe and
reported back to the Stasi on the political, economic, and social situation of their host
countries. Specifically, Bruchhäuser’s mission consisted of collecting “operational
intelligence regarding offensive economic activities in the economic realm, the
infiltration of the adversary structure, intelligence of adversary companies and their
centers of interference, accumulation of scientific-technological information and
documents from non-socialist countries, recruitment of western economic cadres, and
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intelligence on operationally interesting persons from non-socialist countries.”359
Paranoia over external, mischievous “interference” in the GDR economy seemed to take
precedence over uncovering foreign industry secrets. But informant Bruchhäuser
provided the Stasi mostly with technological information about West German businesses,
especially in the field of polyurethane chemistry. He also went to the Cologne Furniture
Fair in 1970 and 1972 to evaluate the international standards and the technological
development of furniture production more generally.
In 1972, however, after Erich Honecker succeeded Ulbricht, the entrepreneurial
situation in the GDR took a turn for the worse. Already majority-owned by the state, the
Bruchhäuser family business became expropriated under the auspices of the new
collectivization policy. Having endured partial expropriation in 1960, this was more than
the Bruchhäuser family was willing to accept.360 A few weeks after the announcement of
the collectivization policy, the Stasi inadvertently sent both father and son on trips to
western countries. This negligence on part of the intelligence service created an
opportunity for the Bruchhäusers to flee the GDR. They reunited in West Germany,
where they joined forces with an old business contact in Lauenförde, Lower Saxony.
They proceeded to take over a furniture company called Tecta and continued to produce
furniture, now specializing in Bauhaus designs and other high-end furniture.361 Taken by
surprise, the Stasi wanted to force the Bruchhäusers back into the GDR by holding the
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rest of the family, Axel’s mother and his three sisters, hostage. For two years the Stasi
tried to follow their every step but eventually gave up in 1974.
This episode shows to what length the GDR went to catch up technologically with
the West, and the Federal Republic in particular. The Stasi took the risk of involving
father and son in their IMS program, providing transportation, and finances to enable the
duo to deepen their business contacts in the West. Bruchhäuser’s mission also illuminates
the paranoia with which the GDR leadership made policy vis-à-vis the FRG. They
suspected manipulation and offensive behavior at every turn of the road. Such hostile
projections hardened the lines of the Cold War competition time and again throughout the
later decades, often without having any solid basis. However, to a certain extent the
investment paid off. Bruchhäuser did report back on new ideas about how to combine
chemical components that could substitute scarce natural resources, such as wood or
fillers for cushions.362 Among the projects that his expert knowledge and industrial
espionage enabled were the new synthetics works in Schwedt. In a letter that he sent
home to a friend in Güstrow after his flight, Axel Bruchhäuser pointed out that the
technological standard in Schwedt was tremendous, and that people in the West were
“pulling their hair seeing how little such technological expertise was put to use.”363
Espionage

surely

informed

and

perhaps

even

expedited

technological

development in the GDR furniture industry, though taking real advantage of these
advances depended on the visionary entrepreneur. But such a figure had been lost to the
other side due to the expropriation policies of the state. The planned economy suppressed
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the entrepreneurial spirit, dissuading company owners from working colaborating with
economic planners. Whether middle-class industrialists actually physically emigrated to
the West like Bruchhäuser or retreated into “inner emigration” by refusing cooperation,
in the end the government lost a crucial building block of the national narrative.364

“Wir bitten um Ihre Beurteilung”: Consumer Opinion and Market Research
Postwar national branding established a direct link between production and
consumption by inscribing a narrative into products. In the case of West Germany, the
brand was particularly national by design, but it shared its modern edge with other
European countries. In the East German case, branding changed from serving as keeper
of German culture to articulating a socialist synthetic modernity more international in
character.365 The narrativity of material culture can explain consumer choices based on
fashions, personal tastes, and projections of self-image. Accordingly, consumers purchase
the representation of values, “a narrative, in the form of a desk or a chair, that they
circulated to others by displaying the items in their homes or offices.”366 The act of
consumption, then, symbolizes the population’s acceptance or rejection of the national
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brand. In this way, consumption became an integral part to the success or failure of
official aesthetics in interior design in East and West.
From the early days of the German Democratic Republic design educators made a
great effort to include the population in the branding of postwar East Germany. Interior
design shows offered an opportunity for direct interaction between design visionaries and
the general public. In 1952, the Institut für angewandte Kunst, the later Zentralinstitut,
organized an exhibition presenting the official vision of the GDR leadership, asking the
population to judge the displayed products. This evaluation by the masses, the catalog
informed visitors, constituted an “important democratic cultural task,” as the public
judged the current industrial production “with the goal of influencing their further
development and of scrutinizing those distributers and buyers who brought the mediocre
and the bad instead of the best into retail.”367 The GDR thus fortified the chain between
production and consumption by actively fostering the participation of consumers in
writing a national narrative. Yet the Formalism Debate and its aesthetic diktat curtailed
this initial conversation between the population and institutions that created objects of the
human environment. Eventually, public opinion polls proved to be an outlet for
participatory democratic expectations among the population rather than a true attempt to
integrate consumer opinion in the realities of production.
Shortly after the Formalism Debate, the Institut put together exhibitions that often
stood in stark contrast to the official style guidelines, for example in cooperation with
furniture companies that kept a modern outlook such as Hellerau. Angry comments in the
guestbook of the 1956 show “Industrial products - functional and beautiful”
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(“Industriewaren - zweckmäßig und schön”) at Alexanderplatz in East Berlin attested to
the customers' disgruntlement. Seeing beautiful and modern sample furniture at the
exhibit highlighted the drab reality in stores where the stylistic mix of German socialist
historicism held sway. One guest even called the exhibition a “smoke screen” hiding the
real state of the socialist interior design industry.368
The result of visitors’ frustration with the inability of the leadership to organize a
more modern economy touched a sore spot of the GDR during the 1950s. It resulted in
eastern pilgrimages to West Berlin, the island of capitalism surrounded by socialism. “It’s
always the same. Retail, that is the government, has only to blame itself if we go to the
West to see or even buy well-designed products!” one visitor remarked disappointedly,
knowing that the GDR had the potential to produce modern items after seeing them
displayed in the exhibition. “This [exhibition] is proof that we also have such things.
Where can I buy the nice little upholstered lounge chairs from Hellerau?”369 To engage
the economic planners, consumer comments used ideological rhetoric: “Fulfilling
personal needs is the best cultural education (Kultur-Erziehung). How can we benefit
from the most beautiful exhibition if everything is destined for export?”370 The
aggravation of the population jumps out at the reader of these remarks. Most of the
commentators signed their critique with full name and address, which indicates that they
neither feared repression nor punishment for their candor. “This book with its contents
can be described as an ‘arraignment;’ an arraignment because it uncovers openly and
consistently the idleness of retail and partially even that of the industry,” one of the last

368

I. Hämmerling, guestbook “Industriewaren – zweckmäßig und schön,” June 1956, SiG.
Signature illegible, guestbook “Industriewaren – zweckmäßig und schön,” June 1956, SiG.
370
Ernst Riech, guestbook “Industriewaren – zweckmäßig und schön,” June 1956, SiG.
369

154
371

comments summed up the general tone of the guestbook.

This document offers early

testimony to the way in which the GDR leadership increasingly managed popular
discontent by the late 1960s once it became clear that the reconstruction-period promises
of delayed gratification would not come true.372
Indeed, ten years later, the critique had not changed. At the occasion of the
modern living design exhibition Modern Dwelling (Modernes Wohnen) in Hoyerswerda
in 1965, similar comments about retail’s failure to embrace modern furniture distribution
appeared in the guestbook. Visitors of the show placed special blame on the retail buyers
and proposed that “the HO [Handelsorganisation] and Konsum buyers of Hoyerswerda
should acquire good taste by seeing the original [in this exhibition]. Hopefully then there
will be good products available in our stores.”373 Against the backdrop of the Formalism
Debate and the consecutive oft-changing style directives from the leadership, though, the
public also understood insecurities on part of the buyers urging them “to buy and act
bravely!”374 Here it became evident that many GDR citizens preferred modern idioms to
the opulent kitsch of socialist historicism. In the 1950s, there existed no agreement
between the leadership and the populace about the “look” of German socialism.
Middlemen, industrialists, and buyers grew insecure and often simply followed their
personal taste or tried to stay true to the company’s style. In the 1960s, when the branding
slowly changed to a “socialist modern,” production and retail had to undergo a complete
restructuring in order to fulfill this new vision. Structural problems in the organization of
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the GDR economy seemed to be the true cause of consumption disruption and the
incomplete modernization of GDR workshops and homes in the long run.
The subdivision of the economy into districts hindered a sustainable consumer
product supply to the population. Mainly, the mismatch between production and
consumption resulted from the GDR’s high standard of “societal division of labor and the
resulting positioning of production sites for specific consumer goods.”375 The industry in
each district was supposed to cover the consumption needs of the entire region, which
posed no problem in regard to foodstuffs or articles of personal hygiene and clothes.
However, in regard to furniture, the situation became more difficult. Despite efforts to
streamline the furniture assortment in the GDR, each of the furniture combines
maintained a specific style, divergent from others. Oftentimes, regional production and
consumption did not overlap. This problem persisted until the final days of the GDR.
Interdistrict exchange of goods was extremely limited, which in turn negatively affected
the availability of specific furniture sets and add-on systems across the country.376 If
somebody who had set up house in the district of Dresden with ready access to the very
particular furniture of Hellerau moved to Schwerin at the Baltic Sea coast, he or she was
left with two options. Either start over, furnishing the home with new furniture, which
would be extremely costly, or add pieces of furniture produced in the new home district,
which might compromise their aesthetic vision. No matter how trivial these problems
might seem, they affected the quality of living in the GDR and the support of the national
brand by a disgruntled population.
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In line with the scientification of socialism under Khrushchev, the GDR
established Market Research mechanisms to coordinate supply and demand starting in
1962. This new insterest in consumer behavior originated with the “consumer turn” of
1958, which heralded an ideological shift away from an economy exclusively based on
heavy industry to an increasing consideration of consumer demands.377 This ideological
turn predated the restructuring of economic policy in Ulbricht’s NES by five years. As
paradoxical as conducting market research in a centrally planned economy might sound,
the Institut für Bedarfsforschung (Institut für Marktforschung after 1967) contributed
tremendously to the configuration of Five-Year Plans. Conducting polls among
consumers, comparing past production rates with actual demand, and calculating and
analyzing the predicted consumption of goods belonged to its tasks. The institute saw its
mission as one of “understanding and explaining the antagonism between production and
consumption, supply and demand, communal and individual interests, communal and
individual consciousness” via consumer motivation research.378 In this fashion, market
researchers searched for ways to redress discrepancies in the socialist “planning of the
market” – a contradiction in and of itself. Foreseeing business landscapes for five-year
intervals based on this data presented an insurmountable task, yet the planning apparatus
continued to attempt to reach budget conclusions and anticipate demand despite recurring
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proof that the estimates were off on both the consumer and the producer end of the
equation.379
Nonetheless, the presence of a market research institute in a planned economy
illustrates how the GDR tried to balance ideological boundaries and the uniformity of
standardized materiality with the appeasement of consumer demands.380 By 1971, a
period when prefabricated housing high rises had become the preferred way of building
in the GDR, consumers continued to prefer functionality over pomp and ornament.381
According to a market research survey, half of the population liked the new add-on
furniture systems, such as MDW. More than 40 percent of the population liked the idea
of extra storage for clothes in the living room. Among consumers who had a onebedroom apartment, where the parents used the living room as their bedroom, this
number almost doubled. In regard to their interior design taste, the population was split
down the middle. While 49 percent favored a cohesive style of their living room
furniture, 44 percent preferred to have different styles or shapes in supplemental small
furniture, such as side tables or flowerpot stands. Regarding dining tables and chairs, the
percentage of consumers preferring aesthetic cohesion with their storage furniture
(Behältnismöbel) was even higher at 53 percent. 82 percent indicated a preference for
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natural materials in their furniture, preferably real wood.

382

For the economic planners,

the study’s findings indicated that the population had specific ideas about their living
environments, requesting modern design idioms that enabled the consumer to achieve
maximum flexibility and practicality. Though synthetic surfaces, increasingly applied in
accordance with the modernization concepts of the mid-sixties, were not on the list of
preferences, which shows that the narrative of synthetic modernity failed to find full
support among the GDR population. Antiques and inherited wooden furniture continued
to be a substantial part of GDR interiors. However, the government also encouraged this
trend when raw materials and consumer products became scarcer in the 1980s.383
Attempts to include these variations into the narrative can be found in Kultur im Heim, a
GDR interior design magazine. In reports titled “Biedermeier im Neubau?” and “Möbel
aus zweiter Hand,” design journalists promoted the integration of old furniture into
appropriate socialist living environments.384 The key to keeping the home “socialist” was
to avoid treating the piece as ornamentation, no matter how historic or precious, and
rather to assign the furniture a specific function. Second-hand furniture, it was pointed
out in 1985, helped to mitigate the gaping holes in market saturation.
GDR consumption analysis illustrates how general popular attitudes towards
home furnishings changed over time (see table 3). The number of households that wanted
to replace their furniture more than doubled from 21 percent in 1971 to 43 percent in
382
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1984. While this figure is still comparatively low, it indicates the growing expectations of
material wellbeing among the East German population in the later years of the GDR.
Erich Honecker’s consumption-oriented promises of Einheit von Wirtschafts- und
Sozialpolitik at the Eight Party Congress in 1971 likely spurred expectations.
Nevertheless, the planned economy failed to fulfill these hopes for improved material
conditions because of the non-fulfillment of past production quotas and fast progress in
prefabricated housing.385 The public housing programs of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s
started a large migration from decaying historical inner-city housing to new, sometimes
bigger high-rise apartments on the outskirts of cities, which often necessitated the
purchase of additional furniture.386 Whereas the production capacity in East Germany
would have been large enough to cover the unexpected demand, the economy became
increasingly dependent on export revenues, and a large percentage of the national
production was sent abroad, as will be described in more detail later.
GDR households with the
Percentage of households (%)
following opinion on furniture
1971
1975
1981
1984
consumption
One should only buy once
34
31
33
29
One should renew parts
36
30
24
17
One should renew everything
21
32
37
43
No opinion
9
7
6
11
Table 2: Development of Demand for Furniture and Upholstery in the GDR, 1971-1984.387

The population grew increasingly upset about these gaps in supplies. In Eingaben,
complaint letters to the communal, regional or national leadership, consumers made their
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individual plight with the retail sector known.

388

Since Eingaben were not consistently

retained, it is difficult to extract a true sense of popular opinion from these letters. The
population mainly used them to criticize and not to complement the consumer supply,
which leaves these letters to over-represent negative opinion.389 These letters provided
citizens with the illusion that they could bring their concerns directly to the people in
power, an emulation of direct participatory democracy and another “smoke screen” that
the government implemented to maintain domestic stability. Just like the guestbooks at
design exhibitions, Eingaben functioned as pressure valves to release consumer
frustrations, which the Party invented to prevent civil unrest without actually having to
change anything in the slow-moving economic system.390 Prisma, a popular GDR
television program that had “taken upon itself” to achieve justice for the wronged in the
East German economy, continuously featured complaints and forwarded Eingaben to the
responsible places, which annoyed economic planners and policymakers.391 Ironically,
Prisma did more of a disservice to consumers, because it took the focus away from the
wrongs in the system and directed it instead toward individual cases that, after some
moralizing on national TV, industry and retail were able to fix. With little effort, the
388
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leadership could create the impression that the socialist economy was able to fulfill
demands, although the reality was the crass opposite.
In the Federal Republic, consumer demands necessarily shaped attempts to forge
a cohesive aesthetic in the market economy. In 1954 the Institut für Demoskopie
Allensbach conducted a survey about consumer tastes in furniture among females over 18
years of age (see table and image below).392 This survey exemplified the challenge of
diverse tastes that West German industrialists and design politicians faced in their quest
for aesthetic revival. The overwhelming majority, 60 percent of the women interviewed,
preferred flowered kitsch, dark woods, and curved lines on living room buffets and
recliners. 30 percent liked what could be described as subdued modern or Swedish style
with clear lines, blonde woods, and unadorned surfaces. Only 7 percent of the
respondents, mostly younger women between the ages of 18 and 29, showed interest in
the organic shapes of 1950s American-influenced, “international” design. A further
breakdown of this group reveals that better educated female wage earners and
entrepreneurs from mid-sized towns favored the modern idioms (the Swedish and
International styles). These numbers revealed a slowly growing trend toward modern,
abstract aesthetics among consumers. The industry intended to speed up this trend by
shaping consumer taste with the initiatives enumerated above, such as the
Wohnberatungen and industry-sponsored permanent exhibitions of well-designed objects.
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“Of the four living rooms depicted here, which one of these rooms do you like best, I mean, which
one would you choose to live in if money wasn’t an issue?”
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All women
18 – 29 years
30 – 44 years
45 – 59 years
60 years and
older

Living room 2
60
54
62
65
61

I like best (%)
Living room 1 Living room 4
29
7
34
10
29
6
26
6
26
4

Living room 3
2
1
1
2
5

Education
26
4
2
40
16
1
Town Population
Under 2,000
69
23
4
2
2 – under 20,000
60
29
7
2
20 – u. 100,000
51
35
8
3
100,000 and more
56
31
8
2
Profession
Worker
69
25
3
2
Farm Hand
71
22
5
0
Farmer
71
18
5
3
Employee
41
41
13
2
Civil Servant
60
29
5
5
Entrepreneur
53
32
12
1
Table 3: West German Survey, Wohnstil (1): Einrichtung, Möbel, Lampen. 1954.393
Primary School
Secondary School

67
38

I don’t know
2
1
2
1
4
1
5
2
2
3
3
1
2
2
3
1
2

Yet the Rat für Formgebung’s attempts to streamline West German taste in
interior design had little success. In 1963, sociologist Alphons Silberman conducted a
study in Cologne and Bergneustadt, in which eight different pictures were shown with a
more gradual difference than the earlier survey in 1954. All the same, the preferred
aesthetic was bulky and ornamented, especially in the higher-income brackets.394 A few
years later in 1969, the Rat für Formgebung started a quality initiative similar to the
economic levers employed by economic planners in the GDR, awarding outstanding
design that reflected official aesthetics with a government-endowed prize – curiously
393
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named “Good Design” as well.

395

A jury appointed by the Rat evaluated submissions

from industry and design students. Many of these prized designs were assembled in a
traveling exhibition that the design council sent around western and eastern Europe.
Contrary to the intent, the prize did not reach a larger German audience and was often
confused with the much older Good Industrial Design (Gute Industrieform) quality seal
awarded annually at the Hanover Fair.396
Aside from policies, design, and production, retail played an important role in
creating or undermining the national brand. Just like in the GDR, much of the availability
of modern designs depended on their distribution through buyers and retail organizations.
One of the largest German retailers was the Neckermann mail order business, which had
sent out catalogues to 10 million West German homes by the early 1970s. Asked how
Neckermann conceptualized its product line, Eckart Rittmeyer, the head buyer at
Neckermann, responded that despite accepting its responsibilities as an active factor in
furniture consumption, Neckermann did not perceive itself as an educator. Instead,
demand simply dictated the choices in the catalogue. Unfortunately, he continued,
designer furniture and low prices seldom matched up, but even if they did, he thought
that the Rat für Formgebung’s jury for the Good Design quality seal was too avant-garde
in its award practice, missing the mark with respect to both the needs and demands of the
population.397 Gerhard Krahn, the general manager and partial owner of the small
furniture store Gessmann and the larger furniture center Europamöbel in Frankfurt shared
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this view in his observations about consumption in both stores. Whereas the typical
Gessmann customer was usually well off, the Europamöbel center catered to the lowincome strata. Asked to speculate about the promises of functional furniture design at
affordable prices, Krahn said that the center would not change low-income consumer
behavior, “because this furniture with clear lines doesn’t offer enough on an emotional
level.”398 He also pointed out that even the affluent often preferred style furniture
(Stilmöbel) over functional furniture. However, Krahn observed that the functional
avantgarde styles at the Gessmann store sold eventually, and with increasing speed, at the
Europamöbel center.399
In the end, despite all the effort put into the education of consumers about Good
Design, West German policymakers never succeeded in completely eradicating the
typically bulky-style furniture, commonly known as Gelsenkirchner Barock, an opulent
Biedermeier of sorts, which came to embody German popular taste like no other. In her
acclaimed photographic study of the West German living room, Herlinde Koelbl captured
diverse lifestyles and their corresponding home decors during her 1980 travels through
the Federal Republic.400 Not one living room looked like the next, yet some of them
subscribed to certain conventions. Next to a couch and a coffee table, the typically
German shelf and storage system Schrankwand overpowered the room and its inhabitants
in most every picture. The otherwise diversified tastes seemed to originate with the idea
of the living room as a representative space furnished to receive visitors, a room that
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symbolizes social status and ambitions while taking into account needs for comfort.401
Especially the middle-income groups liked to demonstrate their affluence with heavy,
wooden furniture, elaborate patterned fabrics and various knick-knacks. To this social
group, functionalism and Good Design represented the scarcity of the postwar years, a
time of poverty and shame of which most Germans did not want to be reminded. While
the Federal Republic understood the centrality of prosperity in its postwar narrative of
national branding, the selected furnishing style just did not fit the self-image of a large
segment of the population.
Accordingly, there can be no single answer to the sociological analysis of taste
and consumer behavior in the two German states. By the early 1970s, though, a
noticeable change in tastes took place among the larger consumer base and the increased
demand for modern furniture would eventually lead to a sinking price structure, as
evident in the international success story of Ikea. This went along with an increasing
design presence as lifestyle expression in West Germany.402 In the East, the boom in
prefab housing that created demand for practical, smaller furniture can surely account for
some of the fascination with modern design.

Conclusion
Due to the high number of contributors, the narrative of national branding created
a challenge in both German states. The vision of a modern, advanced West Germany that
embodied technological precision and durability, yet at the same time also progression
401
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and mobility, was juxtaposed to an East Germany that branded itself the keeper of
German cultural heritage, espouser of a backward-looking historicism that only gradually
gave way to a more international vision of a modern socialist consumer society during the
restructuring of the economy. Yet policymakers, designers, industry, retail, and
consumers came to the market with different expectations. Even the education of retailers
and consumers did not result in the desired cultural streamlining under the umbrella of a
national brand or a style, one representing an ideologically and culturally consistent
narrative through which people east and west of the German-German border furnished
their homes.
An analysis of both German economies through the lens of centralism and
regionalism uncovers factors that undermined and changed the national brand narrative.
The design institutions in both Germanys tried to influence cultural and economic policy
centrally, despite, or sometimes because of, their lack of authority and legitimate powers
at regional administrative levels. Although the decision-making powers in cultural
matters lay with the regional government rather than the federal government, the West
German Rat für Formgebung enjoyed far-reaching influence in cultural and economic
circles through corporatist structures. Meanwhile, the central organs of the GDR and even
the first party secretary Ulbricht could not force their aesthetic and economic principles
on individual enterprises whenever regional identity trumped official visions for a
socialist material culture. While previous explanations of popular conduct under the GDR
dictatorship such as the concept of a “niche society”403 find acts of non-conformity
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mostly in the private sphere of the home, my analysis of economic structures and the
relatively limited extent of cultural streamlining clearly indicates that, instead of
retreating into the private, disobedience happened in plain sight – even in one of the most
significant political arenas of state socialism: the command economy.
Elitist efforts to affect the self-conception of consumers went astray. In the West,
design furniture instilled with the clarity and simplicity of a functional, modern style
remained only affordable for the higher and upper-middle classes. Since the majority of
consumers did not see their emotional needs reflected in the official aesthetic in the West,
industry and retail followed aesthetics that proved successful in the market in order to
compete in the expanding trade in lifestyle consumption during the 1960s and 1970s.
Gelsenkirchner Barock survived among an abundance of different styles, catering to the
German notion of Gemütlichkeit. In the East, the command economy prepared its own
pitfalls with Five-Year plans that usually yielded results one could adequately title
“planning ahead and falling behind.”404 Even as large parts of the population longed to
buy modern furniture for the limited spaces in prefab housing across the GDR beginning
in the 1960s, the demand could not be satisfied due to the guiding concept of “division of
labor,” which ironically fractured rather than centralized the East German economy. All
of these factors contributed to mixed styles in German homes, creating a trans-border
traditionalism of sorts as an alternative to the states’ modern visions for the everyday.
Unintentional aesthetic convergence of East and West German domestic culture then
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started with the GDR’s and Federal Republic’s similar struggles over a centralized
cultural policy, regional economic organization, and consumer tastes.
Remarkable in the Cold War context is the fact that neither Germany’s furniture
production imitated or culturally identified with the United States or the Soviet Union.
Few facets in furniture production acquired an air of German-ness. Emphasizing
durability over modishness is a feature with which German design and engineering has
become synonymous (even if GDR production failed to uphold these principles, officials
continued to demand them). The Schrankwand as an example of extraordinary detail and
organizational efficiency embodied typically German values and found broad acceptance
on both sides of the Wall. In the end, the efforts to create national brands by infusing
German homes, East and West, with styles that conformed to their respective narrative
met the same fate as Weimar’s Werkbund and the Bauhaus broken dreams of
democratizing Good Design. Until Ikea disseminated its neo-functional, modern product
line in Germany, designer furniture that deserved the name could only be found in the
homes of the rich and in government buildings.
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CHAPTER 4: DEALING CULTURE ACROSS THE WALL:
INTRA-GERMAN TRADE AND AESTHETIC INCENTIVES
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET
Introduction
At the 1963 Leipzig Trade Fair, West German designer Friedrich Koslowsky
approached leading GDR politicians and economic planners with his idea for a “House of
Life” in East Berlin. This furniture store project, which the designer described as a
“consumption site with sample show,” would offer GDR producers the possibility to
present their products to West German buyers, thus facilitating trade contacts. Based on
the hope that a shared Wohnkultur and reciprocal trade would overcome the German
division, he sought to “build bridges” between the GDR and the Federal Republic.405
While Koslowsky never realized his idea for the House of Life, his notion of cultural
rapprochement through trade suggests that external economic contacts affect the product
landscape of a national brand.
After examining the undermining influence of associational and ideological
factions, regional diversity, and consumer tastes on cohesive national aesthetics, the
question arises then how industrial design helped the two German states in their endeavor
to reclaim international significance. Economic historian Sidney Pollard has shown that
exports were a fundamental part of Germany’s economic foreign relations.406 As the two
German states tried to establish themselves as trading partners for the capitalist West,
their special situation complicated trade relations. The Basic Law and West Germany’s
“German Policy” (Deutschlandpolitik) claimed the territory of the GDR as part of the
405
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postwar German state. Bonn’s position in the German Question relied on two principles:
the Federal Republic’s claim to sole representation (Alleinvertretungsanspruch) and its
policy of non-recognition (Nichtanerkennungspolitik) vis-à-vis the GDR. Of course,
Soviet tanks guaranteed the territorial integrity of the GDR. In terms of trade and
economic development, however, GDR officials often looked toward the West, playing
into West German policies when it served their own economic interest. This chapter
traces how export trade triggered a renegotiation of Wohnkultur on both sides of the
border.
With the fulfillment of immediate postwar needs for housing, furnishings, and
clothing behind them, both German states shifted their political and economic attention to
export industries. This change of focus in economic policy had two opposing effects on
German-German relations. On the one hand, it pitted the two economic systems directly
against each other in a competition for economic superiority. On the other hand, due to
the interconnected economic infrastructure, the in “intra-German trade” between the two
states glossed over the division of the Cold War stalemate. The Federal Republic
welcomed economic interactions with East Germany precisely because they offered an
opportunity for East-West dialogue that did not necessitate official political recognition
of the GDR. Like Koslowsky, Bonn regarded trade as a transfer of cultural ideas. It
recognized the potential to impress principles of democratic political culture upon the
East German population.
This unidirectional understanding of cultural transfer limited to the two German
states, however, became more complex when the Federal Republic entered the European
Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. Commitment to a future of Western European
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unity eventually conflicted with German attempts at upholding connections between its
two parts. The contested territorial situation and the special nature of intra-German trade
made the GDR practically an unofficial member of the Common Market, which caused
tensions between the Federal Republic and the EEC member states. At the same time,
European economic integration brought with it cultural change that culminated in a
convergence of German aesthetics in the 1980s. Rather than corroborate the usual mutual
Cold War rhetoric of economic superiority and cultural difference vis-à-vis an “other”
Germany, this process ultimately led both to adapt their aesthetics to changing economic
and political climates on the international markets, connecting them to broader European
ideas of modern culture. Attuned to German-German competition and collaboration in the
realm of trade and exports, this chapter explores the aesthetic convergence of East and
West German design in the Mittelstand (small and medium-sized) furniture industry
within the European context. It will show that German-German economic cooperation
undermined the Cold War division of Europe and presents the GDR as an early example
of cultural Europeanization that reached beyond the Iron Curtain and thus beyond the
borders of the Common Market.407
Traditionally, historians have discussed Europeanization as the colonial impact of
European values and technology on other regions of the globe.408 But with the increasing
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interest in the structural and political growth of the European Union, debates about
supranational policy-making and its effects on member states relocated the concept
within the borders of the European Union.409 Historians have joined this debate on
Europeanization, yet they are usually less interested in the institutionalized Europe and
more attracted to long-term social and cultural processes.410 Ulrike von Hirschhausen and
Kiran Klaus Patel, however, point to the analytical limitations of Europeanization when it
is exclusively understood as a normative implementation of specific concepts closely
associated with Europe, such as Roman law or Christianity.411 Instead, they suggest a
socially constructive approach that takes pointers from concepts of cultural nationalism
and sees Europe as an imagined community.412 As such, Europe is constructed and
imagined by different actors as a social and cultural formation in constant flux. This
approach examines discourse and social practice in an effort to understand Europe as an
experience community (Erfahrungsgemeinschaft) and a cultural space that is not limited
to the borders of the European Union.
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Similarly, although this study looks at European identity formation in industrial
design from a standpoint closely tied to European economic integration, it goes beyond
the border of the EEC. It extends the analysis of processes of Europeanization to consider
the mutual transfer of cultural values in economic interactions with the GDR. The
concept of Europeanization marks an interactive process that includes institutions,
political processes, political programs and individual actors at the European level as well
as at the level of the nation. In the realm of design, this approach examines how European
economic integration affected material culture as an expression of national identity. At
the end of this process, both German states contributed to a modern European aesthetic
that did not follow one distinct style, but rather substituted stylistic dogmatism with
diversity.
Claiming that cultural Europeanization completely cancelled out national identity
would be going too far. European identity should not be understood as a variation of its
national predecessor.413 Unlike national identity that represses regional or international
identity, scholarship on European identity perceives of it as being based on the
recognition of a multitude of identities.414 Therefore, while the two German states
maintained their special relationship in intra-German trade and used it as a medium to
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influence the population on the other side of the border, they also changed their cultural
outlook through interactions with Western Europe.

When East Meets West: Encounters at the Leipzig and Cologne Fairs
It was no coincidence that Koslowsky proposed his plan for the House of Life at
the Leipzig Fair. Ever since the German partition, trade fairs had functioned as sites of
East-West encounters. In the Cold War climate of ideological competition, the fairs also
gained political significance for the two German states as places for comparison between
their alternative visions of modern material identity and technological advancement. At
the same time, cultural considerations accompanied political motivations as they used the
fair to keep the transfer of ideas open. For the furniture industry, the Leipzig Fall Fair and
the International Furniture Fair in Cologne evolved into important arenas for the
promotion of East and West German Wohnkultur, on which both based claims to political
legitimacy and economic preeminence. This interplay between aesthetics and ideology is
crucial in understanding what Leora Auslander has termed the “communicative capacity
of objects.”415 It instills material culture, in this case interior design products, with the
ability to communicate cultural values and social relations that go beyond the mere
exchange value of the objects in question. In this way, purely economic transactions gain
cultural and political significance.
As a locus of concentrated encounters between consumer products and the general
public, fair displays could thus achieve a visual effect that combined economic and
representative interests. In the early twentieth century, fairs had undergone a modal
415
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change: a shift from sale fairs (Warenmesse) to sample fairs (Mustermesse). Whereas
trade remained the main incentive for holding a fair, producers increasingly limited
themselves to exhibiting samples instead of selling on site.416 As a result, exhibitioners
paid more attention to the composition of their product displays, which showcased
advances in design and technology. In the Cold War years, this shift encouraged aesthetic
competition whenever East and West met at the fair. Appealing displays advertised
goods, however, they also functioned as representations of the political order that had
brought them forward. While economic considerations surely played a significant role in
an individual company’s decision to present its products at the fair, both German states
were aware of the larger issues at stake. Entrepreneurial deliberations did not eclipse the
political implications of product displays. Accordingly, the visibility of their products
made producers the ambassadors of either East or West German cultural identity, which
gave cause for concern about the message conveyed to the public at large. For example,
during a stroll across the 1960 Cologne Furniture Fair, West German intra-zonal trade
representatives noticed displays of GDR system furniture for their sufficient quality and
aesthetics.417 The price range of this furniture was decisively below that of West German
production, causing not only surprise, but also unease among Bonn’s trade specialists.
Without the capitalist pressure for high profit margins, the GDR pricing policy made
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commodities available to the masses, thus possibly convincing West German consumers
of the GDR’s socialist promises of material egalitarianism.418
Hosting a commercial event that advanced capitalist principles was quite a leap
for the socialist East Germany of the immediate postwar years. To circumvent this
problem, the GDR provided the fair at Leipzig with a politico-economic connotation.419
During the early years of German division, the GDR leadership claimed that Leipzig was
of paramount importance in bringing about a unified German economy (deutsche
Wirtschaftseinheit). A pamphlet published in 1947 by the fair organization attested an
“export compulsion” if the reconstruction and the revival of economic life in Germany
should be a success. To reach this goal, the two German states needed to work together
because preproduction for export products on the respective other side of the zone border
tied the two economies together. If fair activities and economic promotion continued
broken down by occupation zone, the pamphlet argued, it would inadvertently hurt the
“German product” and contradict all-German interests.420 The pamphlet offers early
evidence of East German pragmatism regarding the looming German division, knowing
that only a unified economic policy could secure its survival and reemergence as a brand
on the global markets. To drive the point home, the brochure offered anecdotal evidence
for the GDR’s true efforts for German economic unity from the prior fair: “Passengers on
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special trains from all parts of Germany understood their unhindered passing at the zone
borders as a symbolic act: a dividing line was crossed and, finally, there was space for
dealings and action once again.”421 Such spatial analogies connecting East and West
persisted throughout the pamphlet, culminating in the exclamation “Contemplation of the
whole!” (“Besinnung auf’s Ganze!”) that paid lip-service to East German commitment to
German unity.422 Likewise, West German economic representatives welcomed Leipzig’s
all-German activity as a way to improve intra-zonal trade, because it complemented
similar efforts toward preserving economic ties at Western trade fairs, such as Hannover
or Cologne.423
While the reopening of the Leipzig fair immediately became a political issue in
the East-West conflict, the fair in Cologne seemed to emerge in a less contentious, but
related context. Cologne faced two structural challenges. When Cologne opened its doors
to fair visitors in the fall of 1947 for the first time after the war, it not only competed with
the Leipzig fair that, with Soviet support, had managed to open the year before, but also
with other cities in the Western zones of occupation such as Frankfurt or Hanover.424 In
contrast to the Leipzig fair, Cologne received no financial support from the occupation
authorities. The necessity to be self-sustaining eventually led to the discovery that
specialized fairs brought in more revenue for Cologne. Therefore, cities in the West
German zones of occupation divided up these special-interest fair events between one
another to ensure sufficient attendance by the general public and to attract specialists. The
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International Furniture Fair, introduced in the spring of 1949, became one of the few
postwar trade events that still exist today.425 The early years of German division thus saw
a flurry of activities on both sides of the border that not only aspired to maintain
economic ties, but also to create spaces for East-West encounters. While the economic
incentive to participate in both the Leipzig and the Cologne fairs was high for industry,
national interests and Cold War diplomacy complicated seemingly apolitical trade.
With the severing of German-German economic unity in the aftermath of the
introduction of the West German currency Deutsche Mark (DM) in 1948, these
communal efforts reversed course. The Soviet Union reacted to the separationist policy
by American and British occupation authorities with a blockade of western access to the
eastern zone. Faced with this hostile Soviet countermeasure, the West German economic
administration decided to withdraw its representatives from the Leipzig fair, although
officials feared that it could lose the status of an all-German trade institution.426 Yet
exactly this scenario came true: after the blockade ended in 1949, Leipzig developed an
exposition-like character, providing the Eastern bloc with a platform for selfrepresentation. The contemporary Cold War description of Leipzig as a “GDR
performance show” embodied this notion well, and the barriers that the fair put up to
limit access for western companies in successive years only affirmed it.
Once German unification slipped out of reach, the GDR joined the COMECON in
1950 and subsequently built its own economy independently of the Federal Republic.
East Germany funded its industrial development mostly through trade. Accordingly, the
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mid-1950s saw an aggressive internationalization of the fair, which was closely
connected to the GDR’s quest for political recognition.427 In the late 1950s and early
1960s, the GDR increasingly used the fair to display the reputed superiority of the
socialist order, not least in contrast to the commodities of the West German
Wirtschaftswunder. This deliberate politicization of Leipzig also raised questions about
the political symbolism of West German participation in the context of its nonrecognition policy vis-à-vis the GDR. Allowing businesses to go to Leipzig contributed
to the fair’s success and could be interpreted as West Germany’s unofficial recognition of
the other German state. Furthermore, trade relations would stabilize the weaker East
German economy. But on the contrary, the Federal Republic supported these economic
interactions precisely because they offered an opportunity for East-West dialogue that did
not necessitate official political recognition.
In the absence of official treaties, the principle of reciprocity regulated GermanGerman affairs, such as fair-based trade. However, the GDR used fair participation as a
political and economic lever. In order to guard the interests of East German industries,
the leadership made strategic decisions about which industries received permission to
participate at the fair. The domestic furniture industry, at the time a vibrant and important
crafts industry on the verge of mechanization, was unable to withstand western
competition. Consequently, the government denied Western furniture producers access to
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Leipzig. In contrast, West German officials did not take similar actions to guard domestic
industry and trade against GDR competition at the Cologne fair. This imbalance upset
West German industry. For example, constituents of the National Lumber Industry
Association (Hauptverband der Deutschen Holzindustrie und verwandter Industriezweige
e.V.) complained about the large presence of East German furniture businesses at the
1960 International Furniture Fair. In a letter to the Federal Ministry of Economics, the
association pointed out the lack of state-implemented regulations for East German
exhibitors in Cologne, while the GDR government systematically excluded certain West
German producers from the Leipzig fair.428 By 1960, only one West German furniture
company had gained permission to exhibit its products in Leipzig, allegedly thanks to its
low price range. Sales of approximately 200,000 DM made it worth their while.429
Quickly it became evident that these imbalances in trade fair representation
signaled as much Bonn’s economic decision-making as political strategy in the context of
the German Question. When spokespeople for the West German lumber industry urged
the Federal Ministry of Economics to intervene on their behalf in Cologne, the ministry
responded that the state chose to refrain from regulating the private enterprise that
organized the fair because of the liberal principles of the social market economy. Up to
that point, the ministry explained, it had only advised the organizers of the fair to admit
exhibitioners from the Soviet zone in the interest of expanding the inter-zonal trade,
provided that Eastern traders did not abuse the fair event for provocative political
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demonstrations.

Despite this reasonable caveat, the Federal Republic knowingly

established intra-German trade relations as a political rather than an economic interest. In
the early years of German-German trade, its volume and revenue remained relatively low,
which rendered it insignificant to the overall welfare of the West German economy.
Accordingly, Bonn knew how to exploit the liberal-capitalist division between productive
civil society and the state, tailoring it to the political requirements of the German
Question.
Indeed, prior corporative attempts to balance out intra-German trade on an
economic level had failed. In meetings between representatives of the furniture industry
and the Federal Ministry of Economics at the Cologne furniture fair in February 1960, the
delegates ascribed the mismatch between East and West German furniture exports to the
fact that the ministry did not prominently feature furniture in trade agreements with the
GDR. The ministry offered to solve the problem by listing furniture separately in the next
trade agreement, and by invoking the principle of reciprocity at the intra-zonal
negotiations.431 This was a well-meaning attempt to appease national industry, but
separate negotiations between the West German furniture representation and the GDR
revealed that solving the matter of reciprocal furniture trade to the satisfaction of all
parties involved would be difficult. Hiding behind the mechanisms of the planned
economy and putting their national interest first, the East German delegates exploited the
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differences between the two economic systems to complicate the principle of reciprocity
in intra-German trade.432
In a meeting with the East German agency for intra-German trade (DIA) the
following day, West German furniture industry representatives learned that the GDR
furniture industry was incapable of covering the needs of the East German population.
Theoretically, the DIA claimed, exports to the West should be offset with imports from
the West to close the gap. Unfortunately for industry in the Federal Republic, the
economic planners usually allocated import quotas to raw materials, confirming that
GDR trade policy generally avoided importing finished products like furniture. In order
to redress this imbalance in intra-German trade, the East Germans ironically advised the
West German furniture industry to participate more frequently at the Leipzig fair. To
advertise their goods and create demand, the DIA recommended, Western producers
should furnish a collective display with products “of average pricing and average taste”
(mittlere Preislage und mittlere Geschmackslinie). Only with a demand in place did the
DIA see the possibility of receiving a budget allocation for furniture in the next economic
plan. However, it would take the DIA at least a year of negotiations and planning to win
this privilege at the Leipzig fair for the West German furniture industry.433 As puzzling as
this charade played between fair officials and the DIA may seem, the West German
furniture industry unexpectedly gained greater access to the Leipzig fair via these intraGerman trade negotiations. Whereas the need to protect domestic industry remained, the
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GDR did not want to damage the economic exchange with the West and possibly lose
access to Western currency.
While East German companies did promote their products at the Cologne
Furniture Fair, their primary focus lay on the semi-annual Leipzig fairs. There they
enjoyed the full support of official policy. In 1964, the GDR Council of Ministers
decided to award gold medals to “heighten the political prestige of the Leipzig Fair and to
underpin its significance as an international trading center.”434 These gold medals at
Leipzig allowed the national industry to set higher prices for domestic retail as well as for
exports. Furniture combines could thus reach their annual value quota faster if their
products met the DAMW’s gold-medal criteria of functionality, style, premium materials,
and “highest international development level.”435 With the economic reorientation toward
consumer goods under Ulbricht’s New Economic System in 1963, GDR design
politicians and economic planners thus shifted focus away from developing a German
socialist domestic culture toward modeling aesthetic policy to compete with Western
advanced production techniques. Nonetheless, the award system benefitted most directly
the state, namely by furthering its international reputation as a leading industrial nation.
In fact, the Party instituted a ratio for medals awarded, distributing awards between the
GDR, other socialist countries, and the non-socialist countries, often presenting East
German industry in a favorable light.436 At the 1970 Leipzig Fair, the GDR awarded its
own industry 35 gold medals for outstanding and technologically progressive products.
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The Soviet Union received the second most medals with 12 awards of excellence.

437

That

year’s official (and hence confidential) fair report, however, contradicted outright the
East’s propaganda show of socialist economic prowess: “The number of new and
enhanced designs is completely insufficient, and their quality is at the most equivalent to
world standard.”438 By overemphasizing its achievements, the GDR attempted to
convince the international community that the East German planned economy could keep
up with the innovations in design and technology displayed by capitalist competitors. To
that extent, the Leipzig fair fulfilled the state’s diplomatic goals as the image of the GDR
began to change in Western countries: “The state between Elbe and Oder was not simply
the ‘Zone’ anymore, but was noticed as a modern industrial society – indeed without
democracy, though still successful in its own ways.”439
Willy Brandt’s New Eastern Policy (Neue Ostpolitik) of the late 1960s
contributed to the increased economic exchange across the inner-German border.
Changing course from the conservative Adenauer government’s “policy of strength” to
cooperation and accord, the Federal Republic utilized German-German exchange in the
realm of culture, economy, and humanitarian aid for rapprochement in the German Cold
War.440 With the ink on the Four Power Agreement that secured the status of a divided
Berlin still wet, the euphoria of peaceful coexistence spilled over to the trade fair. West
German furniture became a staple at the Leipzig Fall Fair, thanks to three special
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exhibitions on human environment – the Interscola for school furniture, the Intacta for
interior home design, and the Expovita for sports and leisure-time activities
(Freizeitgestaltung) – that served as venues for Western products.441 Already in the fall of
1971 the combined display area of all represented industries from the Federal Republic
and West Berlin had reached 19,000 square meters. This rendered the FRG the secondlargest participating nation, second only to the GDR itself.442 Overall, the atmosphere at
the fair that year was described as “thoroughly friendly” (durchaus freundlich).443 For the
first time since 1946, politicians refrained from the traditional polemics against the
Federal Republic in official speeches. Another “first” was the official invitation of the
West German state secretary to the reception that GDR Minister of Foreign Trade Horst
Sölle held at the Leipzig city hall.444 The conciliatory spirit of the 1972 Basic Treaty
prolonged the German-German détente for another year.
After 1973, the GDR fell back into a more habitual pattern of deep distrust and
paranoia in its relationship to the Federal Republic. Representations of Western culture
and economic successes grew more threatening by the mid-1970s when Honecker
initiated his consumption program Unity of Economic and Social Policy (Einheit von
Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik). Integrating capitalist market incentives into the socialist
Plan, Honecker’s program emulated Ulbricht’s defunct New Economic Policy in an
attempt to cure the shortcomings of central planning. Already a couple of years into this
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new policy, economic planners realized that the early emphasis on heavy industry had
compromised the structures of consumer good production. Because of East Germany’s
difficulties in fulfilling consumer demands, it feared that displays of the Western lifestyle
would threaten the stability of the socialist economy and promote the perks of capitalism.
In subsequent measures aimed at minimizing ideological impact, the GDR leadership
quickly sequestered the population from the lure of the West. In 1974, the East German
government explicitly prohibited fairgoers from exploring western stands in Leipzig.445
Exclusively specialists, with the express permission of a company or combine director
(Kombinatsdirektor), and only in the company of their staff, could visit exhibitions of
Western companies. The GDR admitted to taking such measures in confidential talks
with the West German GDR Trade Committee, reasoning that the general foreign
currency shortage (Devisenknappheit), warranted tight control of demand.446 However,
these complex relationships between political aesthetics and everyday consumption that
developed within the realm of intra-German trade cannot be sufficiently explained by
looking exclusively at individual encounters at the fair. Rather, the complexities between
political and economic goals require a macro-analysis of intra-German trade and its
impact on political aesthetics, a field that has not received much attention from design
historians. Postwar design scholarship has focused on the historical development and
meaning of aesthetics within one social and political order. Stepping out of the national
frame allows insights into external economic influences’ impact on the development of
industrial design.
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Dealing With the Devil: German-German Trade
In order to appreciate the full extent of the ideological struggle aesthetically
displayed at the trade fairs, it is important to understand the nature of intra-German trade.
The trade fairs as such only served as the stage for a constant back and forth in the
economic relations of the two states that was going on behind the scenes. Intra-German
trade became an increasingly important tool in the German Question over the course of
the 1960s and 1970s. Its handling and implementation on either side of the border tells a
story of steady political antagonism that concurred with growing economic
interdependence.447
The Federal Republic’s refusal to acknowledge the GDR remained the guiding
principle in its dealings with the eastern part of Germany. To assure its claim, the
Ministry of Economics demonstratively handled intra-German trade through an extra
body, the Treuhandstelle für Interzonenhandel (TSI), rather than the foreign trade
administration.448 Meanwhile, the GDR, denying the Alleinvertretungsanspruch of the
FRG and claiming nationhood, handled intra-German trade through the Ministry for
Foreign Trade. These structural demonstrations of diametrically opposed politics in
regard to German unity provided an ongoing bone of contention, but did not prevent the
two German states from trading with each other. In the West German case, the
disagreement even spurred Bonn’s engagement in economic cooperation as Bonn hoped
to undermine East Germany’s demarcation policy. Both German economic systems
mutually depended on each other for the rebuilding of viable economies after the Second
447
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World War because they were interlinked by the production of pre- and semi-finished
goods. Relatively poor in natural resources, they developed strong export industries
whose success was based on finishing processes by adding to product value. Naturally,
industrial and trade relations worked quite well during times of economic prosperity, but
times of economic downturn, such as the oil crisis of 1973, put the political opportunism
of intra-German trade and the goodwill of Western entrepreneurs to the test.
Until 1971, the GDR avoided imports of finished products like furniture, to save
scarce foreign currency for much-needed raw materials.449 Instead, the planners of the
GDR economy pushed exports to the West to earn foreign currency. By 1958, East
German exports of furniture numbered only 835,000 accounting units, yet they increased
steadily over the course of the 1960s.450 This growth of the GDR as a furniture export
nation can be traced back to the collectivization of 1958, which created enormous
production capacities for bulk goods.451 Meanwhile, the West German furniture industry
remained unsuccessful in procuring orders from the GDR, a trend that persisted
throughout the Cold War period. As the Federal Ministry of Economics’ hesitance to
enforce the principle of reciprocity in trade fair participation showed earlier, rather than
pursuing domestic economic interest, the Federal Republic integrated German-German
trade policy into an overall strategy for maintaining relations with the GDR. The low
economic pay-off for the West indicates the political nature of West Germany’s trade
with the East. In the process, the GDR economy “accidentally” grew dependent on West
German trade in order to support struggling consumption-oriented industries. While the
449
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Federal Republic perhaps had not calculated this dependency of the GDR as the outcome,
it was surely not an unwelcome one.
The Berlin Agreement of 1951 established the basis for intra-zonal trade, more
commonly known as intra-German trade (innerdeutscher Handel). Aside from the
political decision to fix the exchange rate between the Ostmark and the D-Mark at
equivalency, so-called Swing credits served as a financial instrument to overcome the
economic oddities of German division.452 These credits were interest-free, short-term
intergovernmental loans aimed at stabilizing trade between the two German states. While
relatively insignificant until the 1970s, the Swing credits became an instrument of
political bartering once Honecker introduced his consumer-geared program Unity of
Economic and Social Policy in 1971. As Jonathan Zatlin has shown, West German goods
and money started to seep into the East German economy, devaluing German socialism
by undermining its currency first and its political legitimacy second.453 Because it was the
GDR’s second largest trade partner after the Soviet Union, goods and loans from the
FRG became a crutch to a planned economy, which failed to fulfill consumer demands on
its own.
During the negotiations in advance of the German-German Basic Treaty, the FRG
reconsidered the effectiveness of its trade policy toward the GDR. Trade by credit had
become the law of the land, which created mutual dependencies: the GDR depended on
West German money to finance its imports, and West German companies wanted the
452

In reality, the Ostmark was never worth a full Deutsche Mark, but this provided political support for the
value of the East German currency. To the population it signaled that prices in the GDR remained more
stable and were lower than in the West. “Thus, the SED’s assertion of equivalence helped bolster its
political legitimacy and create the illusion that the purchasing power of the East German mark was
equivalent to the D-Mark’s.” Jonathan R. Zatlin, The Currency of Socialism: Money and Political Culture
in East Germany (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007), 116.
453
Zatlin, The Currency of Socialism, 6.

191

business, which is why the FRG required the GDR to procure exclusively West German
products for the credits. Accounting units usually documented the exchange, which
eliminated most of the actual money flow. In this way, the GDR received 2.5 billion DM
worth of raw materials, preproduction and subassembly parts, and services from the FRG
in 1970 alone.454 However, to keep up this level of trade in 1971, the TSI estimated that
the GDR had to raise its debts by another 500 million accounting units that year, because
it had received 418 million units more than it delivered to the FRG in the previous
year.455 East German short stockage, the incapability to deliver certain in-demand
products, partially caused this imbalance. Meanwhile, GDR purchases of finished
products were small in number, which illustrates the fundamental difference that marked
East-West trade: the GDR exported finished products to profit from high added value,
while it imported semi-finished products and raw materials such as steel (32.4 percent of
the annual imports) and subassemblies (34.6 percent of the annual imports) from the FRG
that contained less or no added value.456 Finished products only constituted 6.3 percent of
the GDR’s annual imports in 1971.457 Had the business community at large known this
statistic, the West German Ministry of Economics would likely face renewed complaints
from domestic industrial associations. Bonn thus tried to mask this imbalance by utilizing
separate statistical methods for German-German trade and foreign trade. Although the
ministry claimed that this was to politically contrast the two kinds of export on paper,
these statistics constituted a form of manipulation. While Bonn’s trade statistics on the
454
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GDR offered information about the industrial origins of products, they did not specify the
degree of finishing, thus obscuring the fact that the West German side delivered goods of
lesser worth, and thus more of them, to East Germany, while the GDR delivered mostly
finished products of higher worth, and thus less of them.458 Despite all of these favorable
conditions for the East, by 1971 the GDR had accumulated a debt of 1565.9 million
accounting units, or 1565.9 million DM. West German officials privately welcomed these
debts as a solid political guarantee for the persistence of German-German relations.459
Despite an increase in consumer products after Honecker’s promises of June
1971, the GDR continued to be pressed to fulfill demands.460 The earlier reliance on
heavy industry had resulted in underdeveloped consumer goods and capital equipment
industries, which included machine construction, shipbuilding, and electrical engineering.
Bonn knew that the GDR would not have the funds to buy the machines necessary to
continue building up the capital equipment industry to further develop the consumer
goods program. In a prognosis, a FRG economist looked skeptically at alternative
solutions to East Berlin’s dilemma, pointing to the traditional interconnectedness of the
two German economies and the GDR’s dependency on West German spare parts and
fittings. Consumer goods production relied heavily on machinery originally built in the
Federal Republic.461 Without natural resources to sell for foreign currency, the GDR
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faced the dilemma of financing increased consumer goods production with the export of
finished products, thus sending abroad the very objects that its own population needed.462
Yet in the end, these funds financed imports of steel and other construction materials for
Honecker’s second ambitious project: the housing program.463 Well aware of these
simultaneous and contradictory investment projects for 1972, the West German Ministry
of Economics estimated that the GDR needed to reduce its imports by 100 million DM in
order to avoid further debts. At the same time, its iron and steel purchases had to
decrease, that is, from a West German perspective this would have been a plausible
reaction, if the economic planners wanted to import western consumer products in a
quantity that would even come close to covering the demand for commodities among the
East German population.464 Instead, furniture exports to the West continued to increase,
with the FRG as the main receiving market. In the first quarter of 1972 alone, trade with
West Germany grew by 18 percent in comparison to the same time period in the previous
year. But the domestic shortage of consumer products was not the only unwarranted
effect of Honecker’s ambitions. The export-oriented nature of East Germany’s furniture
production eventually worked at the expense of national aesthetics.
Success on the export market meant a certain degree of adaptation to Western
tastes. Coinciding with both Honecker’s plans to increase consumer goods production
and relaxed German-German relations in the context of Basic Treaty negotiations, the
Federal Republic experienced a “furnishing wave” (Einrichtungswelle), caused by a

462

For an in-depth analysis of the dilemmas that the GDR faced under Honecker’s economic policy see
“The New Economic System of Planning and Management 1963-70 and Recentralization in the 1970s,” in
The East German Economy, ed. Ian Jeffries and Manfred Melzer (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 26-40.
463
Dr. Sieben (TSI), Prognose Nr. 2 - 1972, 15 April 1972, B102/396753, BAK.
464
Ibid.

194
465

general rise in wages during full employment.

Large buyers, such as the Kaufhof

department stores and the Neckermann mail order business, increasingly relied on large
production capacities in the Eastern combines. Although the mail-order businesses had
direct connections to East German furniture combines, the West German Ministry of
Economics oversaw these trade relations and monitored their progress closely.466 Noting
that in the past the GDR had seldom serviced special orders, Kaufhof representatives
remarked in a meeting with the ministry that this attitude changed in the early 1970s,
when the GDR became more receptive to western aesthetic taste. It was mostly bedroom
furniture of the lower-middle price range that fulfilled the necessary quality standards and
attracted West German consumers. Kaufhof would have ordered also sofas, armchairs,
and desks, but the Plan proved inflexible in responding to its specialized demands in
these branches of the furniture industry. In addition to the East German industry’s
inflexibility, the GDR transportation system was unreliable. For example, Deutrans, the
GDR cargo company, delayed deliveries to the FRG in 1971 because of the fall harvest.
Allegedly, their trucks had to transport potatoes from the fields to the towns. Under such
circumstances, standardized, easily transportable wooden furniture turned out to be the
most consistent – both in availability and quality.467
The dialectic aesthetic of intra-German trade, that is the interplay between
demand and subsequent aesthetic reorientation of production, affected the guidelines for
industrial designers. As the GDR economy increasingly opened up to export markets in
the West, East German designers found their vision of socialist industrial design
465
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jeopardized by the aesthetic requirements of export. In a 1975 interview, designer Horst
Michel pinned the demise of GDR materiality on West Germany’s mail-order giants such
as Neckermann or Quelle.468 Their buyers, he was convinced, undermined his and his
disciples’ efforts to create a morally responsible product culture in the GDR. With this
observation, he indirectly criticized the cultural and economic leadership for turning the
GDR production system into a magnet for western bulk buyers. Collectivization and
regional organization of industry had created large combines that became viable only
with mass production. These production clusters, however, presented ideal conditions for
Western retail chains. Michel complained that large businesses like Neckermann were
only after the cheapest price, thus requiring that East German industry use low-quality
materials, which compromised the aesthetic as well as the functionality of the products.
Michel forgot, however, that the backward production standards of the East
German furniture industry limited the clientele specifically to those Western large
retailers that targeted the low-income population. High-end furniture producers and
retailers usually refrained from cooperation with East German combines because their
customers demanded expensive woods and state-of-the-art production methods. The
GDR economy could not offer either. Even Hellerau, despite its reputation as the
successor of the turn-of-the-century Werkstätten movement and its skilled workers, could
not keep up with Western standards. In the 1980s, the combine cooperated with the
luxury brand Interlübke by mass-producing wooden chair designs for the West German
company. However, Hellerau was unable to produce one of the two designs contracted by
Interlübke, because it did not own the machinery necessary to mill the required details on
468
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bent parts.

While Michel astutely spoke to the creative potential of industrial designers

and the skills of the furniture workers, the interplay between East German technological
backwardness and the resultant request for low-end furniture ended in the mass
production of low-quality goods.
The picture of East-West placidness and trade cooperation changed abruptly with
the global economic downturn during the oil crisis of 1973. The crisis hit the West
German economy hard, but especially industries that relied on oil and chemicals derived
from it – such as cushion foam for seating furniture – suffered greatly. As a consequence,
these industries turned territorial vis-à-vis their East German counterparts. In 1974 the
Bavarian Upholstery Association sent a complaint letter to West German Minister of
Economics Hans Friderichs to point out a new set of imbalances in intra-German
furniture trade.470 Specifically, the Bavarians demanded to be granted the same tax
advantages that the federal government provided for East German companies. GDR
export goods enjoyed a turnover tax reduction of 6 percent, while it was applied in full to
West German products, thus relatively increasing western prices. In its response to the
Bavarian Upholstery Association, the Ministry of Economics attributed this competitive
advantage in favor of East German products to the “special quality of the intra-German
trade.”471 The turnover tax reduction served as a means to create incentives for Western
buyers to order eastern products. This measure originated with the reevaluation of the
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DM in 1970, which had negatively affected intra-German trade.

Because the Berlin

agreement had fixed the exchange rate between the Ostmark and the DM at 1:1, the
prices for East German exports remained stable while they should have gone down. From
the perspective of the ministry, the turnover tax reduction was just a measure to even out
the playing field for GDR export industries.473 Because of “budget concerns, the tax
system, and European Community agreements,” Friderichs explained, such a turnover tax
reduction could not be applied to domestic industries, even if they were in financial
distress.474 Friderichs furthermore pointed out that the East German exports of upholstery
products only constituted 1.8 percent of domestic production, which, he assumed, would
not affect the market. Whereas the ministry refused to financially support individual
branches of domestic industry, implementing the competitive laws of capitalism and the
European Common Market, the federal government had no qualms about changing the
rules of the game for East German competitors. Upholding good trade relations with the
GDR became a guiding principle in Bonn’s economic policy, even if that entailed
financial losses or breaking European trade agreements, and took precedent over creating
competitive advantages for domestic industry.
Nevertheless, West German industry, especially in federal states neighboring the
GDR, such as Bavaria, did have cause for concern. The erratic nature of trade between
the GDR and the FRG by the early 1980s shows how Friderichs’ generalizations about
upholstery import based on trade statistics could amount to misinformation or only
472
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momentary truths. Because of bulk production and differing Plan priorities, the
availability of specific furniture lacked consistency. Nevertheless, the furniture sector
was the fastest-growing entry in the lumber product trade between East and West
Germany (see table 4).
Jan.-June
1980
1981
In mio. VE
110,9
135
Real increase in mio.
+ 24.1
VE
In percent
22
Table 4: West German Imports of East German Lumber Products, 1980-1982.475

Jan.-June

1980

1981

Real increase
in mio VE
+ 14.3
+ 4.1
+ 2.7
+ 1.1

Sofas and divan beds
14.7
29.0
Wardrobes
0.3
4.4
Chests of drawers
1.9
4.6
Living
room
furniture
5.3
6.4
systems
Kitchen chairs
5.4
6.0
+ 0.6
Armchairs
20.8
12.4
- 8.4
Table 5: West German Imports of East German Furniture, 1980-1981.

Jan.-June

1981

1983

Real increase
in mio VE
Armchairs
12.4
31.5
+ 19.1
Add-on Furniture
23.8
+ 23.8
Kitchen Tables
11.9
+ 11.9
Wooden Bed Rests
8.1
11.5
+ 3.4
Sofas and divan beds
29.0
14.9
- 14.1
Table 6: West German Imports of East German Furniture, 1981-1982

1982
150.8
+15.8
12

In percent
97.3
142.1
20.8
11.1
40.0

In percent
+ 154
+ 42
- 49

The tables above provide a small glimpse of the flexibility that West German buyers had
to demonstrate in dealing with the GDR planned economy (see tables 5 and 6).
Inconsistencies in the Plan could result in the overproduction of certain furniture in any
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given year. In 1981, this happened to be sofas, which resulted in a growth of sofa exports
to the Federal Republic by 97.3 percent. The following year the pattern changed to
armchairs with an increase of 154 percent, while the purchase of sofas balanced itself out
with a decrease of 49 percent. Seeing that giant furniture retailers such as Ikea and RKL
Möbel found themselves on the receiving end of these gyrations makes one wonder how
they could calculate their product range while dependent on GDR production.476 Yet
small and medium-sized furniture producers, such as the clients of the Bavarian
Upholstery Association probably suffered most when GDR furniture flooded the West
German market. The fact that Bonn did not take action on behalf of their industry and
played along with the GDR inconsistencies confirmed West Germany’s political interest
in the intra-German trade.
In a self-justificatory gesture, the GDR turned some of the western trade partners’
concerns on their head. At a conference on the “situation of the global economy” in the
fall of 1981 in Hamburg, Jürgen Nitz, a representative of the East German Research
Institute for Politics and Economy, explained to a surprised western audience how the
capitalist path in the global economy continued to disappoint the socialist nations.477 The
disconcerting results, he explained, threatened GDR trading interests: the slowing-down
of industrial growth; the relatively slow accumulation of capital after the oil crisis;
chronic inflation in capitalist countries that redounded to the detriments of socialist
economies; stagnant wages which throttled down demand for import products from
socialist countries; and the increasing instability of capitalist currency, which made credit

476
477

Note, Schaefer, Ergebnisse des IdH im 1. Halbjahr 1981, 24 August 1981, B102/396753, BAK.
Transcript, Annual Conference “Internationale Politik 1981,” 7 October 1981, B102/396753, BAK.

200
478

negotiations difficult for the GDR.

That these developments negatively affected trade

between East and West, Nitz proposed, ought to be a logical conclusion. East Germany,
as well as other socialist countries, Nitz continued, would not accept the blame for the
consequences and would fight against attempts to pin these crises and inflationary
tendencies on the GDR. While pointing to the shortcomings of capitalism, the GDR
displayed little concern in regard to the structural quirks in the planned economy and its
focus on political goals that negatively affected the Western European countries.
For a political advantage in trade negotiations, the GDR did not shy away from
manipulating Plan statistics to blind-sight western countries to the real extent of its
economic situation. To the West German Ministry of Economics manipulated Plan
production goals presented similar problems to those, which the undefined course of the
capitalist economies posed to the GDR. Usually, the ministry looked to the Plan in
combination with GDR foreign and intra-German trade to leverage West German trade
policy diplomatically. Yet the Plan often reflected political aims rather than economic
probabilities, leaving the ministry to rely on GDR trade policy patters to estimate real
outcomes. For example, in the 1981-85 Plan directive, the Planning Commission
allocated an impossible growth in the production sector, which, Western economists
realized, was a statistical trick to balance and conceal the import purchases necessary to
uphold the current standard of living in the GDR on paper. Over the course of the 1970s,
supplementing domestic consumer good industries with imports on credit had become a
standard solution in GDR economic planning in order to create the impression that the
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population’s standard of living had indeed improved.

But even these imports could not

completely fill the gaps in supplies. Buying on credit changed the focus of the GDR
economic policy from long-term growth through investments to the short-term policy of
borrowing and, subsequently, to the “immediate exigency of debt reduction” by the
1980s.480 As a consequence, the Federal Republic in fact partially financed Honecker’s
economic reform of Unity of Economic and Social Policy. Western trading partners, first
and foremost the FRG, continued to grant the GDR loans and credits until the entire
system came close to collapse under enormous debts in 1988-89.481
The significance of the financial and economic cooperation between the two
German states lies in the fact that their collaboration clearly undermined the division of
Europe in the Eastern Bloc and the partners of the transatlantic alliance. A nascent
undoing of socialist aesthetics in furniture design heralded the cultural effects of East
Germany’s trade with the West. Cheap mass production for export became took
precedence over the morality of socialist material culture, which contributed to a quality
decline in both aesthetics and materials. In the end, the Iron Curtain proved permeable
from the Bay of Mecklenburg to the Vogtland. Through intra-German trade, West
German money and consumer products increasingly seeped into a socialist Germany that
desperately tried to gain popular support by creating a hybrid economy. The GDR,
though, won a reliable source of foreign currency, which increasingly stabilized the
479
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economic policies of the SED leadership and contributed to the smoke screen of a
flourishing consumer society in the East.

Creating the Common Market
The specific characteristics of intra-German trade, such as the high degree of
interdependence in production industries and special tax cuts, differed greatly from
international norms of foreign trade. Settled in the 1951 Berlin Agreement, the special
relationship created by the Cold War division of Europe influenced the handling of
economic and financial transactions between the two German states. While this intraGerman development seems a logical progression of prewar territorial unity and
economic embeddedness, the playing field changed once other parties became involved.
When the Federal Republic joined the European Economic Community, intra-German
trade caused problems in the Common Market. This triangular relationship between East
and West Germany, West Germany and the EEC member states, and the member states
and East Germany spun a complex web of economic and political interests dominated by
the German Question. It is impossible to understand the cultural dynamism of this exportimport triangle and the aesthetic market incentives without examining Germany’s
political goals in conjunction with the economic interests of the EEC member states first.
They formed the basis on which the two German states engaged culturally in the most
profit-oriented manner with other European nations and thus contributed to the making of
a modern European identity.
German furniture, with its legacy grounded in interwar modernism, remained a
contender on the global market and continued to be an important export good for both the
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GDR and the FRG after the Second World War. It is thus not surprising that the annual
Cologne International Furniture Fair grew to become the most important furniture
marketplace in the world. Within intra-German trade, the furniture traveled mostly from
East to West, but on the global market, both countries gained important positions as
furniture export nations. Already in the early 1960s, the GDR proclaimed itself the
world’s largest furniture export nation, if only in percentage of total annual production
rather than real profits. It exported 40 percent of its furniture production to twenty
countries, at a time when the standardization and mechanization of the GDR furniture
industry had only started to gain momentum.482 If nothing else, this high percentage is
telling about the chronic state of East Germany’s domestic under-provisioning in the
realm of household goods and domestic culture. Instead of securing supplies for its own
population, the GDR sent critical percentages of its products abroad. In comparison, West
Germany reached the status of the world’s largest furniture exporter in absolute numbers
alongside Italy by the early 1980s, with three billion DM in sales, which was about 17
percent of its annual furniture production.483 As the Federal Republic imported the same
amount of furniture from other countries, its market was saturated.
The European Market has been paramount for West Germany’s foreign economic
relations. France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg took about 35 percent
of Germany’s exports in the 1950s.484 Meanwhile, the vivid economies of these nations
also presented competition. In 1955, the Federal Republic identified Italy, Belgium,
482
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Norway, and Sweden as its main competitors in the furniture export market. A market
analysis by the Federal Ministry of Economics found that the rate of export orders for
furniture slowly picked up, mainly from Western Europe, but also from overseas, where
the demand for seating furniture was especially high. Unfortunately, rising packaging and
shipping costs made trading goods overseas less lucrative, which would keep the number
of successful competitive contracts low. In Western Europe, however, the demand for all
kinds of furniture was high after the war had wreaked havoc there. Yet economic analysts
worried especially about German furniture’s inability to “jump over the tariff wall”
within Europe.485 The fact that the German industry had cut itself off from the
international market between 1933 and 1945 had encouraged other nations to build their
own industries to compensate for the loss of their German trading partner (see table 7 for
West German furniture trade statistics). As a byproduct of this process, the report stated,
these countries had developed strong national tastes that rendered any mention of “a
global furniture market situation” that corresponded to distinctive aesthetics pointless.
Under these circumstances, particularly Italy and Belgium emerged as the main
competitors, which, although they did not produce more cheaply from a technological
standpoint, nevertheless had lower costs of labor. Analysts saw the only chance to
overcome these hurdles in “exporting especially high-quality products, that neither the
national industry of the target markets could produce nor Italy, Belgium, Norway or
Sweden could export there at the same qualitative level and with the same design
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aesthetic.”

This national approach to export goods developed alongside the FRG’s

early attempts to create a national aesthetic in industrial design.
Product
Furniture
Wicker)

(Wooden

and

Year
1953

Quarter or Month
I
II
3.3
3.9

III
4.6

Oct.
2.6

1954
4.1
6.3
3.9
3.1
Table 7: Development of West German Furniture Trade in Million DM, 1953-1954.487

Nov.
1.4
3.3

Despite such visions of a national path, the Schuman Plan brought GermanFrench rapprochement in 1950, paving the way for German economic integration in
Europe. Instead of isolating Germany in fear of its reemergence as a dominating power in
Europe, France changed course and relied on the stabilizing effects of cooperation for
lasting peace in Europe. Paris hoped to influence German foreign policy and tie West
Germans to a larger European idea rather than traditionalist concepts of national interest
whose violent potential had been proven in the recent German past.488 The FrancoGerman rapprochement enabled economic cooperation in the realm of coal and steel that
included Italy and the Benelux.489 These first steps toward a shared European economic
sphere enabled West Germany’s economic success story as an export nation that excelled
with the establishment of the European Economic Community on January 1, 1958. The
integration into the Common Market solved most of West Germany’s furniture export
problems by abolishing tariffs between EEC members, leveling the playing field between
486
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German, Italian, and Belgian furniture production in the European market, and rendering
the Scandinavian countries less competitive. The destruction of the war coupled with
initial dismantlement of industrial structures, which were drastic prior to Cold War
rearmament, put the production of consumer goods for the West German domestic
market first. However, the open Common Market accelerated industrial modernization
with the support of American money and technology, which was only one reason for the
Federal Republic’s later superiority in the EEC. Social stability under the conservative,
welfare-oriented Adenauer governments promised foreign investors safe profits and
offered them a gateway into the Common Market.490 Furthermore, at the time of the entry
into the EEC, the national economy of the FRG was well equipped and organized with a
dense network of railways and highways, an outstanding communication system, and
possessed, with the Rhine River, the most efficient inland waterway in Europe.491 These
favorable infrastructural conditions turned the Federal Republic into a true competitor in
the EEC, compelling German industry to acquire more capital and accelerate its
(peaceful) expansive strategies.
From the very inception of the EEC, the German Question stood at the center of
Bonn’s relations to other member states. The FRG demanded special stipulations for
intra-German trade, a cause for concern to other EEC members who feared that GermanGerman interests could affect the community. Accordingly, the 1957 Treaty of Rome
contained a “Protocol on intra-German trade and related issues” stipulating that German-
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German trade remained unaltered by the EEC agreements.

492

However, paragraph 2 of

the protocol required all EEC states to relate any trade with “German territories outside of
the territory of the Basic Law,” that is to say the GDR, to the other members and to take
precautions that any agreements with the GDR would not contradict the principles of the
Common Market.493 Furthermore, paragraph 3 of the agreement stated that each member
state was allowed to take action against injurious interaction between another member
state and East Berlin.494
While trade with the GDR theoretically counted as foreign trade, the GDR could
not be treated as just another third party. Its special status due to the open German
Question and West German non-recognition required bilateral agreements signed at the
level of non-state actors, such as foreign trade associations. Its special status foreclosed a
common EEC trade policy toward East Germany by definition. In theory, the principles
of paragraphs 2 and 3 applied to the Federal Republic as well, but Bonn exempted itself,
claiming as its guiding foreign policy the notion that “in all of its actions, the government
of the Federal Republic assumes the political and economic unity of Germany, whose
realization is only obstructed by factual, but not legal reasons.”495 For the FRG, the
protocol regulated all trade between East Germany and the EEC, interpreting it to mean
equal treatment for all German territories. From this point of view, trade between the
GDR and any of the EEC members did not constitute foreign trade. When the EEC
492
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Council of Ministers attempted to include EEC-GDR trade relations under Article 111 of
the Rome Treaty that regulated foreign trade in 1961, the Federal Republic demanded a
clause exempting it from all of the council’s decisions vis-à-vis the GDR.496 Time and
again, Bonn prioritized the wellbeing of German-German relations over European
agreements, affirming the political nature of intra-German trade.
Not surprisingly, one of the first foreign trade disagreements in the EEC came
about in relations to the Eastern Bloc and European trade credits. The Berne Union had
implemented the limit of state-backed credit to five years with a gentleman’s agreement
between western countries to create fair trading conditions across the Iron Curtain.497 In
accord with western containment policy, this agreement strove to prevent the Soviet-led
bloc from playing western trade partners against one other for political or financial gains.
Together with the United States, the FRG had been timid about overstepping the Berne
Union rules, admittedly because in its special geographic situation, West Germany
already consistently ranked first in trade statistics with the Eastern Bloc in general and
the GDR specifically (see table 8).498 By 1964, a number of western countries, among
them Japan, the UK, Italy, and France, broke the Berne agreement and granted the East
European socialist countries credits ranging from seven to fifteen years. Worried about
keeping its prominent status in the “Eastern trade” (Osthandel), the Federal Republic
started an initiative to streamline EEC foreign trade policy regarding the East. The
Federal Ministry of Economics stated explicitly that “intra-zonal trade is an instrument of
496
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reunification policy,” thus emphasizing the special nature of the German-German
relationship.499 While Bonn felt no need to justify its special interest in these trade
relations, the government feared that the GDR could find favorable financial support
elsewhere, thus jeopardizing the carefully crafted dependencies and interconnections
between the two German economies. In conference with other EEC members, West
Germany put two options on the table that would apply to all members: granting a sevenyear liquidation limit or upholding the Berne Union agreement. By creating unity among
the EEC members, Bonn attempted to shape Europe’s global trade policies in protection
of its own special relationship to East Berlin.500 However, Italy preferred to debate these
matters immediately in the Berne Union or the OECD in order to come to a binding
agreement for all western nations. The archival documentation of German involvement in
the question of western state-backed credits ends here and it is therefore plausible to
assume that these matters continued to be discussed in one of the two other
organizations.501
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Exports/Deliveries to the GDR
1961
1962
1963
1964
11.52 13.68 14.28
8.76
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Imports/ Deliveries from the GDR
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
14.16 16.92 19.68 22.92 26.36

Country
1965
Belgium/
11.88
Luxemburg
Denmark
12.36 21.84 14.40 18.36 24.60 15.84 16.32 17.04
France
21.48 15.96 18.12 26.28 69.00!
8.4
8.52 12.60
Greece
6.48
4.56
4.92
6.57
9.50
2.64
3.96
4.80
Iceland
0.96
0.72
0.96
0.36
1.68
1.92
1.68
1.20
Italy
10.80
7.92 12.96 13.32 16.08 14.28 11.52 12.36
Netherlands
16.08
9.24 12.12 15.60 19.92
17.2 17.64 23.28
Norway
6.0
6.12
7.32 15.96 10.08
8.40
7.68
6.00
Portugal
0.36
0.36
0.48
0.48
0.60
0.24
0.24
0.24
Turkey
4.68
1.32
5.64
4.92
9.24
6.12
4.32
5.76
Great
27.48 27.00 22.44 17.04 23.16 18.72 18.48 21.12
Britain
NATO
118.2 108.7 113.6 127.6 195.7 108.2 107.3 124.0
Europe (w/o
0
2
4
5
4
4
4
8
FRG)
Canada
1.56
0.12
1.20 10.92 14.04
0.96
0.84
1.08
USA
2.76
1.68
6.36 19.92 12.60
2.52
3.00
3.24
FRG (intra- 216.7 213.5 214.8 287.1 297.7 235.6 228.6 255.5
zonal)
5
3
9
3
8
2
2
8
NATO
339.2 324.0 336.0 445.6 520.1 347.3 339.8 383.9
total
7
5
9
2
6
4
0
8
Table 8: Trade Results between NATO States and the GDR (in Million US $).502

20.76
14.28
6.11
2.40
14.88
30.24
9.84
1.56
8.16
29.04

23.88
15.96
8.42
2.88
14.16
32.76
11.88
0.36
9.36
33.60

160.1
9

179.6
2

1.37
6.72
257.1
1
425.3
9

1.44
6.48
315.6
9
503.2
3

While Bonn protected its political goals regarding intra-German trade against
rivaling European interests, the East German economy greatly profited from integration
into the European market. In 1970 an inter-German public exchange about how the GDR
benefited from West Germany’s economic cooperation with France, the Benelux
countries, and Italy created disharmony between usually amicable trading partners. The
Federal Minister for Intra-German Relations Egon Franke estimated publicly that the
GDR earned 400 to 500 million DM per year because of its economic relationship to
West Germany.503 By trading with Western Europe through West German middlemen,
the GDR enjoyed the same tariff conditions as EEC members after internal tariffs were
502
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abolished in 1968. With Franke’s official statement, the Federal Republic hinted at the
GDR’s dependence on West Germany for economic prosperity. Moreover, his remarks
suggested that it would be prudent for East Germany to stop pushing for recognition
under international law. In this way, European integration not only shaped economic
relations between East and West Germany, but also influenced debates on the German
Question in the early 1970s.
Not surprisingly, the depiction of East German economic growth as an outcome
of West German European integration politics offended the GDR government. In a public
note, the Council of Ministers defended the socialist economy against the “capitalist
imperialism” of the Federal Republic by pointing to its trade relations with the Soviet
Union and other socialist countries.504 Indeed, the Soviet Union was East Germany’s
biggest trade partner. However, it should be stressed that commodities within the scope
of the eastern bloc’s Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) exchanged
exclusively for kind, not money. In the COMECON’s exchange system, just like in the
intra-German trade, every product was assigned accounting units. Accordingly, no hard
currency found its way into the GDR via trade in the COMECON. For foreign currency,
East Germany had to depend on credits and trade with the West.
Just like Minister Franke had foreseen, the Eastern Treaties (Ostverträge) of the
Federal Republic with the Soviet Union, Poland, and the GDR threatened East
Germany’s special status in the EEC statutes. The question of a unified EEC eastern trade
policy resurfaced in 1970 immediately with the signing of the Moscow and Warsaw
treaties. The EEC thought that if the Soviet Bloc recognized European cooperation not
504
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only de facto but also de jure, a more cohesive and effective European economic policy
would be viable, which could possibly contribute to the EEC’s extension to other
Western European countries. With the East-West détente and the GDR’s international
recognition on the horizon, West Germany’s EEC partners wanted to renegotiate the
status of intra-German trade.505 Once the Basic Treaty was signed in 1972, the other
member states grew increasingly impatient with the special status of intra-German trade.
Pushing for the abolition of the “Protocol on intra-German trade,” the EEC
acknowledged the new political reality of two German states. West Germany meanwhile
maintained that the Basic Treaty had not deepened the German-German division any
further. The question of German unification remained open, Bonn argued, because the
two German states still considered each other foreign territory (Ausland) and thus intraGerman trade would remain an important bond between them.506 In order to ease
European concerns, however, Bonn pointed to trade statistics: the percentage of intraGerman trade in contrast to West German EEC trade was small; the trade between the
EEC partners and the GDR had decisively increased in recent years; intra-German trade
was unlikely to grow because of the GDR’s problems to deliver; and the ruinous danger
of GDR price-dumping practices was negligible for the Common Market, since East
Berlin kept prices high to reap larger profits.507 Accordingly, from the West German
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point of view, there existed no reason to nullify the protocol. Then again, the advent of
Honecker’s consumer turn changed the course of intra-German trade.
As the earlier discussion of German-German trade has shown, trade between East
and West Germany grew exponentially after Honecker’s accession to power in 1971. As
a parallel development, EEC skepticism about the stoical West German claim to a special
relationship between Bonn and East Berlin grew. In 1974, Belgium demanded that the
community implement instruments to monitor intra-German trade.508 The same year, the
Netherlands complained that the Federal Republic interrupted the free-trade zone,
stopping imports of GDR products sent through other EEC countries into West
Germany.509 Bonn reacted strongly, insisting on upholding the regulations of paragraph 1
of the protocol on intra-German trade. The FRG justified this stance with the continued
political interest of keeping German-German economic exchanges direct and as frequent
as possible in order to thicken contacts between East and West.510 When bilateral
negotiations failed to produce agreement, the Benelux countries began a grievance
procedure in accordance with paragraph 3 of the protocol on intra-German trade, which
allowed states to take measures if the trade of a member state with East Berlin hurt their
interests.
While the Benelux coutries rightfully questioned Bonn’s loyalties for the way it
handled intra-German trade, the real bone of contention was the tariff exemption for East
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German products. The European Court of Justice had declared these to be products “not
of German origin” for the purpose of EEC trade policies after the GDR’s formal
recognition by EEC members had made it a “third country.”511 Due to the special nature
of intra-German trade the GDR paid no tariffs for crossing the border into the Federal
Republic.512 Once inside the EEC zone East German goods could continue to move
around the EEC without further taxation, skewing the principles of the Common Market
and hurting national industries as well as dealership networks. Consequently, the West
German position that connected the German Question to intra-German trade came under
close scrutiny by the EEC. The Benelux furthermore hinted at the FRG’s economic
profiteering from inter-German trade as a transit layover for distribution of Eastern
products. Because of the tax exemption and established dealership networks, West
Germany could sell East German goods to other member states with higher margins. As
the system of intra-German trade was rooted in product bartering tied to exclusive credit
agreements, the method necessarily conflicted with the free trade of the Common
Market.513 Had the products entered the Common Market under the usual tariff laws
through other EEC member states, they would not have enjoyed this competitive
advantage. In order to avoid legal action while guaranteeing the uninterrupted political
priority of intra-German trade, the Federal Republic proposed a compromise: a license
agreement that allowed for 10 million DM worth of GDR products to be brought into
511
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West Germany through other EEC countries. This proposal represented a maximum
amount that, so Bonn hoped, would neither enable East Berlin to supply West German
demand exclusively through third countries, nor possibly create a political lever for the
GDR.514 At the same time, the national dealership networks of its European partners
would get a piece of the pie and acquire leeway that they desired in trading with the
GDR.
Despite the risk of disagreement in the EEC, the Federal Republic upheld intraGerman trade as a policy toward unification. This rapprochement policy triggered
widespread domestic critique from liberal and conservative quarters. In a public hearing
before the parliament in 1977, sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf described the lack of clarity in
Bonn’s Deutschlandpolitik in combination with European integration as “explosive.”515
Active pursuit of European political unity would necessarily preclude German
unification, Dahrendorf maintained, because none of West Germany’s neighbors had a
strong political or economic interest in seeing Germany reunite. Political scientist HansPeter Schwarz criticized the policy of rapprochement, noting that the Basic Treaty had
taken the German Question out of the East-West conflict and German policies had fallen
by the wayside.516 Yet the analysis of intra-German trade in relation to the EEC
integration shows the political power and economic significance of the unresolved
German Question, which lasted well beyond the Basic Treaty. Looking at the cultural
effects triggered by EEC trade policy, the FRG under the leadership of the Social
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Democrats achieved its goal of deepened German-German economic and cultural ties
precisely because of European integration. Through the circulation of East and West
German goods in the EEC, both product cultures interacted on the same market.

Aesthetic Convergence in the Common Market
The integration of the EEC increased the interaction of East and West German
import and export economies through the loophole of intra-German trade, permeating the
Iron Curtain with capitalist market principles and Western aesthetic styles. West German
stubbornness thus not only worked to uphold bonds between Germans, but also
contributed to a convergence of aesthetics between East Germany, the Federal Republic,
and EEC countries. Although both German states had developed strong notions of their
own national identity in design during the reconstruction years, other countries’ styles
and tastes affected German material culture in turn with growing trade.
In the GDR, the aesthetic incentives of the Common Market worked mostly
through export goods production, slowly undermining socialist material ideals. To the
East German office for quality control, the DAMW, the fact that exports to the West
increasingly determined the appearance of commodities in East Germany was even more
disturbing than the obvious gap between the claims and the realities of its production.
East Germany’s inflexible planning mechanisms made the production of export furniture
and domestic design inseparable. Once set on a furniture model, the regional industry
structured the distribution of raw materials and ordered the machines needed to realize
only these designs. Changing the design meant a halt in production until the supply sector
responded and the necessary technological changes were made. This crippled innovation
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to the degree that industry reports after 1970 regularly included remarks on the oldfashioned look of GDR furniture.517 While these products should not have been awarded
the official seal of quality – a measure that the DAMW and the Central Institute used to
encourage “socialist” design – they made exceptions for poorly designed furniture in the
export business. The DAMW’s realistic assessment that earning foreign currency was
more important “because we cannot force our design principles on the foreign buyer”
exemplifies how economic necessities suppressed socialist fervor, designers’ creativity,
and innovation.518
The furniture at the 1970 Leipzig Fair, in particular, failed to live up to the
DAMW’s expectations: “The requirements of a socialist living culture cannot be met
with these [export] models.”519 While the East German upholstery section at the Leipzig
fair did display joy of experimentation (Experimentierfreudigkeit), it was often a result of
foreign, that is to say Western European, customers’ requests.520 Indeed, archival
evidence suggests that the GDR actively pursued Western European customers. For
example, by the 1960s the Zentralinstitut had sent its staff to trade fairs in the West to
report on the technological quality and design of the capitalist competition.521 The new
travel agreements of the Basic Treaty facilitated the task of the Zentralinstitut in this
regard. Short trips to West Berlin to visit exhibitions at the newly opened International
Design Center or to view the range of products at West German furniture stores increased
tremendously after 1972. Most of the documented visits to the Cologne International
517
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Furniture Fair fall into this time period as well. Ironically, this observational activity
entailed a certain degree of adaptation to Western aesthetics. In 1974, the Bavarian
Upholstery Association accused East German combines of “slavishly” imitating West
German designs and selling their furniture at cut-rate prices.522 West German producers
feared the eastern economic competition on the European market. The FRG government,
however, saw this transfer of cultural ideas as a way to impress Western aesthetics upon
the East German population and thereby to propagate the principles of capitalist
democracy.
Indeed, the Zentralinstitut’s successor, the Amt für industrielle Formgestaltung,
started a product card index in 1974, in which it cataloged furniture systems
predominately from Scandinavia, the Federal Republic, Switzerland, and Italy, with an
occasional Russian model thrown in to inspire the export models that headed east.523 The
western firms in the card index were extreme examples of classy, high-priced designer
furniture like Interlübke – nothing one would expect in a workers and peasants’ state. In
the process of cataloging the West’s furniture, GDR industrial designers compared their
products with those of the West, which, ultimately, hindered the development of a
distinct East German aesthetic. The tendency towards comparison stood in stark contrast
to the GDR’s cultural-economic goal of convincing the West of the East’s superior
quality and comfort of life. The GDR intelligentsia incorporated this Westernization of
style into the socialist framework of the state without hesitation. Cultural critic Karin
Hirdina hurried to make the form fit the ideology in 1975:
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In fact, defined as a program and a method, not as a style, functionalism
represents a Utopian vision of a non-capitalist order of relationships between Man
and his environment. Strictly speaking functionalism does not work in the
capitalist system. It does not affirm capitalism, it transcends it.524
But all too often the natural look of Sweden, the functionalist purism of West Germany
and Switzerland, and the playful avant-gardism of Italy meshed together in the cheap
export furniture offered in West German mail-order catalogs.
Nevertheless, modeling production after popular western brands still seemed like
the most promising strategy to East German economists. To gauge the Western markets,
not only the Amt für industrielle Formgestaltung, but also the larger combines sent their
research and development staff to Western trade shows. In 1979, Dresden-Hellerau, for
example, visited both the International Furniture Fair in Cologne and the International
Furniture Salon in Paris.525 Aside from neo-functionalism, the designs, especially in
France, displayed a strong tendency toward ornamentation, while homeliness and comfort
dominated in Cologne. The GDR with its style specialists in Zeulenroda and other
combines around the country could easily design such items. Yet, the most important
lesson learned from these visits in the West pertained to materials rather than design.
Upon his return, Gert Großpietzsch, the head of Hellerau’s research and development,
recommended in a report that the combine should produce expensive furniture to
maximize its revenues and to target the unexplored parts of the western market.526 In
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terms of materials, he reported, the trend went back to the natural with a high demand for
solid woods and wooden veneers, the exact materials that the Chemical Program had
abolished. Instead, the East German synthetic alternative to veneers, so-called decorative
foil, which went through multiple varnishing and polishing processes after its application
on chipboard, compromised the overall aesthetic.527 With the shortfall of Honecker’s
Unity of Economic and Social Policy program, the material dreams of Großpietzsch and
his designer colleagues remained out of reach, leaving East Germany to continue its lowend quality production strategy. By 1985, about 8 percent of the Federal Republic’s
furniture imports came from the GDR.528 The combines mass-produced contracted
furniture for western clients with different stylistic demands ranging from neofunctionalism for Ikea to style-furniture for enthusiastic retailers.529
In the West German case, trade and a nascent collective vision of Europe as a
cultural space worked European trends into West German designs. The Federal
Republic’s accession to the status of the world’s largest furniture exporter, grossing three
billion DM in 1981, developed parallel to an equally high import of foreign-made
furniture.530 Consequently, domestic producers followed the lead of the European market
demand in order to maximize sales. Foreign influences thus found their way into the
department stores and homes of the Federal Republic, slowly affecting the overall
national aesthetic. While consumption shaped and reproduced dominant ideas about the
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appearance of material culture, artistic influences brought new ideas into the Common
Market. The Federal Republic’s domination of the international furniture market
coincided with the “designer decade” of the 1980s, which brought the aesthetic value of
material culture back to the forefront.531 Cultural events, such as the Venice Biennale of
1980, greatly impacted industrial furniture design again and in a magnitude that had last
been seen in 1958 at the Brussels world exposition. The Venice Biennale marked the
arrival of postmodernism in Europe. Although postmodernism focused on architecture,
most of its participants were engaged in interior design as well. Debates resulting from
this epochal event thus extended beyond the sphere of architecture into the field of
applied arts. Through the mushrooming of lifestyle design stores, in particular, design
entered back into public discourse on consumption. Moreover, design infiltrated all areas
of public and private life via collaborations of traditional brands, such as Alessi or WMF,
with the most creative minds that the applied arts had to offer.532
A radical design movement from Italy illustrates the playfulness of this
postmodern decade and its implications for West German furniture design.533 Inspired by
Art Deco and Pop Art, the virtuoso movement Memphis (1981) entered the design scene
under the leadership of Ettore Sottsass, who achieved an alienation of products through
the deconstruction of silhouettes. While the extreme shapes did not meet enthusiasm
among the population because of their limited functionality, their influence is still visible
in German museums to this day. Wolfgang Flatz’ lightning chair and table (1982),
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displayed in Hamburg’s Kunstgewerbemuseum, drew inspiration from the movement
(see figure 11). Furniture mass production referenced these exaggerated shapes, for
example emulating urban skylines in top pieces of wardrobes and shelves. Especially in
West Germany, this playful movement broke down into geometric forms that are well
exemplified by Peter Maly’s Zyklus furniture (1984), pieces that have become German
classics (see figures 12 and 13). In the GDR, similar shapes emerged with Herbert Pohl’s
Metropol furniture (1986) for the East Berlin furniture combine, which the Amt für
industrielle Formgestaltung approved and recognized with the prize “Gutes Design” at
the Leipzig fair in 1988 (see figures 14, 15 and 16). Unfortunately, the Metropol program
never entered mass production, because the GDR collapsed before the model could be
integrated into the next Plan.534 Nevertheless, opening up to European influences further
increased similarities between the two German states as well as between them and the
rest of Western Europe (see figure 17).
Germany’s own take on postmodernism drew pronouncedly on historical
elements.535 Rather than following the experimental path of deconstruction, Germans in
East and West rehabilitated urban apartment buildings dating back to the nineteenth
century. The rediscovery of the classic architecture of an aesthetically untainted German
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past came alongside a postmodernist critique that aimed at the core of postwar German
national design. In this rejection of modern aesthetics, which encompassed the
Werkbund, the Bauhaus, Ulm, and the late functionalism of large-scale housing programs
and city transportion systems, the strong sense of continuity that they represented came
under attack again.536 Such critique of functionalist modernism affected German furniture
designers as well. In 1982, an East German report from the Cologne fair explained that
the Spartan aesthetics and rigid lines of West German functionalism had been overcome
in the West. Instead, “lines of emphasized elegance with a tendency to individualism”
attracted the consumer.537 Successful West German furniture producers such as
Interlübke and Hülsta recovered elements that evoked the mass appeal of Art Nouveau
(see figure 18). Within Europe, this furniture style was historically one of the most
successful aesthetic concepts that straddled the divide between crafts and mass
production. Its many international names alone indicate the vibrancy of style in the fields
of architecture, art, and decorative arts as well as the scope of its circulation: Jugendstil,
Stile Liberty, le style moderne, arte nova, arte joven, and Nieuwe Kunst to name but a
few. The return to historical styles, as shown earlier in regard to GDR Socialist Realism,
did not constitute a novelty. It rather brought the postmodernist and the style enthusiast in
Germany closer together while creating bridges to the French and Italian cultures that
prefer opulence to asceticism. In the process of European economic integration, then,
awareness of a European culture and identity began to emerge.
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For the first time in its comparatively short history, the EEC awarded an industrial
design prize in 1988. The award recognized small and medium-sized industrial firms that
excelled in the categories of quality design and corporate identity. This prize illustrated,
first, that design had become by the late 1980s a critical factor for the success of
European products of Mittelstand businesses that continue to constitute the backbone of
European national economies today. The design prize marked, second, the culmination of
cultural-economic competition for markets within the European Community that
encouraged the acceptance of other national aesthetic concepts. In the call for
submissions to the 1988 EEC design prize, organizers underscored the pan-European
nature of this event. In particular, the competition’s three objectives emphasized the
concept of a shared European design culture: (1) To stimulate interest in design in
European/EEC industries; (2) To illustrate the nature of the design process and how it can
be used as a tool for industrial innovation; and (3) To promote European/EEC design
outside of Europe.538
The 1980s were a turning point in the effort to forge a European cultural space.
As plans for a cultural TV event illustrate, industrial design served as a building block for
European identity. The pan-European project “La Casa Europea – European Design Day
on European TV” aired on the same day in all EC member countries. This connected and
coordinated program about European design consisted of different elements like
discussions, lectures about objects, interviews, and design presentations. Several of the
goals for this event listed by the organizers pushed for a cohesive European aesthetic that
communicated the “growing together” of the Western European countries. Among other
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things, they used the event to promote the “idea and the reality of European design, to
demonstrate the essential quality of design for European development, to inform about
the innovative perspective of design for Europe, and to offer design as a European
identity.”539 Aiming to prove to a European audience that Europe had grown into a tightknit network of different European locations and activities, exemplified by the
telecommunication that this event utilized, the TV program proposed Europe as an open
space. Industrial design helped to create this European public sphere, serving as a
framework for European innovation to explain “Europe as a real and artificial world.”540
This conception of Europe as a cultural space and its integrative force even brought about
deliberations for a communal EC cultural policy vis-à-vis the GDR.541
Yet not everybody shared the excitement about European design. In 1989, the
West German Rat für Formgebung restructured itself under new leadership. Dieter Rams,
a design personality known as the mind behind the rebranding of Braun and its evolution
into one of the leading technological design companies worldwide, volunteered as
president of the orphaned and disheveled design council. In an effort to bring the Rat to
its rightful place at the core of West German industrial design policy and to fight off
regional competition from the Chambers of Commerce, he started a fundraising campaign
among industrialists and entrepreneurs. In a letter asking for financial support, Rams
pointed to other countries’ design activities and the integration of the European market as
a motivation to reorganize the design policy of the Federal Republic in defense of the
539
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West German brand. The goal was to heighten awareness for German design by
increasing its presence abroad, thus giving German design its rightful recognition as an
important export factor.542 Rams intended to continue the Rat’s thrust for a national
identity predicated on its industrial design, however, these activities, while not
unfounded, already seemed outdated at the time. The Federal Republic’s long-term
policymaking in the European Community was based on continuous growth, both in the
breadth and the depth of the union. For the inclusion of new member states and the
aggregation of supranational powers, the EEC needed popular support. One way to create
that support was indeed cultural Europeanization toward a European identity. Since the
EEC had started out as a purely economic cooperation, it seemed only natural that these
cultural bonds would be forged in a field that straddles the economic and the cultural:
industrial design.

Conclusion
Friedrich Koslowsky never built his “House of Life.” But his vision to erect
cultural bridges via product exchange materialized through the integrative forces of intraGerman trade and the European Common Market. The combination of diplomatic and
economic politics with the interests of the Federal Republic at its core initiated a process
of Europeanization that reached well beyond the Iron Curtain.
Trade fairs functioned as early testing grounds for German-German economic and
cultural contacts, which grew over the course of the 1960s and boomed in the 1970s.
Despite non-recognition of the GDR, the FRG traded with the East and continued the
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pretense that economic exchanges did not imply de facto political recognition.
Meanwhile the GDR aligned itself through trade with the fortunes of capitalist
economies. The GDR utilized intra-German trade to increase exports and to yield more
foreign currency. In order to establish and survive in an international market, the East
German production aesthetic converged with Western ones. The malfunctioning parts of
economic planning increasingly sabotaged any internal aesthetic policies as the export
orientation of the furniture industry worked against delineation from the West.543
Meanwhile, the Federal Republic profited politically from product scarcity in the GDR.
Exhibiting progress and abundance at the fair and through trade, Bonn promoted the
capitalist lifestyles and created demand for western product aesthetics among the East
German population. Although the economic payoff for West Germany was negligible, the
federal government had a continued interest in the East-West dialog to maintain ties
between the two German states, even risking disagreement with other EEC members. The
story that unfolds in this chapter suggests that only after the resolution of the German
Question could the Federal Republic fully commit to Europe.
Yet this is not to say that the EEC was of no significance to the German-German
rapprochement process. Quite the opposite is the case. European economic integration
and cultural European trends paved the way for a cultural convergence between East and
West Germany. The initial moments of German aesthetic convergence towards a
European design can be found in the integration of the Common Market and the
incentives it gave to pursue “European” tastes and styles, no matter how diverse. This
study has examined this process in the realm of the furniture industry and industrial
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design; however, there are probably other areas in which this phenomenon can be
observed. Early attempts at establishing an “East” or a “West” design aesthetic gave way
to aesthetics based on market incentives to compete in the expanding trade of lifestyle
consumption during the 1970s and 1980s. What is remarkable, given the Cold War
context, is the fact that neither Germany’s furniture production directly imitated or
culturally identified with the United States or the Soviet Union. Instead, each drew on the
creative strength of their immediate European neighbors, a process that was accelerated
by the integration of the European Community.
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CHAPTER 5: BETWEEN COMPETITION AND COOPERATION:
COLD WAR DIPLOMACY OF GERMAN DESIGN
Introduction
German-German relations during the Cold War represented a piecemeal effort to
“coexist” in a geopolitical situation marked by rising superpower tensions. Both
Germanys fiercely competed for legitimacy and recognition in the international arena.544
Faced with deadlocked ideological positions, Germans eventually realized that they
needed new avenues of interaction in order to salvage what was left of social, cultural,
and economic (not to mention familial) bonds between the two Germanys. The following
chapter explores East and West German cultural-diplomatic strategies that sought to
negotiate a German-German modus vivendi through the medium of industrial design and
connects these efforts to the complex diplomatic history of the Cold War.
Part of what allowed material culture to mediate German-German relations was
the deeply ingrained self-understanding of Germany as a “nation of culture”
(Kulturnation) that survived the division. Both sides utilized aesthetics to overcome the
horrors of the Third Reich and to display moral improvement. This operational
understanding of aesthetics was the (least) common denominator upon which
communication between the Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic
functioned. While both Germanys shared one cultural heritage with the illustrious names
of Schiller and Goethe, Beethoven and Wagner, Albrecht Dürer and Caspar David
Friedrich, the ideological Cold War shifted focus from “high culture” concerns to
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questions of lifestyle and Wohnkultur. Intended to demonstrate the superiority of the
respective economic systems, industrial design as an expression of material progress and
membership among modern nations turned into a competitive field in the GermanGerman struggle. Dating back to the turn-of-the-century arts and crafts movement,
German design philosophy sought social improvement through aesthetic reform of the
human environment, public as well as private. This tradition of aesthetic progress through
material culture resonated with German politicians after the war.
The Federal Republic held an aesthetic advantage over its eastern neighbor. From
the beginning West German design politicians pursued a modern style in interior design
that they shared with other members of the Atlantic community. Its fresh and functional
aesthetics placed West Germany among the advanced and progressive nations that held
leadership in engineering, technology, and design. Meanwhile, the GDR aligned itself
with the Soviet Union by adopting cultural Stalinism while also retaining strong German
national influence. As interpretations of aesthetics and ideology changed more or less
with every Secretary General of the Soviet Communist Party, however, East Germany
slowly emancipated itself from the cultural wardship of its Big Brother. Impelled by the
economic logic of export markets, discussed in the previous chapter, the GDR made great
progress in the production of furniture that looked more contemporary and thus was able
to find customers in East and West. Nevertheless, in comparison with the Federal
Republic, by the late 1960s the GDR still did not belong to the leading nations in the
development of human environments – the workplace, public spaces, and the home.
The story unfolding in this chapter is not just one of another Cold War race for
superiority, although it takes place against the backdrop of inter-German competition. It
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is also a story of rapprochement: while the East Germans employed culture as a softpower means to promote humane aspects of socialist ideology with the goal of
progressing from the status of a pariah state, West Germany used cultural diplomacy to
foster human interactions between both German populations. Although their diplomatic
goals differed, both Germanys used similar strategies that developed in three phases: 1)
diplomacy within the framework of international design organizations, 2) international
exhibitions of their respective industrial designs, and 3) direct German-German
negotiations about cultural exchanges. In an effort to look at German postwar history
from a cultural perspective, this study examines the actual cultural events resulting from
political negotiations at each of these stages. The main actors of this chapter are trained
designers or representatives of design organizations, who, in one way or another, engaged
in cultural politics on behalf of their states. Accordingly, it follows their exhibition
activities to uncover the political motivations inscribed in East and West German material
culture.545
Withn the context of the Cold War, the political significance of aesthetics in
everyday objects has been well established.546 For example, historian Greg Castillo has
analyzed the “soft power of mid-century design” to evaluate its influence on German
design competition as a “culture battle” (“Kulturkampf”) between Americanization and
545
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Sovietization.

By taking the focus off the superpowers to interrogate the specifically

German cultural politics behind the aestheticization of separate identities – proletarian in
the East and cosmopolitan in the West – I hope to provide a better picture of German
interests in the global Cold War. The design history literature on Germany has not
touched upon the topic of material culture’s operationalization for diplomatic purposes in
the context of the German Question. If we take the significance of Berlin as the
“frontline” of the Cold War and the “shop window” to the West seriously, GermanGerman interaction around trade and cultural diplomacy warrants closer examination.

Encounters of Foreign Design: The Tug-of-War over ICSID Membership
On January 9, 1965, Mia Seeger, the grande dame of West German industrial
design, received a strictly confidential letter from her Belgian colleague Josine des
Cressonnières. The Secretary General of the International Council of Societies of
Industrial Designers (ICSID) wanted to know if Seeger had heard of the Zentralinstitut
für Gestaltung in Berlin and what she thought about its merits as a design institution. Des
Cressonnières did not even know whether the Zentralinstitut, which had applied for
ICSID membership, was in East or West Germany and depended on her German friend
for an evaluation.548 This rather innocuous letter started a two-and-a-half-year-long West
German campaign to prevent the GDR from joining the ICSID and to preserve West
Germany’s membership as the sole representative of German interests in the international
body.
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In the case of ICSID membership, however, the worlds of Cold War diplomacy
and cultural politics collided.549 The campaign to isolate the GDR in the world of
industrial design was in accord with the Federal Republic’s diplomatic maxims regarding
the eastern part of Germany: the Hallstein Doctrine, which prescribed the severing of
diplomatic relations with countries that extended diplomatic recognition to the GDR, and
the West German claim to exclusive representation (Alleinvertretungsanspruch) for all of
Germany in international organizations. To influence third parties, West German
diplomacy as well as East German countermeasures often utilized economic incentives
and foreign aid packages.550 Similar issues were at hand here.
The ICSID had been created in 1957 as a purely professional organization
dedicated to globally advance and organize the new field of industrial design.551 Only
professional associations, not nations themselves, were eligible for membership. A
founding member, the Federal Republic of Germany acted as the sole representative of
German interests. The organization quickly became the dominant international body in all
things design, especially for Eurasia. Among the most important of the ICSID’s tasks
were the editorship of an international design bibliography and the organization of
biannual design congresses. The West German Rat für Formgebung began editing the
international bibliography in 1961. These efforts overlapped with a longstanding program
549
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that cultivated and maintained an interdisciplinary, multi-lingual design library in
Darmstadt. In soliciting information about eastern European design publications from its
GDR counterpart, the West German design council built first contacts with the East
German Zentralinstitut (later renamed Amt für industrielle Formgestaltung) years before
the latter applied for ICSID membership. However, these contacts were contained within
the special domain of German-German relations.552 With the ICSID’s pending extension
into the Eastern Bloc, these intangible relations would receive a novel quality. GermanGerman interaction would become official, because it would take place within an
international framework that accepted representatives from diplomatically recognized
countries, which would force the West Germans to share German representation with
East Germans, chipping away at the Federal Republic’s Alleinvertretungsanspruch.
The GDR received provisional membership in 1967. Mia Seeger’s successor,
Fritz Gotthelf, thereafter intensified efforts to exclude the East Germans from the ICSID.
He turned repeatedly to its executive board, explaining the delicate German diplomatic
situation, but to no avail. The ICSID board assessed the German-German situation in the
context of the East-West dualism, but had neither the interest nor the power to challenge
the Cold War status quo of German division as a non-governmental organization. In July
1967, Gotthelf received a confidential letter from des Cressonnières, who stated that,
after careful consideration, the board had decided to grant East Germany full
membership. She encouraged Gotthelf to keep trying to “find the precedents necessary to
satisfy the mind of our West German friends, because the Executive Committee has
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concluded that it was not possible to come to a decision, against all existing facts, about
the re-unification of Germany!”553 Des Cressonnières ended her letter pointing to the fact
that the ICSID had already granted provisional membership to a design society from the
People’s Republic of China and would have to extend the same to the East German
Zentralinstitut. Without the necessary diplomatic precedent, Gotthelf could do little else
but accept the ICSID’s decision. After more than two years of string-pulling and
backdoor diplomacy, he downplayed the importance of the matter in his response: “One
Germany or two; we aren’t politicians.” Nevertheless, Gotthelf announced that West
Germany would abstain from the vote on East Germany’s membership by being absent
from the next congress “in an elegant manner.”554 But this last minute effort to save face
could not cover up the fact that the FRG and its cultural representatives had suffered a
significant loss in the battle for sole German representation in international bodies.
The ICSID’s extension eastwards followed typical Cold War diplomatic patterns
(see figure 19). The first socialist member, Yugoslavia, only joined the ICSID in 1961,
followed by the Soviet Union’s VNIITE design council in 1965. The novelty of eastward
expansion both encouraged the West Germans to protest it and, at the same time,
prepared the Eastern Bloc for possible diplomatic fall-out. While there is no evidence
suggesting that the Eastern Bloc retreated to the same kind of lobbying done by Gotthelf
to gain ICSID membership, these Eastern European states took a strong position against
discrimination from the West. Yuri Soloviev, the head of VNIITE, sent the Executive
Board a long appraisal of the role of industrial design in socialist societies. The paper
defended the fact that Eastern Bloc design councils were often centralized state
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institutions and not professional associations.

555

Despite initial hesitation on part of the

ICSID board, the desire to grow from a transatlantic into a global organization won out
over ideological reservations. As a result, an adjusted ICSID constitution allowed
national members into the organization. Eventually, most of the eastern European
industrial design institutions were admitted as member societies rather than
“professional” members.556 The same applied to the Zentralinstitut when it requested
membership at the Vienna Congress of the ICSID in 1965.557 The executive board passed
the application in February 1967 for confirmation by the General Assembly in Canada in
the fall of 1967.558
As the West Germans pushed forward their last intervention against GDR
membership in the summer of 1967, tensions between the Zentralinstitut and the ICSID
board rose. From the very beginning, the GDR took a “no nonsense” position vis-à-vis
the West German attempts to exclude them from this organization. As a result of having
encountered the Federal Republic’s Alleinvertretungsanspruch in other international
bodies, the SED leadership suspected Western conspiracy behind the smallest diplomatic
slip-up, and the East Germans became adamant about the correct representation of their
country in name, flag, and national hymn. When the program for the ICSID Congress in
Ottawa failed to identify the Zentralinstitut as an East German institution, its head Martin
Kelm threatened to boycott the congress altogether.559 ICSID Secretary General des
Cressonnières sent him a telegram to calm the situation, affirming that the nomination of
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the Zentralinstitut would be listed with the addendum “German Democratic Republic
(GDR).”560
What seems like an unnecessary severing of relations with the ICSID to an
outsider actually represented a fundamental building block of GDR foreign policy to gain
formal recognition from the West as a legitimate state. For the GDR, membership in
supposedly apolitical organizations was a stepping-stone towards attaining full
membership in the international community and a seat in the United Nations. Moreover,
as the tug-of-war over ICSID membership shows, both Germanys knew that each of these
stepping-stones raised the stakes in the German-German Cold War over ideology,
division, and international recognition. The ICSID eventually granted the GDR
membership in Ottawa together with that of Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria, in
October 1967.561 At this point, all of the Eastern Bloc countries with significant industries
employing industrial designers gained membership in the ICSID, thus leveling the
diplomatic playing field between eastern and western Europe.
Although West Germany’s diplomatic circles were not pleased with East
Germany’s membership in the ICSID, the industrial design community certainly was.
The West German design journal Form, a leading publication with significant influence
on aesthetic discourse in the Federal Republic to the present day, considered the
unfortunate diplomatic outcome as a blessing in disguise: “We welcome this step
because, despite its admittedly similar mode of operation, the foundation of GDR design
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is ideologically different. The membership of the GDR in the ICSID might perhaps offer
more opportunities for knowledge exchange.”562 It is striking that in the previous thirtynine volumes of this design publication, there is not one major article about East
Germany to be found.
A sudden spike of western interest in GDR design after its acceptance into the
ICSID suggests that the logic of East German cultural diplomacy actually worked. The
international validation of GDR design redirected the attention of designers in the Federal
Republic. From this day forward projects from the other side of the wall became relevant
to West Germans. In the same issue, Form directed attention to the leading East German
design publication Form und Zweck. The article recognized the design journal “as an
auxiliary bridge to compensate for the lack of personal exchange of experiences between
East and West.”563 After ignoring Form und Zweck for ten years, West German designers
thus began to take GDR design seriously and eventually discovered eastern publications
as a means to stay informed about design developments there.

International Exhibitions and the Diplomatic Significance of Material Culture
The initial integration of Eastern European countries into the ICSID established
official avenues for the Federal Republic and the GDR alike to pursue contacts on the
other side of the Iron Curtain. Consequently, both the East and West German design
councils worked their way toward establishing more formal relations with those nations.
An air of competitiveness marked this second stage in German design diplomacy in
which both parts of Germany tried to display material progressivism and economic
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prowess to the other camp. The lingering German Question and East Berlin’s
legitimization efforts put FRG and GDR material culture face to face.
Prior personal and professional friendships facilitated this new task for the FRG.
Mia Seeger, together with her Polish counterpart Zophia Szydlowska, the head of the
design council Instytut Wzornictwa Przemyslowego, proposed the first West German
exhibition in the Eastern Bloc.564 The two industrial design personalities had met at the
1960 Milan Triennial, where the German and Polish displays had adjoined one other.
When Seeger saw the final blueprints for the exhibition space, she noticed a wall that
demarcated the Polish exhibition from the German one. She immediately wrote to the
Polish person in charge, “If I read your layout correctly, then you have erected a wall
against the German section, your section against ours. This would greatly hinder the flow
of visitors. In no way do we need a wall.”565 The wall was never mentioned again and a
lifelong friendship between the grandes dames of design ensued. The contribution that
these women made towards constructive East-West exchanges in industrial design cannot
be overestimated. For example, Szydlowska met Martin Kelm in East Berlin where she
informed the head of the GDR design council about the industrial design work done in
West Germany.566 The first FRG design show in the Eastern Bloc presented thus only one
of many ways in which the two influenced Cold War design relations.
In 1967, this first West German exhibition in the Eastern Bloc that resulted from
the friendship of Seeger and Szydlowska, titled Industrial Design from the FRG
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(Industrielle Formgebung aus der BRD), traveled to the Polish towns of Warsaw and
Krakow first, and then moved on to Sofia in Bulgaria, and Zagreb in Yugoslavia. The
West German organizers promoted this event as part of a series of Western European and
Scandinavian exhibitions that had traveled the Eastern Bloc. Yet it took “cautious and
balanced good will” on all sides to make this project happen.567 Once the exhibition had
opened its doors to Polish visitors, more imponderable aspects specific to the FRG’s
relations with the East surfaced. The underlying tone of the show was that of Western
abundance and technical superiority consistent with Cold War competition for the
people’s “heart and minds.” In a design journal review, Peter Frank, an exhibition
supervisor and staff member close to Mia Seeger, reported his uneasiness regarding the
excitement that Polish visitors expressed when seeing the exhibition objects: “As
exhibition custodian, I receive the admiration of visitors with somewhat ambivalent
feelings. The exhibition is more than simply a specific design show.” And he elaborated:
“It is, like every documentation of a country’s national design standards, understood as a
representation in its broadest sense. Perhaps design exhibitions are especially fitting for
this purpose, particularly if they make evident that industrial design expresses more than
just the immediate technological and economic niveau.”568 Not a design politician, but a
rather young and eager design enthusiast, Frank only realized the show’s effect once it
was on display.569 Observing the Polish reaction and trying to put it into perspective,
Frank noted the historical and sociological dimensions of design evaluation. The West
German products either were complete novelties in Poland or representatives of a
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different economic and social pedigree. A bachelor kitchenette, embodying a particular
Western lifestyle, exemplified this socio-historical difference.570 To the astonished Polish
audience, both from a communist and a Catholic viewpoint, this single-person kitchen
must have seemed like a waste of resources and a social oddity.
Two incidents heightened the West Germany’s diplomatic advantage that derived
from this event. Informational visits between GDR and Polish designers fell conveniently
into the two-week period of the FRG exhibition in Warsaw. This afforded East German
designers the opportunity to acquaint themselves with West German products that they
had only before seen in print.571 West Germany could once again demonstrate its
superiority in product design. And while the unexpected visit surely caused great
satisfaction to the Rat für Formgebung, the friendship between Seeger and Szydlowska
yielded an even bigger success for West German diplomacy. After the show opening,
Szydlowska organized a dinner party to honor her dear German friend. It was at this
occasion that the Federal Republic’s chargé d’affairs in Poland, who did not enjoy
diplomatic status and had not secured formal recognition, was invited to an official Polish
event for the first time.572 Made possible by the ICSID and facilitated by the friendship of
two extraordinary women, the FRG not only showed its material culture but also fortified
relations in the Eastern Bloc.
West German engagement in the Eastern Bloc triggered East German concern
about its position as one of the more developed industrial countries in the Soviet sphere
of influence. If it were to be trumped by the Federal Republic in the realm of production
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and consumer culture in front of its socialist friends, the East German politicians feared a
loss of prestige and leadership in the COMECON. Within months of the West German
traveling exhibition, the Zentralinstitut put together its own concept for a traveling
exhibition that would feature GDR state-of-the-art interior design. The show Function –
Shape – Quality (Funktion – Form – Qualität) traveled through the Eastern Bloc for two
years, imitating the route of the West German exhibition by starting in Warsaw and then
progressing to Krakow. The Zentralinstitut modeled the size and the concept of the
exhibition after what the Federal Republic had presented just months earlier.573 Instead of
stressing difference and superiority, as the Federal Republic’s exhibition had done, the
GDR attempted to win over their Polish audience with a “people-bonding”
(völkerverbindend) message: “The prognosis, planning, management and regulation of
industrial design weighs heavily on the control of the socio-technological organism of a
nation and the community of socialist people.”574 Situating industrial design as a common
challenge for all socialist nations, the GDR clearly sought its inclusion in the ideological
and practical problem-solving process within the COMECON. The intended audience,
however, included professionals beyond the Eastern Bloc as invitations went out to
numerous Western design councils and design schools.575 Consequently, this exhibition
served two purposes. First, it declared the state of industrial design in the GDR – in
practice and theory – to both friends and foes. Second, it signaled the communalities with
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other socialist nations. This exhibition later toured through the Eastern Bloc for the years
to come, although it was never exhibited in the West.
As the title “Function – Shape – Quality” suggests, the show’s focus linked
aesthetics to functionality. It was the first GDR display that featured design as an
important quality factor of industrial production. More than 150 objects and group
displays, thirty photographic displays, and eight models provided a comprehensive
overview of East German industrial design.576 An introductory display on German design
history between 1900 and 1933 greeted visitors, deliberately excluding the Nazi period
(see figure 20). The next part of the exhibition introduced attendees to the German arts
and crafts tradition and provided an overview over design education in the GDR. The rest
of the exhibition directed attention to significant aesthetic challenges in socialist
societies: design solutions that “integrated the cultural and the utility value of the
product” for work environments, domestic spaces, and leisure, mirroring the categorized
and state-organized life of the socialist citizen.577
The ideological component of the exhibition was especially apparent in the
accompanying catalogue. It explained the role design ought to play in socialist societies.
“The world that humans shape has a shaping influence on them in return. The properties,
benefits, and shapes of man-made objects stimulate peoples’ behavior and relationship to
the world.” This “stimulation” was further explained: “Their usage, that is the experience
of the objects’ material, construction, and function, which come together in the design,
leads in the end to the unlocking new human senses and to the activation of satisfaction,
576
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pleasure, and joy of living.”

Although the explanation may sound like the definition of

hedonistic consumption, this relationship between humans and their material environment
was central to the mid-1960s understanding of production and consumption in the GDR.
The idea of “humanistic Socialism” placed humans at the center of design with the goal
of creating an environment that served the needs of the population. The degree to which a
product fulfilled these needs determined its ideological value. This attitude represents a
decisive shift away from the heavy-industry emphasis of the early GDR connected to
Ulbricht’s New Economic System policies that had opened up the East German economy
to a more consumer-oriented planning in 1963.
Generally speaking, the catalogue revised many of the more extreme ideological
stances that the GDR had taken in the 1950s and early 1960s. The historical section even
exonerated the Bauhaus, which had been vanquished from the GDR’s cultural heritage
during the Formalism Debate in the early 1950s. Instead of the previous critique labeling
Weimar modernism as cosmopolitan, the Zentralinstitut changed course by 1967 and
crowned the Bauhaus as the highest developmental stage among a series of design
initiatives coming from the East German territory, including the Deutsche Werkstätten
and the Werkbund. The catalog text for the Function – Shape – Quality exhibition in
Moscow two years later even integrated the Bauhaus into leftist, that is socialist,
opposition to the Hitler regime pointing out that the Nazis closed down the design school
as a “hotbed of cultural Bolshevism.”579 One of the pieces displayed, a furniture program
developed by Rudolf Horn, designer and lecturer at the School for Applied Arts Halle –
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Burg Giebichenstein for the furniture combine Deutsche Werkstätten Hellerau,
epitomized the newfound sense of modernistic tradition and a humanistic outlook on
production. Providing a series of furniture pieces that could be added as needed, the
Möbelprogramm Deutsche Werkstätten (MDW) offered individual furniture elements that
the consumer could combine to accommodate individual needs and changing personal as
well as spatial living situations. This furniture program completed the idea of a
rationalized and standardized production, as all the pieces of the program, whether a
bookshelf board or a couch element, fit perfectly together whereever the consumer
decided to put them.
Polish media extensively advertised the show during its run from December 11,
1967 until January 20, 1968. Numerous Polish politicians and designers visited the
displays. Newspaper reviews reveal that the exhibition’s novelty, unlike its West German
counterpart, was not the display of unfamiliar products, since these were mostly available
on the Polish market. Rather, the fascination lay with the process described in the
displays: the development of a design culture and its subsequent appropriation by
industry.580 Especially the integration of design into the economic planning process found
wide admiration among the Polish press, as illustrated by the Zentralinstitut’s relocation
from the Ministry of Culture to the German Office for Standardization and Product
Testing (Deutsches Amt für Messwesen and Warenprüfung, DAMW) in 1965. It is here
that the contradiction between the ideological superstructure and its practical application
in the realm of production lies. While the catalogs stressed the cultural and utility value
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of industrial design, GDR presenters emphasized its economic benefits at the symposia
framing the exhibition.
The mid-1960s were a moment in which the GDR repositioned its aesthetic and
functionalist outlook. Socialist ideology and the stylistic and social considerations
surrounding industrial design merged in humanistic socialism after a decade of
divergence and ideological contradiction. The new interest in individual needs over the
collective economy increasingly contributed to a more consumer-oriented way of design
and the rediscovery of the Weimar modernism as leftist aesthetics. At the same time, the
individual solutions such as the MDW furniture program enabled increasing
standardization of production, which in turn helped preserve resources. Yet, as discussed
earlier, the mismanagement of the planned economy would eventually ruin this moment
of sublime convergence. The GDR economy remained an “economy of scarcity”
(Mangelwirtschaft), in which consumers waited for years to attain coveted furniture, cars,
or other technical equipment. The rehabilitation of the Bauhaus tradition in East Germany
signaled once more the GDR’s determination to competing aesthetically with Western
Europe in general and with the Federal Republic in particular.
To truly engage the West German activities abroad and claim a place among
modern industrialized nations, the GDR showed their design presence and expertise in
Western countries as well. In this regard, ICSID membership decisively opened western
doors to GDR design. After the success in this international organization, East Germany’s
next step towards diplomatic recognition established bilateral cultural and economic
relations with western democracies. After a failed attempt at displaying industrial design
at a 1967 multinational ICSID exhibition project in Barcelona, the Zentralinstitut focused
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its efforts on an exhibition in London, whose goal was to combine political and economic
aims in a cultural event. By displaying products that fulfilled the highest international
standards of quality and design in combination with the clear and unwavering usage of
GDR insignia, the exhibition planners wanted to impress a strong notion of the
characteristics of their socialist economy on Great Britain.581 They further envisioned
broad coverage in design publications as well as an involvement of the ICSID. Yet what
sounds like a straightforward event demanded much diplomatic skill. At first, the general
idea of a GDR design exhibition found fertile ground in England. Sir Paul Reilly, the
head of the British Council of Industrial Design (CoID) and an active member of the
ICSID, had visited the East German design council in April 1970 and knew about the
state of design there.582 But the difficulties started with negotiations between both parties
about an exhibition venue that might accomplish two things at the same time: first, the
location had to be humble enough to avoid the impression that the British government
entertained quasi-official relations with the socialist GDR; and second, the venue needed
to be representative enough not to humiliate the guests. In the end, the Ceylon Tea
Center, a Sri Lankan trade forum, served as the exhibition space.
After finalizing the diplomatic intricacies and the exhibition layout, the staff of
the GDR design council began writing texts that described the exhibition objects. Upon
receiving the texts for the placards and the catalog, both loaded with socialist language,
Sir Paul Reilly retracted his agreement to open the exhibition, a personal favor through
which the East Germans had hoped to gain semi-official British endorsement. At the
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outset, he made it clear that he “was happy to open an exhibition which was entirely on
the subject of Design and did not contain any political or ideological allusions, however
slight.”583 As head of a government-supported organization, he could not be in a position
to open an ideologically inscribed event. If the GDR wanted him back on board, Sir Paul
Reilly demanded that the Zentralinstitut change the texts. From this point on, opinions
within East German official circles diverged extremely. On one side stood the quasidiplomatic body that managed relations with London, the German-British Society. The
society favored changing the texts over losing Sir Paul Reilly. “If opened by SPR [Sir
Paul Reilly], the exhibition ‘GDR Design 70’ would gain a denotative official character
in contrast to similar GDR events in Great Britain. It would hence represent an important
precedent for future activities toward the GDR’s diplomatic recognition by Great
Britain.”584 On the other side, the DAMW, the Zentralinstitut’s superior governmental
institution, opposed any alterations on the grounds that “the revisions would mean
abandonment of our class point of view (Klassenstandpunkt) in the conflict with
theoreticians of late-bourgeois design conceptions.”585 Beyond the ideological issues at
play, the DAMW also pointed to the possibility that others, especially West German
officials, could utilize such altered texts politically against the GDR. In the end, the
possible diplomatic gains won out over ideological concerns. The Zentralinstitut revised
the entirety of the texts and thus completely re-inscribed socialist material culture with
new meaning – a meaning that would cater to Western European sensibilities about
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individuality and that erased any trace of open state socialism from the displays. The
quote in the original read as follows:
New standards for the quality of industrial products are derived from the
development of the socialist order in the GDR. Manufactures are an essential part
of our environment. They influence people’s way of living within every area. The
quality of material and ideological needs also depend on product design.586
The revised, English translation purged the Marxist language and over-simplified the
texts:
New standards of quality have been set for industrial products. It is recognised
that as an essential part of our environment these influence man in all spheres of
his life. Ideally, every product should be an expression of certain requirements,
both physical and aesthetic.”587
The exhibition now underlined the humanistic aspects of GDR design culture. As Martin
Kelm stated in his opening remarks: “It is the goal in our society to positively influence
all of the factors affecting human beings and to create an environment in which one can
experience the challenging notion of humanism.”588 Yet Kelm tried to reinsert ideological
messages on a middle ground between Marxist ideology and humanism:
As you know, we abolished the hurdles of private ownership of property as well
as means of production in order to undertake planning that serves across societal
interests. The people own everything. The people can determine their own
fortunes. Hence, we have the potential to design an environment that serves the
people’s interests. We work on utilizing these opportunities and on putting
industrial design to work in creating a complexly designed humanistic
environment.589
As seen in the catalog for the 1967 Warsaw exhibition, the concept of Marxist
humanism was not entirely new. In the mid-1960s, “socialist humanism” became a key
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term in the rapprochement of eastern and western Marxists.

590

This school of Marxist

thought opposed the structural mechanisms of state socialism and instead emphasized
subjectivity and human agency in socialist theory. Socialist humanism mitigated the
ideological opposition between Western democracies and socialist groups, parties, and
even states. It also contributed to a period of western Eurocommunism in the 1960s and
1970s by enabling the cooperation of bourgeois and leftist parties in western democratic
governments, such as the Labour governments in Britain and the Great Coalition in West
Germany.591
At the London exhibition, the GDR thus strategically, if inconsistently, employed
the concept of socialist humanism, which opposed the very nature of the centrally
structured SED state. To convey this humanistic approach materially, the exhibition
consciously minimized the heavy industrial sector – which, in reality, constituted the real
strength of the GDR economy – and instead displayed more objects that related to the
everyday.592 It especially featured leisure-time objects, such as patio furniture and toys
(see figures 21 and 22): “These items are not only excellently designed, but also
pedagogically valuable and fulfill therapeutic requirements. The colorful, imaginatively
arranged, and multiform toys bestow the entire exhibition with a friendly and casual
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atmosphere.”
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A color slide presentation about Karl-Marx-Stadt’s reconstruction (today

Chemnitz) transported visitors into an ideal socialist environment where public buildings,
public art, the health establishment, and urban infrastructure coalesced. Apparently, the
message resonated with the British audience. On September 9, 1970, even the
conservative Daily Telegraph titled its story on the GDR design exhibition “Humane East
Germans.”594
In the end, the London exhibition far exceeded the expectations and hopes of
diplomatic circles in the GDR. East German products ranging from pictures of heavy
work equipment to displays of prized china and glassware created the impression of a
progressive material culture. Yet visitors not only saw industrial design on display but
also GDR literature and picture albums meant to foster a better understanding of this
socialist country.595 Representatives from several eastern European countries, as well as
the cultural attaché of the American embassy in London and a few British members of
parliament, among other London notables, attended the opening reception. In his speech,
Sir Paul Reilly affirmed the bilateral interest in fostering trade relations between Great
Britain and the GDR “whether officially or unofficially.”596 Not to take advantage of this
sizable market, he maintained, “would be ludicrous for a trading people like the British.”
Yet he acknowledged the unusual diplomatic situation indirectly, hoping that “no-one
here feels any compunction about being present to wish this exhibition well. It is indeed
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innocent self-interest that brings us all together here, since trade is properly a two-way
traffic and cannot be conducted without reasonable personal contacts.”597
The exhibition lasted from September 7 till September 19, 1970, and turned out a
success for GDR foreign policy.598 1067 visitors signed a guest book, but a CoID report
suspected that more people actually saw the show.599 Visitors nominated the tea china,
glassware, and toys as their favorite objects on display. English visitors commented on
the good quality of GDR design and the sophistication of the exhibition system. Many
agreed that there was much more to learn about the GDR and wanted to deepen relations
with the country. In the days following the exhibition opening, major design
organizations in England invited the GDR delegation to talks.600 The final Zentralinstitut
report showed great satisfaction with the way the exhibition demonstrated the GDR’s
capability in the field of design. It concluded that the actual design and content of the
exhibition contributed tremendously to this diplomatic success.601
With the establishment of official cultural relations via the ICSID, the field
opened up for either Germany, respectively, to push for improved relations on the
opposite side of the Iron Curtain. In this fashion, the FRG could capitalize on the
personal contacts of Mia Seeger to set in motion the first West German exhibition in the
East. While the West Germans scored with novelties and triggered interest with
“unusual” objects like the bachelor kitchenette, East German designers struggled with the
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appropriate representation of their industrial design. Using industrial design events to
gain political recognition in the West, the GDR followed a path of cultural diplomacy and
ideological bartering. The GDR had to sacrifice its ideological convictions in order to
make the political message behind socialist material culture palatable to the West. The reinscription of GDR material culture as an expression of humanistic ideals in socialism
signified a decisive shift in the self-conception of cultural diplomacy in East Germany:
political goals became more important than ideological consistency.

Diplomacy of German Design: the German-German Basic Treaty
The process of gradual German rapprochement through the debates and projects
revolving around the ICSID membership was magnified in the bi- and multilateral
negotiations leading up to the Helsinki Accords of 1975. The early 1970s were a special
moment in German-German relations: superpower détente policies facilitated a period of
East-West engagement. This watershed policy change from deterrence to dialogue
resulted in the SALT I and SALT II treaties that limited Soviet and US nuclear arsenals
and stopped the escalation of superpower conflicts for almost a full decade, thus
affirming the Cold War status quo.
Intertwined with these negotiations of superpower relations was the ongoing
German Question: the national status of a divided country and its diplomatic recognition.
In a first step, Chancellor Willy Brandt, who had opened up FRG diplomacy to
negotiations with the Eastern Bloc in his prior office as foreign minister, intensified these
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efforts when he was elected in 1969.

Brandt’s policy revised the previous conservative

“policy of strength” that the Adenauer government had followed in western integration
(Westbindung) between 1949 and 1966, convinced that West Germany’s rearmament and
NATO membership would necessarily lead to reunification. Twenty years later, the
Berlin Wall as the “anti-fascist barrier” symbolized the failure of Adenauer’s strategy
because it exacerbated security concerns in the Soviet Union and among Germany’s
eastern neighbors. In the absence of a peace treaty, border questions had remained
unresolved. One of the central demands of the Eastern Bloc was the West German
acknowledgement of the eastern German border, the Oder-Neisse-Line, as the permanent
settlement of WWII territorial claims. Under the auspices of Brandt’s policy of
rapprochement, Bonn affirmed these borders in 1970 in the Moscow Treaty with the
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Treaty with Poland. Brandt’s close adviser Egon Bahr put
Bonn’s new strategy in the German Question in a nutshell when he stated “responsibility
for Germany had to be borne by Germans themselves.”603
The ultimate goal of Brandt’s Eastern Policy (Ostpolitik), however, was to
reestablish some kind of national context for the two German states.604 It was therefore
crucial “to restore at least some aspects of the pre-World War II links between the two
halves of Germany […]”605 In this way, Brandt’s Ostpolitik differed greatly from
superpower détente, because it sought to change the Cold War status quo. To realize the
602
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eastern policy regarding East Germany, Brandt needed greater independence from
external powers “to create living conditions far better than those enforced by Cold War
rivalries.”606 After twenty years, the FRG thus gave up its foreign policy maxim of
Alleinvertretungsanspruch vis-à-vis the GDR, abolished the Hallstein Doctrine, and
entered official negotiations with the other part of Germany.607 The superpowers on both
sides observed this German-German rapprochement with mixed feelings. On the one
hand, the Germans had to find a way to coexist, but on the other hand, the possible option
of German unification under the umbrella of the opposing system presented a scenario
that neither side wanted to see unfold. Washington was especially nervous about the
degree of independence displayed by West German diplomats and their willingness to
cooperate with Soviet diplomats in order to achieve their political goals. The Soviets
were less nervous about the GDR leadership, whom they kept on a short leash throughout
the negotiation process.608 While the superpowers saw German division as a means for
peace in Europe, Germans argued with increasing intensity that the division was a major
cause for tension.609
As the Moscow and Warsaw treaties still lingered in West German parliament
awaiting ratification and the Four Power Agreement on Berlin had just been signed, talks
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between East and West Germany commenced.

610

After the signing of two technical

agreements, the Transit Accord and the Traffic Treaty that established regulations for the
passage of West German citizens and goods through the GDR, by the summer of 1972,
the East and West Germans entered negotiations about the substantial issues in their
relations: the national question, the absence of a peace treaty and the presence of the Four
Powers, and the question of citizenship. West Germany agreed to the “two states in one
nation” principle by acknowledging the GDR under constitutional law, but not under
international law. Bonn added a unilateral qualification that they therefore did not
consider citizenship to be regulated. Both sides signed the Basic Treaty (short for “Treaty
Concerning the Basis of Relations between the Federal Republic of Germany and the
German Democratic Republic”) in December 1972 after curtailed negotiations that left
some of the issues unresolved. Over the next two decades, the Federal Republic would
spend millions for the Transit Accord annually, which included visa charges and tariffs.
Bonn would also pay more than DM 3.5 billion “to secure the release of roughly 34,000
[political] prisoners and reunite approximately 250,000 families divided by the Wall.”611
West German willingness to pay enormous sums for the transit regulations
highlights Bonn’s efforts to ameliorate interpersonal relations between the East and West
German populations. It also proved Germans’ willingness to take responsibility in the
German Question and acknowledge that the “only way of overcoming the realities of the

610

Egon Bahr maintained in 1983 that the Four-Power Agreement on Berlin would have not materialized
without the active contribution of the two German states. He concluded that the four powers “could no
longer undertake any measures in the center of Europe that touched Germany without the two German
states also participating.” Bahr and Vale, “Bearing Responsibility for Germany,” 78.
611
Sarotte, Dealing with the Devil, 149.

257
612

division was to begin by accepting them.”

At the core of this policy lay the hope that

increased interaction between East and West would lead to the demise of the GDR and
the end of German division. However, the SED completely controlled contacts between
their population and the West: visas for visits to the West warranted a complicated
application process, packages and mail from the West were searched, and – as Stasi files
later revealed – Western visitors were monitored for the majority of their stay. Whereas
the GDR pronounced the desired official quality of contacts between – from their vantage
point – two separate states by sending representatives of their Foreign Office (MfAA) to
the German-German negations, the FRG counteracted these aspirations by assigning the
Ministry for Pan-German Affairs, thus emphasizing a national frame. This negotiation
strategy went beyond the question of recognition and underlined western endeavors to
break down the literal and figurative walls that the SED had erected between people that
shared cultural and political roots. The Brandt government attempted to reach an
agreement that deregulated human interaction between East and West Germans and
limited institutional or official interference. Bonn hoped to strengthen the links between
the two parts of Germany with the goal of reinforcing feelings of national unity.613
In this light, the specifics of German-German cultural exchanges agreed upon in
the Basic Treaty, namely the Cultural Accord (Kulturabkommen), provide an excellent
window into the cultural policy principles of efforts to “normalize” East-West relations
on both sides. They also reveal West Germany’s longterm goals for Ostpolitik. The FRG
wanted a cultural agreement with an “individual component” that would deregulate
cultural exchanges between the German populations by allowing non-state actors to
612
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initiate and conduct cultural events on the other side of the border.

614

The Federal

Republic’s Permanent Representation in East Berlin, which the FRG had set up instead of
an embassy in the aftermath of the Basic Treaty, and the GDR Foreign Ministry carried
out the talks. Beginning in 1974, the Permanent Representation staff functioned as
mediators for political issues, economic cooperation, and cultural contacts concerning
both parts of Germany. Because the negotiations about the Kulturabkommen remained
unresolved for twelve years,615 both Germanys agreed on the state-facilitated cultural
exchange (staatlich vermittelter Kulturaustausch) as an interim solution to enable mutual
visits of theater companies, choirs, and museum exhibitions. Several reasons account for
this long period of negotiations. The initial five rounds of talks between 1973 and 1975
brought no results because the GDR claimed ownership of cultural artifacts that the FRG
had included in a new culture foundation, the Prussian Cultural Heritage (Preussischer
Kulturbesitz).616 East Germany also contested the inclusion of West Berlin in the
Kulturabkommen. Together, these issues brought the deliberations to a screeching halt
until 1982.617
The points of contention were not only a result of the hasty and incomplete
negotiations of the Basic Treaty, but also of the souring of German-German relations in
the aftermath of the 1975 Helsinki Accords. Suddenly, the GDR changed its position
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from dialogue to delineation, as “internal problems increased under the influence of
détente” and, encouraged by the Helsinki human rights stipulations, GDR citizens began
to reject the socialist system openly.618 Frustrated by the East German change of course,
Bonn insisted on continuing the “policy of normalization” despite eastern resistance.619
Meanwhile, the interim solution of state-regulated cultural exchanges suited the GDR.
With the cultural accords in limbo, the SED maintained command over contacts between
East and West and did not shy away from leveraging this control to complicate cultural
exchange whenever Cold War tensions between East and West arose. The FRG, on the
other hand, participated in the state-mediated cultural exchanges because it saw this
agreement as an opportunity to wiggle its way into the cultural calendar of the GDR – an
opportunity to reconnect with the other Germany and to shape East German perceptions
of the Federal Republic. Eventually, Honecker dropped the Preussischer Kulturbesitz to
the bottom of the list in order to recommence talks in 1983. Twelve more GermanGerman negotiation rounds ended successfully with the signing of the Kulturabkommen
on May 6, 1986.
As clear as the lines of argumentation on both parts appear to be, public
disagreement with the West German diplomacy surrounding the Kulturabkommen
certainly grew over the negotiation period. The most prominent critic was Günter Grass,
world-renowned author and artist. In a newspaper interview with the Rheinischer Merkur,
Grass criticized the diplomatic aspect of the agreement because it was negotiated as if the
618
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two Germanys were foreign territory to each other, like a treaty with France or Finland.
Instead, he warned that the Federal Republic gave up the last piece of commonality
between East and West and insisted that “the agreement should have been made on the
basis of a shared culture and history.”620 The political and economic division had long
been established, but the realm of culture had proven resistant against the division
process. The agreement, in Grass’ opinion, put this resistance into question. Grass had
previously approached the FRG government with his concerns about the cultural treaty’s
effects between East and West Germany. As an alternative, he suggested a GermanGerman national cultural foundation to ensure the continuation of the German
Kulturnation.621 “Such a solution – in the tradition of the Paulskirche – could contribute
to the development of a new understanding of ‘nation’, which would exclude
reunification, but, on the other hand, could assist Germans in two states to find a new,
relaxed (unverkrampft) self-understanding. This would also preclude a renewed political
power built-up in the center of Europe. Our neighbors in East and West needn’t fear such
a development any more.”622 Apart from this universalist, pacifist idea for a German
future, the main danger of these policies Grass attested for the arts and their production:
the Kulturabkommen would promote only what was officially acceptable art on both
sides, thus implicitly censoring the diversity of artistic expression. Grass exclaimed that
“everywhere where art, where literature, where painting is created, it is necessarily
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subversive, and it will thus be, perhaps even from both sides, be held back.”

The

Kulturabkommen, despite its intentions of enabling a cultural exchange at the level of the
population, could possibly become a tool for state censorship of the arts.
Despite Grass’ warnings, the Federal Republic pursued the Kulturabkommen to
normalize German-German relations. Rather than Grass’ theoretical contemplations of
the treaty’s meaning for the German national idea, politicians in the FRG valued its
practical merits: they could hold the GDR leadership accountable to the signed treaty, but
not to a, to them, lofty idea of a unified Kulturnation that would not practice or exchange
features of this culture.

German-German State-mediated Cultural Exchange and the Kulturabkommen
The significance of the Kulturabkommen as a cornerstone of self-determined
German Cold War policy becomes evident when we look at two industrial design
exhibitions taking place two years before and two years after the signing of the accord:
the FRG exhibition Design – Thinking Ahead for Humanity (Design – Vorausdenken für
den Menschen) in East Berlin (1984) and the Design in the GDR (Design in der DDR)
exhibition in Stuttgart (1988). The principle of reciprocity, the planning process, and the
execution of these design exhibitions showcase the political strategies behind intraGerman cultural exchanges.
The idea for the western design exhibition originated in 1983 against the backdrop
of deteriorating East-West relations during the Geneva talks about stationing American
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Pershing missiles in West Germany.

At one point, a GDR Politburo member even

hinted at military consequences if Geneva were to fail.625 In this tense atmosphere, Bonn
commissioned the Rat für Formgebung to put together a concept for a West German
industrial design exhibition. The Federal Ministry for Inter-German Relations and the
Federal Economic Ministry jointly coordinated the planning effort so that the FRG
government

could

pitch

the

project

as

part

of

the

staatlich

vermittelter

Kulturaustausch.626 Stressing its contribution to peace in Europe, the western side made it
clear that holding the design exhibition within the same calendar year was of “political
significance.”627 Using every available channel, the FRG impressed the significance of
this cultural event for German-German relations on the SED leadership. Even Economic
Minister Otto Graf Lambsdorff carried this pitch for an industrial design exhibition in his
folder on a trip to the Leipzig trade fair.628 Only nine months after Hans Otto Bräutigam,
the head of the FRG Permanent Representation in East Berlin, first proposed the design
exhibition to the GDR Deputy Foreign Minister Kurt Nier on March 1984, the project
came to fruition. The exhibition ran for two weeks in December 1984 as the fourth
project the FRG sent as part of the Kuturaustausch.629 Bonn’s initiative signaled to the
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international community the German determination in the 1980s to “insulate interGerman relations from the vicissitudes of relations between the superpowers.”630
Initially, the GDR hesitated to support the West German project. Yet after a few
weeks of deliberations, it swallowed the bait that the Rat für Formgebung had put in the
exhibition proposal: a symposium that would convey “specialized technical and
professional details and suggestions.”631 For the notoriously backward economy of the
GDR, every occasion to learn more about western product design presented a welcome
opportunity to catch up to world standards. With the exception of the location, which was
hard to come by on such short notice, the preparations for Design – Thinking Ahead for
Humanity went smoothly, and the exhibition opened on December 3, 1984, in the
International Trade Center on Friedrichsstrasse in the heart of East Berlin. High-ranking
East and West German politicians, representatives of GDR cultural organizations, and
designers attended the opening event.632 Even Wolfgang Schäuble, the Federal Minister
in the Chancellery, stopped by for a short visit during his first official trip to the GDR.
During the opening speech, Martin Kelm hinted at the political significance of GermanGerman rapprochement: “We regard the fact that this exhibition takes place as a positive
sign, particularly at a time when the international situation gives reason for serious
concerns…” “Even the best intentions and the best design achievements would make no
sense for humanity if a nuclear inferno cannot be prevented,” Kelm continued.633 Hans
Otto Bräutigam of the Permanent Representation also included notes on the international
630
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situation when he greeted the guests: “The Federal Government is determined to continue
the path paved by the Basic Treaty and the Helsinki Accords. We want to extend
cooperation and take advantage of every chance to improve relations. We do this
conscious of our shared responsibility for peace and stability in Europe and in the interest
of the people on both sides.”634 “Cultural activities such as this exhibition,” Bräutigam
put the Western attitude in a nutshell, “are the building blocks for good-neighborly
(gutnachbarliche) relations between the two German states.”

635

Such expressions of

“mini-détente” in German-German relations solidified the idea of their special role in
maintaining east-west dialog at the heart of Europe.636 Sharing vital concerns about not
becoming hostages of the superpower arms race with other nonnuclear nations in Europe,
a unified Germany could stand for the universal values of peace and accord, rather than
for economic-political domination.
The exhibition concept expressed the humanitarian goals of this show in the West
German emphasis on interpersonal relations. From its inception, it was conceived as a
show that displayed design’s contribution to everyday life by means of selected,
progressive solutions.637 Humans and the social fabric stood at the center – not the
products themselves – to aim at “deepening mutual knowledge about cultural and social
existence” in the two German states.638 High-profile guests, diplomatic speeches, and the
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awareness that this German-German display of harmony, standing in stark contrast to the
tension-filled “international situation,” benefited both sides in the diplomatic arena. The
exhibition consciously continued the effort of a self-defined foreign policy that the
Federal Republic had begun with Ostpolitik to change the Cold War status quo. It also
constituted a continuous effort on the part of the FRG to push for direct interaction
between both German populations – if only via increased knowledge about each other
(see figure 23).
Nearly two hundred products, systems, and projects from more than one hundred
West German businesses helped to convey the significance and evolution of industrial
design in the Federal Republic. A historical section explained design development in the
FRG by grounding it in the Werkbund and the Bauhaus traditions of modern,
functionalist aesthetics.639 Visitors quickly realized that the exhibition was not a sales
show when they saw the lavish products displayed for home interiors: the luxury
furniture company Interlübke sent its high priced Duo-Bed, while the furniture
cooperative Wohnkultur displayed the two-decade-long success story WK 470 furniture
system, and Vitsoe provided an upholstery suite.640 None of the East German visitors
could afford such expensive furniture. Instead, the exhibition clearly promoted the perks
of the Western lifestyle with the amenities of high-end designer interiors and hightechnology standards for appliances and tools. On top of these displays of affluence, the
placards accompanying the interior design exhibition inflamed Eastern eyes: “In a mass
society and an increasingly depersonalized environment, the personal apartment remains
639
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one of the few areas where one can realize individual ideas.”

Implicit provocations

such as this critique of socialist society altered the character of the cultural exchange
during the two weeks that the show ran.
The initially cozy impression one gathers from the emphasis on “peace in Europe”
and “German-German understanding” in the documents surrounding the conception and
the opening of the exhibition is quickly revised by a closer look at the East German
archives. Unbeknownst to the guest from the Federal Republic, the SED closely
monitored and manipulated the exhibition. Event advertisement posters that the West
German design council Rat für Formgebung provided were only posted in obscure places,
if at all.642 The GDR leadership hoped to keep the number of visitors to a minimum.
Thanks to word of mouth, the frequency of visits rose by the day.643 In a press release, the
FRG celebrated the fact that 22,000 people had seen the show within the first week,
mentioning the noticeably young age of the crowd.644 This average age came courtesy of
the SED, which sent party-loyal groups and young professionals or design students to the
West German product show. Only about two hundred visitors were “normal” GDR
citizens on the first day of Design – Thinking Ahead for Humanity.645 The East German
design authorities outright confiscated a number of books that the Rat für Formgebung
provided for general information about West German design.646 Moreover, the East
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German exhibition personnel prevented contact between East German visitors and the
Rat für Formgebung staff, which was present to give information."647 Instead, the East
German Amt für industrielle Formgestaltung provided its own staff with a twenty-page
script that would enable them to downplay western accomplishments. Emphasizing the
negative effects of competitive capitalism and profit-making on the social make-up of a
country, the text characterized design and its institutions in the FRG as “ineffective.” 648
Another contentious issue, related to the problem of advertising the exhibition,
came up with the slow admission into the venue. A queue of 150-200 curious East
Germans formed in front of the International Trade Center every day. Officials from the
permanent representation stopped by several times and asked the Amt für Formgestaltung
staff to open more registers to decrease the waiting time. The GDR pretended to be
bullied, claiming that the FRG connected political profitability to attendance.649 The West
Germans ignored this provocation. Overall attendance in eighteen days amounted to more
than 66,000 with every one of the 40,000 available catalogs sold. After a GDR observer
initially misevaluated the show as an expert event – based on visitors’ lack of interest in
the placard texts – he remarked that guests increasingly showed interest in the
information and technical descriptions provided via the placards in the following days.650
Nevertheless, the feared spectacle of a big protest failed to appear. The staff members of
the Amt für industrielle Formgestaltung had been afraid that the displays of Western
647
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affluence could cause open critique of the socialist system and its economic shortcomings
from their fellow countrymen. Yet the concluding internal event report described visitor
reaction as “confident and competent-critical (souverän-kritisch) with specialized design
interest.”651 Perhaps to overstate their level of control over the event, the staff did not
record visitors’ disgruntlement. After testing the waters of cultural exchange with the
Federal Republic and with a public relations fiasco successfully averted, the SED
leadership

confidently

finished

the

negotiations

over

the

German-German

Kulturabkommen without initiating further complications. Now that the West German
event had ended, the GDR design institution looked forward to sending an exhibition to
the West in accordance with the principle of reciprocity.
After the postponement of the reciprocal industrial design show for a number of
years, it finally materialized in May 1988. The Amt für industrielle Formgestaltung, the
ministries for Foreign Affairs and Intra-German Trade, the combines as well as design
schools worked together on the Design in the GDR exhibition. One of the regional design
institutions in the West, the Design Center in Stuttgart, hosted the exhibition in its
representational nineteenth-century building, far from Bonn. To ensure the political,
ideological, economic, and promotional success of the event, the SED leadership
demanded elaborate advertising strategies.652 But the FRG government quickly thwarted
such efforts to increase the event’s significance. When the time arrived to print the
catalog, the GDR Permanent Representation in Bonn asked for a greeting from the Chief
651
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of the Chancellery of the Federal Republic.

653

Pointing to the precedent set at the 1984

exhibition in East Berlin, where Kelm and other high-ranking GDR politicians
participated, the eastern side called on the principle of reciprocity. To their great
astonishment, the West German government denied the demand, claiming that “these
kinds of forewords were common during the period of rare, individual state-mediated
cultural projects in prior years. In the light of the extensive project list agreed upon after
the signing of the Kulturabkommen, this kind of high-level preface should not generally
be planned on; they should be reserved for especially high-ranking projects.”654
Diplomatic gestures such as an official greeting would only further legitimize the GDR,
which was of no interest to Bonn. With the signing of the cultural agreement in 1986, the
FRG had reached its goal of securing German-German exchanges on a non-governmental
level and this exhibition presented the perfect opportunity to put this achievement into
practice. If the East had not noticed the political effects of the Kulturabkommen at the
time, they surely realized them in 1988.
A loss of diplomatic significance in conjunction with the provincial exhibition
location demoted the GDR design show from a national event of political importance to a
regional event of purely economic interest. Accordingly, only a regional politician
attended the opening event: the Baden-Württemberg Economic Minister Martin Herzog.
Not even the West German Rat für Formgebung paid an official visit. The FRG design
journal Form covered the exhibition only in a small note in its news section. Eight lines
long, it stated matter-of-factly that 170 products from the GDR were on display in
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Stuttgart’s design center between May 26 and July 31, 1988, providing broader historical
as well as recent insights into GDR design development.655
Meanwhile, the eastern side tried to make the best of a bad situation. Form und
Zweck dedicated an entire page to the exhibition. Exaggerating the importance of the
Stuttgart Design Center, the article described the challenges of putting together the
exposition in such a “lavish” environment. “We could not simply present products with
‘Design in der DDR’ because it was important to depict the way of living and culture, to
convey knowledge about the country, its economic potential, and its people,” the author
explained.656 In this regard, the GDR project emulated the 1984 FRG show – the event
aimed at creating a dialogue and deepening mutual understanding, while not shying away
from “critical comparison.”657 But the result was quite different. Over the five weeks of
its run, a mere 18,000 people visited the exhibition. According to the East German article,
West German visitors perceived GDR design as high quality in its usefulness and as
“aesthetically respectable without attempting to circumvent social responsibility with
spectacular pieces.”658 Although not exactly a rave review, the design council staff
seemed satisfied about having proven the GDR’s prowess as an export nation.

Conclusion
Later in 1988, the FRG liaison for the GDR Permanent Representation in Bonn
summarized the lessons learned in the German-German cultural exchange. The memo
stated that there had been manifold possibilities for cultural contacts and exchanges with
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persons and institutions in the GDR, especially since there was no language barrier and a
plentitude of shared traditions. However, “Cooperation in the classical sense was very
rare, because the GDR avoids ‘the all-German’ (‘Gesamtdeutsches’).”659 It was difficult
for the GDR, as a socialist country, to uphold its policy of delineation after the agreedupon cooperation in the Basic Treaty and the Kulturabkommen. While the situation with
the East improved over time from the Western perspective, the GDR preferred cultural
cooperation with countries of the Eastern Bloc precisely for reasons of demarcation.
Nevertheless, the piecemeal effort to improve German-German relations via cultural
cooperation paid off for both sides.
While Bonn aborted the Hallstein Doctrine as the international climate changed
from confrontation to détente, it capitalized on this moment to emancipate itself from
superpower politics by creating a sustainable German-German dialogue. Of course, the
four-power agreements still decided the fate of Germany on a diplomatic level, but the
German-German policy of rapprochement clearly improved and facilitated contacts
between the East and West on an individual and organizational level. By pushing for nongovernmental relations between East and West Germans, especially in the realm of
culture, Bonn achieved its long-term goal of loosening the SED’s grip on every aspect of
East German social and cultural life. The shared cultural heritage and the significance of
the Kulturnation concept for both German states resulted in ongoing exchanges that
brought – in the case of industrial design – each Germany closer to the reality of the
everyday on the other side of the border. And despite its lack of autonomy from the

659

Thunig-Nittner to Gerz, EC-Meeting 10. 11.1988, hier: Bereich Kultur, 9 November 1988, B 288/256,
BAK.

272

Soviet Union, the GDR was able to “function as an actor on the world stage.”

660

The

Bonn-East Berlin negotiations were part and parcel of the GDR’s transition from a pariah
state to a member of the UN. In the process, the GDR broke the West German
Alleinvertretungsanspruch. Its claim to membership among modern nations, expressed
and communicated through GDR material culture, now received politically
legitimization.
Through the medium of industrial design both Germanys turned a competitive
situation, which could have easily been just another Cold War race between East and
West, into a diplomatic tool for rapprochement. The aesthetization of the respective
economic, social, and political orders in German material culture provided them with a
lingua franca that facilitated exchange and human interaction across the Wall. With the
German-German modus vivendi in place, stable peace in Europe became feasible. Only
after the West German ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw Treaties did Britain, the
United States, France and the Soviet Union sign the Four-Power Agreement of 1972; and
only after the signing of the Basic Treaty did the Helsinki talks advance toward
successful completion.661
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EPILOGUE
Divided by the Iron Curtain, Germany presents an ideal setting to study the at
times accidental ways in which socialist and capitalist countries found an understanding
during the Cold War. Although each Germany strove to integrate itself within its
respective ideological bloc, the special situation of the German Question kept East and
West Germans together, much like the wish to maintain peace in Europe tied their
neighboring countries together. This work offers insights into the intricate nature of
German-German relations by exploring German Wohnkultur. Material culture served as a
field for competition until these exchanges developed a shared language of progress and
security, enabling mutual projects that contributed to German growing diplomatic
independence in respect to the superpowers. The two German states, while located
geographically at the periphery of European integration, created a political space
influenced by larger processes that worked to balance the East-West relationship of the
Cold War in Europe: economic cooperation, global détente, and peaceful coexistence.
Bringing these areas of cooperation into focus enables us to appreciate the continuous ties
between the FRG and GDR that opened up a sustainable dialog and maintained a certain
degree of mutual understanding throughout the Cold War. The relatively smooth
transition from the collapse of the GDR to German unification, then, seems less
unexpected, because the GDR was already participating in and contributing to the West
European idea of an aesthetic modernity.
Divided Germany’s postwar history is largely about the way in which two
opposing ideological systems faced the same postwar challenges. The Federal Republic
and the GDR embarked on a mission for cultural rebirth in order to overcome wartime

274

destruction and the distrust of the international community. Integration into the West and
East seemed the most convenient option as goals for reunification were repeatedly
postponed. Whereas their European neighbors feared the strength of a reunited Germany,
the political leaderships on each side of the border wanted to see their respective
experiment of state-building come to fruition. This new beginning manifested itself in the
reconstruction of German Wohnkultur, which developed against the background of three
confluent concerns: the shadow of the Nazi Past, demarcation in the German Question,
and Germany’s global position. As the governments in Bonn and East Berlin strove to
distance themselves from the legacy of the Third Reich, they faced a new imperative
reimagine the cultural and social fabric of the German states. Industrial design became
central to the political and economic rebuilding of Germany. As such, both Germanys
extended debates about the meaning and function of material culture in the early
reconstruction years.
Instead of a new beginning, however, continuity in aesthetic expression
undermined visions for a fundamentally changed Germany. At first, the social ideals and
hopefulness of Weimar modernism informed developments in East and West Germany.
Designers relied on the aesthetics of the interwar years after 1945, leading to dramatically
different results after the early 1950s critique of modernism. In the West, this aesthetic
lived on as a functionalist consensus through the activism of the politically wellconnected Werkbund. Functionalism demonstrated West Germany’s Western integration
as it shared modernist aspirations with other Western countries. At the same time, it
communicated Adenauer’s policy of strength in the German Question. This policy was
fueled by the conservative belief that German unification on democratic terms could only
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materialize through alignment with the West and in opposition to the Soviet-dominated
East. The fact that this policy of strength foreclosed the opportunity to reconcile with the
eastern part, however, did not seem to matter to Bonn in the early 1950s. Rather, the
government focused on reconnecting the Federal Republic to western world standards in
cultural progress and technological development. Consequently, economic and
diplomatic interests superseded concerns about unification of Germany until the mid1960s. In this way, the GDR lost its significance for Bonn in regard to the future of a
democratic Germany. Meanwhile, the GDR looked toward socialism as the answer for a
rebirth of Germany and a radical break with the Third Reich legacy. After initial
experiments with functionalism, the GDR tapped into an aesthetic past that preceded
Nazism and emulated the socialist realist doctrines of cultural Stalinism. The material
environment connected to this aesthetic, which included the often petit-bourgeois
interiors of the early twentieth century, mirrored the personal preferences and experience
of the middle-aged GDR leadership. In aligning itself with the Eastern Bloc, East
Germany’s government claimed the cultural heritage of the turn of the nineteenth century
that combined their traditionalist outlook on German identity with the necessities of
demarcation from the West in the German Question.
By the mid-1960s both German states were forced to acknowledge the truth that
the primacy of their diplomatic considerations had not created a real cultural break with
the past. The relationship between people and their possessions had received updated
appearances but no new content. Objects still signified social status, which the promotion
of Good Design and the fight against kitsch as a marker of moral decay only affirmed. In
failing to create a sense of belonging among the population through ideological
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inscription of material culture, the focus of the German Cold War shifted to the realm of
economics. Political legitimacy increasingly rested on the ability to provide a good
standard of living. Consequently, the two states created materialistic narratives of
national brands to facilitate the population’s identification with the new state. The
Federal Republic benefitted from the economic boom of the 1950s and 1960s, which
convinced many West Germans of the advantages of democracy. In contrast, the GDR
tried to advance its economy with Five-Year Plans, not only to compete with the leading
industrialized nations but most importantly to convince its citizens of the advantages of
socialism. In order for the national brand to develop its integrative power, however, all
participants in the production and consumption processes needed to support this
endeavor, which became difficult over time. Yet an increasing gap between centralized
cultural policy and regional economic interests undermined the brand narrative’s
coherence. By the 1970s it became evident that production optimization and consumer
choice trumped governmental visions for a cohesive aesthetic identity.
Having failed to devise a strong national brand identity, both German states
remained vulnerable to external influences. With the shift from cultural to economic
competition, the GDR invited West German capitalist success into the socialist realm.
Encounters at the fair and intra-German trade opened the doors to growing
interdependence. On the one hand, constant comparison generated exchanges in
governmental, industrial, and design circles, thereby increasing awareness of aesthetic
developments in domestic culture on the other side of the border. On the other hand, the
trade fairs logically led to an increase in collaborative manufacturing between East and
West German industry. Generous credit conditions in intra-German trade fortified ties
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between East and West when the GDR restructured its industry-oriented economy in the
1960s to satisfy consumer demands. These German-German dealings proceeded
alongside the European integration process and the creation of the Common Market.
Through its special relationship with the Federal Republic, the GDR became an unofficial
member of the European Community. This status allowed the GDR to benefit from tariff
exemptions by introducing products through West Germany into the EEC zone.
Meanwhile, the European market incentives affected the appearance of East and West
German furniture dialectically, and the two German states moved closer to a shared
modern European product culture. This aesthetic Europeanization expressed the wish of
both countries to regain a status of significance among the modern industrial nations as
well as to be active contributors to the cultural fabric of Europe as they imagined it.
Notions of a broader European identity, connected to hopes for a peaceful coexistence,
flourished with the solidifying of European cultural and political processes.662 Although
Western integration had been a dominant foreign policy principle in the Federal Republic
since the 1950s, Bonn also emphasized the cultural and political importance of GermanGerman interaction in the European context throughout the 1960s and the 1970s.
Politically, the German Question superseded economic concerns in the Federal Republic.
It safeguarded trade relations with the GDR from interference from France, Italy, and the
Benelux countries to create a sustainable East-West dialog in the realm of export and
material culture. At this point, the Federal Republic could afford to embark on political
flirtations with the East as it was firmly integrated into the West,.
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This trend toward a German Cold War policy, detached from the concerns of the
superpowers and the European neighbors, intensified with the German-German
rapprochement during the détente years. Culminating in an agreement on the status quo
of Germany’s division with the Basic Treaty of 1972, fundamental political
disagreements could be tabled in order to foster contacts across the border. The
Kulturabkommen that grew out of the Basic Treaty negotiations eventually “normalized”
German-German interactions for cultural events, sports meets, and youth exchanges. By
creating direct contact between the populations of East and West Germany without the
involvement of the state, the German Question moved beyond the reach of both the GDR
government and superpower involvement. To a certain extent, Germans could work
together toward unity again. Industrial design, which had for so long served as a field for
Cold War competition, became an arena in which to mediate and channel the German
Cold War as it turned into a lingua franca through which Bonn and East Berlin could
communicate. A vocabulary for transparency, humanity, and morality developed that
shaped German engagement for peace in Europe in the 1980s since both Germanys faced
similar struggles in the effort to overcome the legacy of the Nazi past, the reconstruction
of the country, the struggle for international recognition and membership among the
modern industrialized nations. When the superpowers ended global détente by stationing
new nuclear missiles in Europe, the two German states took the opportunity to define
their own position on these policies by cooperating in mutual exhibition projects against
renewed arms buildup. This endeavor provided both Germanys with a certain degree of
emancipation from the United States and the Soviet Union. However, such German-
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German interactions were less than harmonious, leaving the GDR to feel torn between
economic opportunities in the West and political backing in the East.
One event that displayed this ambivalence in the aftermath of the Basic Treaty
and the Helsinki Accords was the annual Ostseewoche (Baltic Sea Week) in the East
German city of Rostock. Between 1958 and 1975, it was one of the most important
international events that the GDR hosted. The Ostseewoche allowed the East German
leadership to increase its international standing and to contribute to the “tradition of good
relations between the German and Northern European towns and communities.”663 After
initial hesitation, the countries abutting the Baltic Sea increasingly sent diplomatic
representatives to the event. By bringing these countries together in cultural
performances, sport contests, product fairs and economic and environmental talks, the
GDR claimed that the Ostseewoche contributed to peace in Europe.664 Of course, these
annual happenings also served as a diplomatic stepping-stone in East Germany’s pursuit
of regional influence.665 The state carefully presented itself in a progressive and modern
manner. For example, the product fair showcased a furniture system in 1968 that the
government commissioned just for this occasion under the fitting name of “Rostock.”666
It exemplified GDR efforts to find adequate solutions for furnishing prefabricated
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housing. This resulted from a series of experiments for “variable living” by the
centralized urban planning institution Deutsche Bauakademie, in collaboration with
furniture designers to maximize options for storage, seating, decorative space, and even
sleeping in the living room. Reviewing the modular system, the East German design
journal Form und Zweck used the same neo-functionalist terminology of rationality,
functionality, and versatility used in the West.667 Again, the GDR used the language of
industrial design to present its progressiveness and acknowledgement of individuality
despite its collectivist ideology. In this way, the East German leadership endeavored to
appeal to western nations by emphasizing its humane side and downplaying the coercive
nature of its economic and social systems.
In 1976, a year after the signing of the Helsinki accords, the GDR demoted the
Ostseewoche to a cultural fair and refrained from inviting diplomatic representatives of
the Baltic Sea nations henceforth.668 FRG diplomats had expected an abrupt change in
policy, as it was consistent with the GDR’s general policy shift from dialog to delineation
in the aftermath of the Basic Treaty, yet they still speculated about plausible reasons
behind East Berlin’s decision. Among the possible scenarios which the head of West
Germany’s Permanent Representation in East Berlin listed was the low participation of
high-ranking official representatives of Baltic Sea countries at the previous Ostseewoche,
the avoidance of “a certain competition with the Federal Republic in the Baltic,” and the
possibility of growing Soviet mistrust toward too much “East-West hanky-panky” (“ostwestliches Techtelmechtel”) in the central Baltic region.669 However, these interpretations

667

Lothar Walk, “Rostock – ein Baukasten,” in Form und Zweck, 1/1970, 36-43.
Gaus to Foreign Office, betr. Rostocker Ostseewoche, 26 January 1976, B 288/94, BAK.
669
Ibid.
668

281

see the GDR exclusively in a position of weakness and ignore the strategic nature of the
GDR’s decision to eliminate the diplomatic dimension of the event.
On closer examination, the new conception of the Ostseewoche is yet further
proof of the GDR‘s participation in processes of Europeanization. By 1976, the East
German leadership had gained international acknowledgement in the United Nations and
had shown its significance as a sovereign state in the Basic Treaty and the détente process
leading up to Helsinki. Consequently, the Ostseewoche had fulfilled its political function.
Honecker could have chosen to abandon the event all together to please the Soviet Union
and avoid competition with the Federal Republic in the Baltic region. Yet he continued
the event with a focus on cultural exchange and knowledge transfer, thus turning it into a
forum for the GDR to be an active player in the development of a constructive European
identity. By keeping the dialog with the Baltic countries open, the GDR could work its
way around the Iron Curtain while minimizing the potential for political controversy with
either the Soviet Union or the Federal Republic. Nevertheless, this event and the question
that it raises indicate the need for more research on East Germany’s position on European
cooperation. What exactly moved the GDR to scale back official diplomacy with the
West in the aftermath of the Basic Treaty, but made it open up again to German-German
cooperation during a time of worsening Cold War tensions between the superpowers in
the early 1980s? And what kinds of conclusions does the East German case allow us to
draw in regard to other Central European countries, seeing that the GDR had special ties
with the West? Taking the GDR as an example of cultural Europeanization outside of the
official EEC zone opens up interesting avenues of inquiry for the integration and
expansion process of the European Union in the first decade of this century, one that
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included many of the former Soviet satellite states such as Poland, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, and Hungary. Tired of being the buffer for American and Soviet security
interests, these countries began to break away from the Eastern Bloc even before the
GDR. An analysis of the interaction of Eastern European regional politics with panEuropean cultural ideas could offer new insights about the recent integration process and
even suggest broader patterns of European identity formation.
For the GDR, the events of 1989 cut the scope of such an investigation short.
Instead of seeing its contribution to European culture unfold by becoming an EEC
member in its own right, the East German population saw many of its achievements
simply swallowed up when the Federal Republic absorbed it in 1990. Contrary to the
plans for an all-German constitution spelled out in the Basic Law, unified Germany kept
the 1949 law with minor alterations. Seeing an historic opportunity, West German
Chancellor Kohl rushed the unification process without spending time on such
considerations, which was both to West Germany’s advantage and disadvantage. From
the perspective of Bonn, the Basic Law did not need to be changed, taking the fact that
the Federal Republic was the last German state standing as proof of a success story.
While nothing in terms of political culture, administrative structure and international
significance changed for the FRG, East Germany simply disappeared from the map in a
matter of a few months. Bankruptcy and revelations of its corrupt, dysfunctional
economy discredited the GDR and every fiber of its political and public life.
Accordingly, the FRG laid claim to being the sole “modern” German society out of
political necessity to maintain leadership in the unification process. Contemporary
debates about the healthcare system have shown that any of the positive results that East
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Germany brought forward would carry the stigma of socialism and the GDR dictatorship.
Searching for reform ideas for the reorganization of medical treatment in Germany to
reduce costs, the Federal Republic turns to Scandinavian nations for solutions rather than
building on the experience of East German polyclinics. This seems like a lost opportunity
to apply lessons that could have been learned by studying social policy in the East. In
turn, western ignorance has triggered the Ostalgie debate about the merits of social
security, consumption, and material culture in the GDR. Ostalgie is a pun that combines
the German words for nostalgia and East (Ost) to denominate former GDR citizens’
longing for the financial safety and social certainty of the socialist German state. It is the
claim to a positive East German identity. At the same time, the term signifies gradual
amnesia towards the violence with which this state forced its citizens to stay and the Stasi
intruded into their private lives. Additionally the Ostalgie debate unintentionally ridicules
the East German everyday by focusing on kitschy gadgets, such as the Sandman figurine
or colorful egg-holder cups in the shape of roosters, when addressing the socialist
material culture. This seems to be an overcompensation for the West German perspective
that views the GDR as largely gray and dusty, which is ironic, because western
functionalism itself was mocked as “rectangular, gray, and stackable” (“vierreckig, grau
und stapelbar”). By showing how material culture both reflected and channeled the
political realities of the German division, this work illustrates how the German Question
was linked to concepts of European cultural unity. Perhaps it is time to end a debate that
is trying to justify a dictatorial regime, and rather acknowledge that the East Germans
themselves were a constituent part of this European modernity that the West has since
successfully claimed for itself.
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APPENDIX: FIGURES

Figure 1: Bauhaus Newspaper Shelf, Walter Gropius, designed 1923.
Photo copyright Katrin Schreiter.
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Figure 2: Exhibition "We're building a better life," 1952.
Photo copyright unsettled, Schwinning Estate, Werkbund Archiv Berlin.
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Figure 3: Interior design display in East Berlin's first high-rise, May 1952.
Photo copyright Bundesarchiv, Bild 183-14563-0005, Heinz Funck.

287

Figure 4: View into the West German exhibition at the World Exposition in Brussels, 1958.
Photo copyright Werkbund Archiv, all rights reserved.
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Figure 5: Werkbundkiste, 1958. Die Neue Sammlung – Staatliches Museum für angewandte Kunst,
Munich.
Photo copyright Sophie-Renate Gnamm.
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Figure 6: Peter Maly, cover for Schöner Wohnen, 1968. Photograph copyright Richard Stradtmann
für Schöner Wohnen
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Figure 7: Rolf Heide for Brigitte, “Neue Formen, Farben und Materialien in alternativen Räumen:
auch unter Dach kann man gut leben. 1968.
Photo copyright Ortwin Müller

Figure 8: Rolf Heide, room setting for Schöner Wohnen, 1986.
Photo copyright Winfried Nörenberg.
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Figure 9: MDW furniture system, designed by Rudolf Horn for the East German furniture combine
Deutsche Werkstätten Hellerau, 1967.
Photo copyright Burg Gibiechenstein, Halle.
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Figure 10: Spektrum furniture system, produced by Hülsta in West Germany, 1985.
Photo copyright Hülsta.
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Figure 11: "Blitz Tisch," designed by Wolfgang Flatz, 1982.
Photo copyright Katrin Schreiter.
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Figure 12: Bar "Duo," designed by Peter Maly for the West German furniture company Interlübke,
1986.
Photo copyright Rudolf Schmutz, jr.
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Figure 13: "Zyklus" chair, designed by Peter Maly for the West German upholstery company COR,
1984.
Photo copyright Rudolf Schmutz, jr.
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Figure 14: Interior design study for the East German concept furniture "Metropol," designed by
Herbert Pohl, 1986.
Copyright Herbert Pohl.
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Figure 15: Furniture program "Metropol," designed by Herbert Pohl, 1986.
Photo copyright Herbert Pohl.
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Figure 16: Award "Gutes Design" for the "Metropol" furniture program, 1988.
Private Collection of Herbert Pohl.
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Figure 17: Desk, designed by Rotraut Pohl for the East Berlin furniture combine, 1987.
Photo copyright Rotraut Pohl.
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Figure 18: Hülsta interior design exhibition at the Cologne International Furniture Fair, 1982.
Photo copyright Gerhard Wetzig.
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Figure 19: Maps depicting the eastward expansion of ICSID.
Copyright ICSID.
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Figure 20: The historical section of East Germany’s FFQ exhibition in Warsaw, 1967.
Photo copyright unsettled.
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Figure 21: East German toy, exhibited at "GDR Design" in London, 1970.
Photo copyright Günter Höhne.
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Figure 22: Plastic garden chair, exhibited at "GDR Design" in London, 1970.
Photo
copyright
Günter

Höhne.
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Figure 23: East and West German designers at the opening of the West German exhibition "Design–
Vorausdenken für den Mensch," 1984.
On the far left: Rat für Formgebung president Philipp Rosenthal, and next to him is Martin Kelm,
the head of the Amt für industrielle Formgestaltung.
Photo copyright unsettled.
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